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This dissertation uses a multi-level analysis of individuals and institutions to examine the 
cultural, social, and political conditions which contribute to the process of transformation to 
adaptive governance at the local scale. Specifically, the dissertation addresses the following 
questions: (1) what community-level factors affect individuals’ abilities to contribute to 
transformations in governance that enable adaptation to socioeconomic and environmental 
change? (2) why do legislative structures governing marine resources play out differently in 
communities’ abilities to transform governance in the Lakes Region? and (3) what underlying 
cultural factors explain conflict in institutional preferences for adaptive governance? 
This dissertation builds on critiques that the literature on governance has focused too 
narrowly on outcomes with less attention to interactions between individuals and institutions or 
the overall process of transformation. Attention to these dimensions is needed to advance 
understanding of governance as a process, rather than an outcome, which is influenced by diverse 
stakeholders and the interactions between stakeholders, existing governance structures, and the 
biophysical system. The objective of this dissertation is to examine the social, cultural, and 
 
political factors which may facilitate or constrain the transformation of governance at the local 
scale, with attention to legislative structure, shifting power dynamics, conflict, and differential 
access to resources. I integrate theoretical understandings of structure and agency (Giddens 1979, 
Radcliffe-Brown 1952, and Bourdieu 1977) and conceptualizations of friction (Tsing 2004) to 
situate actors and institutions in a globalized context to understand how they are affected by, 
interact with, and transform structures of governance in socio-ecological systems. This study 
addresses gaps in knowledge of how individuals may be constrained by governance structures and 
do not have equal opportunity to contribute to decision-making (Agrawal 2005) or how they 
engage with the structures to redefine power dynamics and transform governance (Cote and 
Nightingale 2012).  
I use a case study of the Lakes Region of southern Chile which experienced an 
environmental crisis in 2016—a harmful algal bloom—which paralyzed the region’s economy and 
illuminated pre-existing tensions between stakeholders. Resource users were out of work for six 
months and aquaculture exports of salmon were prohibited. The region depends on the globalized 
nature of production and export of large-scale aquaculture product, while simultaneously, many 
rural communities still rely on income from artisanal harvests of wild benthic resources. As this 
dissertation will show, the development of new ocean uses has caused conflict between stakeholder 
groups. But new and unpredictable environmental challenges that the Lakes Region faces, such as 
the harmful algal bloom in 2016, will require these diverse stakeholders to cooperate with each 
other to transform governance away from these separate legislative structures to collaborative, 
communicative adaptive governance that responds to social and ecological feedback from the 
system. 
 
Through this case study, this dissertation documents the process of transforming 
governance, with special attention to legislative structure, power dynamics, and conflict. Using a 
multi-level analysis of resource users and institutions, I examined the interactions between 
individuals, institutions, and political structure within the context of a rapidly changing, globalized 
state, to demonstrate how and why individuals and institutions can or cannot transform 
governance. I found that individuals and institutions abilities to transform governance depended 
on individuals’ differential access to resources, conflict which may in part be underpinned by 
differing ontologies and interactions with political structure, and individual and institutional 
collective preferences and social networks. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 iv  
 
 
DEDICATION 
 
I dedicate this dissertation to my Chilean family, the Bustamante-Toros, who opened their home 
to me in 2010 and changed the trajectory of my life. 
 iv  
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
Many people have helped me during my time at the University of Maine. First, I would 
like to thank my advisor, Dr. Christine Beitl, for her guidance through the Ph.D. process. I would 
like to also thank my committee members, Dr. Cindy Isenhour, Dr. Heather Leslie, Dr. Teresa 
Johnson, and Dr. Stefan Gelcich, for their academic support. 
I would like to thank the US National Science Foundation Adaptation to Abrupt Climate 
Change IGERT program grant DGE-1144423 and the Wenner-Gren Foundation for their funding 
support for this research, the Doctoral Dissertation Fieldwork grant (Grant Number 9454). 
I have been fortunate to have a strong personal support network during my time at the 
University for which I am very grateful.  Every individual mentioned here has offered me endless 
encouragement and support. I want to thank my partner, Mike Torre, for making life fun, for his 
humor, and for listening to me while I externally processed my ideas. I want to thank my parents, 
Cathy and John Ebel, who have always believed in me and continue to remind me that I always 
land on my feet. Thank you to my siblings Jonathan, Amelia, and their spouses Beth, and Alex, 
who have supported me and have given me two great sobrinos- my niece and nephew, who bring 
me joy every day. Thank you to Maribel Bustamante-Toro for being my best friend and research 
partner on this project, and to her family, Rosita, Nina, mami Rosa, Martín, and Sergio, who 
opened their home to me in 2010 and have given me endless love, support, and milcaos. Thank 
you to Kirsten Kling and Naomi Rose Caywood, who were wonderful friends through this process. 
Many thanks to Jamie Havercamp for her comradery. Thank you to Lydia Horne for her friendship 
and her offers to edit this work. I want to thank Sloan Russell, who has been there for me in every 
capacity—as friend, mentor, and sister, for so many years. Thank you to Benny and Debbie 
 iv  
 
Robbins for being my second parents and for taking a chance on me by giving me a job on a lobster 
boat, which taught me what hard work really is. Thank you to Kirk Maasch, who was not only my 
academic mentor but also my good friend. I hope to emulate how he treats his students in my work 
moving forward. I would lastly like to thank Macaskill (Mac) Ebel for being a constant source of 
joy throughout the five years of my Ph.D. journey and accompanying me on every adventure, from 
skiing and biking in the University Forest to combing the beaches for agates in Chile. 
  
 iv  
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
DEDICATION ................................................................................................................................ ii 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ......................................................................................................... ..iii 
LIST OF TABLES ......................................................................................................................... ix 
LIST OF FIGURES……………………………………………………………………………….x 
Chapters  
1.     OPPORTUNITIES AND CHALLENGES FOR TRANSFORMATION TO 
ADAPTIVE GOVERNANCE IN MARINE SOCIO-ECOLOGICAL SYSTEMS ........................1 
1.1 Governance as a “wicked” problem in socio-ecological systems…………………......1  
1.2 Situating my research…………………………………….…………………..............11 
1.3 Methods………………………………………………………………………….…...14 
1.4 Dissertation outline…………………………………………………………………..21 
2.  LIVELIHOOD DIVERSIFICATION AS A FORM OF RESILIENCE? AN  
ETHNOGRAPHIC ACCOUNT OF ARTISANAL FSHERS IN CHILE’S LAKES REGION.....29 
2.1. Abstract………………………………………………………………………….......29
 2.2 Introduction…………………………………………………………………………..30 
2.2.1 Chiloé’s and the broader Lake Region’s artisanal fisheries……………...31 
2.2.2 Fishing: A way of life………………………………………………………34 
2.2.3 A way of life threatened…………………………………………………….41 
2.2.4 Livelihood diversification as resilience to abrupt 
environmental change…………………………………………………………....44 
2.2.5 Limitations of livelihood diversification……………………………...…...49 
 iv  
 
2.2.6 Addendum: Moving from coping to adapting in the Lakes Region………..51 
2.2.7 Transformative adaptive strategies in the Lakes Region……………………53 
3. MOVING BEYOND CO-MANAGEMENT: OPPORTUNITIES AND LIMITATIONS 
FOR ENABLING TRANSFORMATIONS TO POLYCENTRIC GOVERNANCE IN  
CHILE’S TERRITORIAL USER RIGHTS IN FISHERIES POLICY…………………………..57 
3.1. Abstract……………………………………………………………………………….57 
3.2. Introduction ...................................................................................................................58 
                   3.2.1. Chile’s co-management systems: Territorial User Rights in Fisheries……….62 
         3.2.2. Opportunities for polycentric governance in Chile…………………………...66 
         3.2.3. Navigating change in the Lakes Region……………………………………...68 
3.3 Methods………………………………………………………………………………..70 
3.4 Results ............................................................................................................................72 
3.4.1 The effect of legislative structure on communities’ abilities to              
transform.governance…………………………………………………………..72 
3.5 Discussion……………………………………………………………………………..74 
3.5.1 A changing oceanscape: Legislative structures which facilitate a new 
configuration of stakeholders in environmental governance……….……….…….75 
3.5.2 Accumulation by dispossession in the Lakes Region: Finfish aquaculture 
and the encroachment on fishing areas………………………………………….…75    
3.5.3 Accumulation by resistance in Carelmapu: Conflict between fishers  
and the development of Marine Coastal Spaces for the Original 
 iv  
 
Peoples (ECMPOs)……..........................................................................................78 
3.5.4 The makings of polycentric governance in Ancud…………………….…….81 
            3.5.5 Conditions which limit or enable polycentric governance…………………..84 
3.5 Conclusion…………………………………………………………………………….86 
4. VALUES UNDERLYING POLICY ACTIONS IN A SMALL-SCALE 
FISHING COMMUNITY IN CHILE……………………………………...…………………….89 
4.1. Abstract……………………………………………………………………………...89 
4.2. Introduction………………………………………………………………………….90 
4.2.1 Preferences for adaptive governance and the relationship to 
universal values……………………………………………………………….....93 
4.3 Ethnographic setting: Environmental change, adaptation, and conflict 
in Carelmapu……………………………………………………………………..95 
4.4 Methods………………………………………………………………………………97 
4.5 Results………………………………………………………………………………101 
4.5.1 The Indigenous Community’s history and preferences for 
Adaptive governance…………………………………………………………....101 
4.5.2 The fishing unions’ history and preferences for adaptive governance…….103 
4.5.3 Survey of individual and group values underlying preferences for 
adaptive governance………………………………………………………….....104 
4.6 Discussion…………………………………………………………………………..109 
4.6.1 Limitations in data……………………………………………………….110 
  4.6.2 Shared values: The salience of “tradition”……………………………….111 
 iv  
 
  4.6.3 Traditional fishing practices and ancestral roots to the sea: The 
Indigenous Community and Indigenous peoples in Carelmapu…….…...………112 
4.6.4 Historical fishing rights and fisheries policy: Fishing unions in 
Carelmapu………………………………………………………………………115 
4.6.5 Power over resources………………………...............................................117 
4.7 Conclusion: Ontologies, frames, friction, and policy actions…………………..…121 
5. STRUCTURE, AGENCY, AND WICKED PROBLEMS: THEORETICAL, 
METHODOLOGICAL, AND POLICY CONTRIBUTIONS TO STUDIES OF SOCIO-
ECOLOGICAL SYSTEMS…………………………………………………………………….124 
5.1. Addressing wicked problems through insights from anthropology ............................124 
5.2. Theoretical contributions to studies of governance in socio-ecological systems…...125 
5.3 Methodological contributions to studies of socio-ecological systems……………….128 
5.4 Policy implications and recommendations…………………………………………..130 
5.5 Calls for future research……………………………………………………………...131 
5.6 Directions for future research………………………………………………………..131 
BIBLIOGRAPHY ................................…………………………………………………………133 
APPENDICES………………………………………………………………………………….144 
           Appendix 1: Informed Consent………………………………………………………….144 
           Appendix 2: Semi-structured Interview (administered 2016 and 2018)………………...146 
           Appendix 3: Structured Survey (administered April-May 2018)……………………….150 
BIOGRAPHY OF THE AUTHOR ..............................................................................................156  
 iv  
 
LIST OF TABLES 
Table 3.1. Summary of themes from semi-structured interviews (n=26). Note: themes 
are not mutually exclusive……………………………………………………..…………………………73  
 iv  
 
LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure 1.1. The coastal Lakes Region which shows the communities of Estaquilla, Calbuco, 
the comuna of Maullín which includes Carelmapu, and Ancud on Chiloé Island…..…..15 
Figure 1.2. Research Phases, starting out with the exploratory examination of 
the Lakes Region, narrowing to a comparative study between Ancud and 
Carelmapu, and then conducting structured surveys in both communities, but with a  
focus on examining the factors which contribute to conflict in 
Carelmapu……….……………………………………………………………………...21 
Figure 2.1 A map of the coastal Lakes Region and the communities of Estaquilla, Carelmapu,
 Ancud, and Calbuco ……………………………………………………………………34 
Figure 2.2. Fishing vessels in the caleta of Estaquilla………………………………………….38 
Figure 2.3. Sheep grazing near a fishers’ home in Estaquilla…………………………………..47 
Figure 3.1. A map of the Lakes Region with field sites Ancud and Carelmapu………………..62 
Figure 4.1. A map of Carelmapu in the coastal Lakes Region………………………………….97 
Figure 4.2. Likert ranked responses of self-identified Indigenous individuals and non-
Indigenous individuals to statements associated with Schwartz et al. (2012) 
 values………….………………………………………………………………......106 
Figure 4.3. Likert ranked responses of the Indigenous Community and the fishing unions to 
statements associated with Schwartz et al. (2012) values.……………...…………107 
 
 iv  
 
Figure 4.4 Multidimensional scaling (MDS) ordination of Euclidian distance 
similarities from Likert ranked responses of all statements associated 
with Schwartz et al. (2012) values..…………………………………………….108 
Figure 4.5 3D Multidimensional scaling (MDS) ordination of Euclidian distance 
 similarities from Likert ranked responses of all statements associated with 
 Schwartz et al. (2012) values……………………….……………………………..109 
1 
 
CHAPTER 1 
OPPORTUNITIES AND CHALLENGES FOR TRANSFORMATIONS TO ADAPTIVE 
GOVERNANCE IN MARINE SOCIO-ECOLOGICAL SYSTEMS 
1.1. Governance as a “wicked” problem in socio-ecological systems  
It is evident that socio-ecological systems are undergoing rapid, sometimes abrupt, 
environmental change with unpredictable consequences. Although environmental change occurs 
globally—accelerated by climate change, fluctuating economic markets, declining resource 
abundance, and uneven development—the effects manifest differently across spatio-temporal 
scales. In many regions around the world, the effects of global environmental change will be 
shouldered at the local level (Coulthard 2008). Therefore, as futures of socio-ecological systems 
become more uncertain, there is a need to create adaptive governance at the local level that can 
manage uncertainty and conflicts through the coordination of actors and the integration of diverse 
knowledges into policy (Berkes et al. 2006; Folke et al. 2005; Lebel et al. 2006; Lockwood et al. 
2010; Olsson et al. 2006). The responsibility to form innovative governance falls on the shared, 
collective effort of stakeholders—the government, private business, civic organizations, 
communities, political parties, universities, and the media—to make decisions, choose goals, and 
act to achieve those goals (Chaffin et al. 2016; Jentoft and Chuenpagdee 2009). Yet, facilitating 
the achievement of collective decision-making and the collective judgement of stakeholders is 
complicated by the constantly evolving nature of socio-ecological systems, the ever-changing 
linkages between globalized and local economies, and the diverse stakeholders who often have 
various, and sometimes divergent, objectives, needs, and desires. 
Figuring out how to develop successful governance is a “wicked problem,” one with no 
technical solution that requires structures that brings together the collective judgment of 
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stakeholders (Jentoft and Chuenpagdee 2009). Studies have contributed to understandings of the 
determinants of adaptive governance at multiple scales (Adger 2000; Tompkins and Adger 2004), 
including the importance of social networks within communities and across nested institutions 
(Tompkins and Adger 2004).  Further, studies have shown what conditions management 
institutions need to promote good governance, such as the capacity to learn from unpredictable 
events (Armitage et al. 2009), the ability to accommodate stakeholder views, and the capacity to 
link to other institutions at different scales (Armitage et al. 2009; Olsson et al. 2004). However, 
studies of governance in socio-ecological systems often treat the system as static and focus on the 
determinants of successful governance without considering the details of the problem or the social 
and cultural factors that facilitate or constrain the transformation of governance (Cote and 
Nightingale 2012; Jentoft and Chuenpagdee 2009; Poe, Norman, and Levin 2014). To address 
these issues, governance can be analyzed at the local scale to illuminate the process of local 
adaptation and transformation, as well as the social and cultural factors that affect governance at 
the local scale (Coulthard 2008). 
As Jentoft and Chuenpagdee (2009) suggest, studies of governance which focus solely on 
outcomes ignore the idea that governance is a process rooted in sociopolitical history and culture 
of a specific place. What might be successful governance in one place during one instance in time 
might become maladaptive when faced with another problem, or when implemented in another 
place. Furthermore, studies of adaptive governance lack understandings of how individuals are 
affected by existing governance structures, which may facilitate or constrain their actions related 
to transformations (Cote and Nightingale 2012). Building on those critiques, this dissertation 
contributes novel insights to understandings of governance transformations by examining 
governance as a process, rather than an outcome, which is influenced by diverse stakeholders and 
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existing governance structures. It is necessary to study governance as a process because it is the 
dynamic, complex interactions between stakeholders, existing governance structures, and the 
biophysical system which contribute to outcomes. 
This dissertation asks: What factors contribute to or inhibit the transformation of current 
governance structures to adaptive governance in socio-ecological systems? Specifically, the 
dissertation addresses the following questions: (1) 1) what community-level factors affect 
individuals’ abilities to contribute to transformations in governance that enable adaptation to 
socioeconomic and environmental change? (2) why do legislative structures governing marine 
resources play out differently in communities’ abilities to transform governance in the Lakes 
Region? and (3) how do underlying human values shape individual and institutional frames related 
to policy interpretations and actions? Although socio-ecological change occurs at the global scale, 
studies that provide a lens into the local scale can illuminate how socio-ecological change and 
“processes of policymaking” are of global consequence but are “local in their manifestations” 
(Randeria and Grunder 2011:202). What this means is that the effects of global change and the 
potential solutions to problems manifest themselves locally, thus studying governance 
transformations at the local scale can contribute to understandings of global issues. 
The objective of this dissertation is to examine the social, cultural and political factors that 
may facilitate or constrain the transformation of governance at the local scale, with attention to 
legislative structure, shifting power dynamics, conflict, and differential access to resources. To 
achieve this objective, I use theoretical understandings of structure and agency and 
conceptualizations of friction (Tsing 2004) to understand how individuals are affected by, interact 
with, and transform structures of governance in socio-ecological systems. Theories of structure 
and human agency can make significant contributions to understandings of the process of 
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governance transformations. Further, illuminating areas of friction (Tsing 2004; 2012) can situate 
individual and institutional behaviors and decision-making in global processes to show that the 
emergence of cultural forms and institutions may be “persistent but unpredictable effects of global 
encounters across difference” (Tsing 2004: 3). Tsing (2004) suggests, similar to Randeria and 
Grunder (2012)’s argument, that global processes manifest at the local scale, and insight into local-
to-global engagement can demonstrate that individuals and institutions do not exist in a vacuum. 
Instead, cultural emergence and individuals’ behaviors are shaped by histories of local-to-global 
networks, power relations, systems of oppression and opportunity, and relationships with the 
environment (Tsing 2004). However, few studies of socio-ecological governance have employed 
these theories to understand how individuals are affected by globalization and constrained or 
supported by governance structures. Examining these interactions can elucidate why individuals 
may not have equal opportunity to contribute to decision-making (Agrawal 2005; Peterson 2014) 
or how they engage with the structures to redefine power dynamics and transform governance 
(Cote and Nightingale 2012). 
Historically, social theory sought to explain uneven distributions of power in rapidly 
changing societies (Cassell 1993). In the nineteenth century, attempts to explain power 
differentials and individuals’ capabilities to act during a shift from an agrarian to industrialized 
society focused on why some societies maintain internal stability while others do not. Émile 
Durkheim (1900) suggested that societies that maintain internal stability have parts that are held 
together by the structure of “social facts.” “Social facts”, considered to be the shared values, 
common symbols, or shared systems of exchange, drew attention to the study of institutions as a 
way to examine individual and group behavior and the shifts of societies over time. However, it 
was not until more than 70 years later that a more concrete, practical understanding of structure, 
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which accounted for human agency and spatial and temporal factors, was offered to social theory 
through Giddens (1979)’s structuralist approach. 
Giddens (1979) created a theory to analyze social practice through suggesting that the 
every-day actions of individuals and their relationships with structures are recursive in nature 
(Cassell 1993: 7). For individuals to enact a social practice, they must draw upon a set of rules, 
conceptualized as the structure (Cassell 1993: 10). Giddens’ structure is internal to agents and 
produces human agency, yet the actors “may be incapable of offering an account for the rules that 
are drawn upon, even though they are known in the sense the he or she knows ‘how to go on’” 
(Cassell 1993: 12). Contrary to Giddens’ theories of internal structure, theories of structure by 
anthropologist Radcliffe-Brown suggest that structure is real and observable—tangible and 
concrete patterns of social relations. This is similar to Pierre Bourdieu’s theory of practice 
(1977)—his “habitus”—which aimed to recognize the mutual reproduction of structure, as 
resources and schemas, and agency, as actors with the capacity to engage in “highly autonomous, 
discerning, and strategic actions” (Bourdieu [1977] in Sewell (1992)). However, these theories 
have fallen short, critiqued because of their inability to accommodate issues of change and agency 
(Embirbayer and Goodwin 1994; Sewell 1992). These critiques have created tensions between 
scholars who supported Giddens’ abstract notion of structure, and scholars who reinforced 
Radcliffe-Brown’s and Bourdieu’s concrete notions of structure (Lizardo 2010). Despite the 
tensions, I suggest it is necessary to integrate these theories to ensure that actors are not seen as 
unconstrained, and also to ensure that structure, in its more tangible forms of policy, law, and 
political economy, is not viewed as impervious to individual agency or collective action. Structure, 
as both a set of internal rules and norms (Giddens) and as a tangible set of rules (Radcliffe-Brown 
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and Bourdieu) may constrain or facilitate certain behaviors. Yet, individuals may still enact their 
agency to transform structure, and therefore address cultural and socioeconomic change over time. 
For this dissertation, I suggest that both conceptualizations of structure are useful and 
essential to understanding patterns of social relations and the transformation of governance in 
socio-ecological systems. In particular, I understand Radcliffe-Brown’s and Bourdieu’s posited 
theory of structure, as tangible and concrete, to include policy and political economy, while I 
understand Giddens’ theory of structure, as internal to the agents, to include the tacit knowledge 
and informal rules individuals draw upon to enact their agency. 
I further find Giddens’ emphasis in the spatial and temporal aspects of social interactions 
and practices—particularly how these aspects affect how actors may respond to external or internal 
stimuli or stresses (Cassell 1993: 17)—to be useful to studies of adaptive governance. Specifically, 
attention to spatial and temporal factors allow for studies of adaptive governance at the local scale 
to account for global phenomena and policymaking at the state level. Giddens stated, “excluding 
time and space distorts our understanding of the way social reality is constituted” (Cassell 1993: 
17) and suggested that it is a focus on space and time while examining the actor-structure 
relationship which can illuminate the “incremental process of change” in institutions and cultures. 
Giddens’, Radcliffe-Brown’s, and Bourdieu’s perspectives of structure and Anna Tsing’s 
conceptualization of friction shaped my interpretation of interactions that occur across multiple 
levels, which informed the development of a multi-level analysis of both individuals and 
institutions to understand how individuals interact with formal institutions, formal policies, and 
informal rules to transform governance. Theories of institutional emergence or governance 
formation in socio-ecological systems must recognize that individuals are not just affected by 
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political structures, but instead are able to enact their agency to engage with the structures to create 
or recreate the structure or its purpose. Theories of structure and friction can be studied empirically 
through a multi-level analysis of individuals and institutions at the local scale to illustrate the 
problems individuals’ face in a rapidly changing, globalized socio-ecological system, 
stakeholders’ preferences for adaptive governance, and the cultural, social and political reasons 
why individuals can or cannot enact their agency to faciliate governance transformations. 
 Using a case study of marine governance in the Lakes Region of southern Chile, this 
dissertation draws upon social theories of structure, agency, and friction to examine the factors 
that affect the transformation in governance at the local scale. Although this research is conducted 
at the local scale, transformations in governance and adaptation to environmental change are 
influenced by regional, national, and international levels of political and social organization. 
Specifically, the region has been affected by globalized processes of large-scale aquaculture 
development by international corporations as well as global climate change, resulting in sea 
surface temperatures rises in the coastal zone. As I show in this study, transformations in 
governance do not just produce outcomes, but also provide the means by which actors create or 
reinforce power dynamics by interacting with political structures. It is how actors interact with 
political structures and informal rules in a globalized context which demand the understanding of 
governance as a process. For example, in Chapter 3, I examine why legislative structure, developed 
at the state level, has differential effects in two communities’ abilities to transform to polycentric 
governance. I found that it was not just legislative structure that facilitated or constrained their 
abilities, but the ways in which individuals enacted their agency. In one community, individuals 
were able to act collectively to initiate the transformation of governance. However, in the other 
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community, individuals were unable to organize to transform governance because they were in 
conflict with another stakeholder group and used their agency to resist transformation. 
 In Chapter 4, I sought to understand conflict in one community by studying the values of 
individuals and institutions which underpinned their frames related to policy action to illustrate 
why individuals enacted or resisted transformation in governance. Examining this conflict at the 
individual and institutional levels demonstrated that two groups in the community had different 
value frames rooted in divergent ontologies as well as varying interpretations of, and interactions 
with, political structure. The knowledge that this conflict may in part be underpinned by conflicting 
ontologies and interpretations and interactions with political structure illuminates the challenges 
in facilitating the transformation of governance at the local scale. It also points to the need for 
anthropology in understanding governance transformations, conflict, and adaptation (Crate et al. 
2008). It is this zone of cultural friction and awkward engagement (Tsing 2004) where 
anthropologists can problematize collaboration and connect the local scale to the global (Crate et 
al. 2008). 
The Lakes Region of Chile is an ideal site to study socio-ecological governance to 
understand how the interactions between individuals and political structures affect the process of 
adaptive governance formation. In 2016, the Lakes Region experienced a high magnitude harmful 
algal bloom caused by increasing sea surface temperatures, high chlorophyll levels, and poor 
practices in large-scale aquaculture (Buschmann et al 2016; Daughters 2018). The harmful algal 
bloom caused the widespread death of marine species, closed wild fisheries to harvesting, and 
prohibited the export of aquaculture product, devastating the region’s economy. The crisis brought 
to the surface underlying tensions between artisanal fishers, government officials, aquaculture 
companies, and Indigenous communities in the region who have divergent visions for the 
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oceanscape, along with varying levels of power to influence marine resource governance. Harmful 
algal blooms are predicted to occur more frequently (Buschmann et al. 2016), posing challenges 
for the stakeholder groups in the region to adapt marine resource governance under the context of 
environmental change. 
National level governance in the Lakes Region began with the creation and implementation 
of Chile’s fisheries co-management policy, Territorial User Rights in Fisheries (TURFs) Policy. 
Chile’s TURFs policy was implemented in 1991 under the Fisheries and Aquaculture Law (FAL) 
in response to overexploitation of inshore marine resources. TURFs have had significant success 
since the policy’s implementation, improving inshore abundance and diversity of species, and 
empowering local communities to become stewards of the resources on which they depend 
(Gelcich et al. 2010; Moreno and Revenga 2014). Although the TURFs policy has facilitated 
fishers’ acquisition of knowledge and the restoration of species abundance and biodiversity 
(Gelcich et al. 2010), this dissertation suggests that the TURFs system was designed to respond to 
a specific problem—the overexploitation of marine resources—and treated populations in coastal 
communities as homogenous. The creation of TURFs in large part followed the design principles 
of classic common pool resource theory put forth by Elinor Ostrom in 1990, where small, 
homogenous groups of individuals can act collectively to form institutions for resource 
management. Assumptions of common pool resource theory suggest that the decentralization of 
power and participation of resource users in institutions create benefits for those who participate 
(Ostrom 1990). However, applications of these assumptions to the TURFs policy ignored the 
diversity of stakeholders at the local scale who complicate natural resource governance. It was not 
until 2013 that the legislation regarding TURFs was amended to incentivize the formation of 
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management committees which is a platform to incorporate more diversity through multi-
stakeholder collaboration. 
My dissertation demonstrates that, until a legislative amendment in 2013, which created 
space for the integration of diverse stakeholders into management committees (see Chapter 3), the 
TURFs policy implemented in 1991 did not consider the level of heterogeneity in stakeholders at 
the local scale or evolve to adapt to new legislation which promotes new ocean uses. New 
legislative structures have shift power away from fishers to aquaculture companies and Indigenous 
communities and have change the stakeholders in environmental governance. The TURFs policy 
likely did not recognize these new ocean users because when the policy was formed, Indigenous 
groups were still heavily persecuted, and were only allowed to legally organize themselves in the 
mid-1990s. In 2008, 17 years after the implementations of the TURFs policy, new legislation; the 
Lafkenche Law, recognize the diversity of coastal communities and granted Indigenous 
communities ancestral rights to the ocean which allows them the opportunities to create Indigenous 
protected areas (see Chapter 3 and 4). In addition to new Indigenous ancestral rights to the ocean 
space, aquaculture, which was largely experimental in 1991, now drives the region’s economy. 
The law to govern aquaculture was not implemented until 2003, 12 years after the implementation 
of the TURFs policy. In the early 1990s when the TURFs policy was formed, marine governance 
at that time likely could not have predicted its proliferation. 
Currently, marine governance is separated into three avenues under the Fisheries and 
Aquaculture Law: The TURFs co-management system; the management of aquaculture; and the 
Lafkenche Law, which allows the development of indigenous protected areas, Marine Coastal 
Spaces for the Original Peoples (ECMPOs). As this dissertation will show, the development of 
new ocean uses has caused conflict between stakeholder groups. But new and unpredictable 
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environmental challenges that the Lakes Region faces, such as the harmful algal bloom in 2016, 
will require these diverse stakeholders to cooperate with each other to transform governance away 
from these separate avenues to collaborative, communicative adaptive governance that responds 
to social and ecological feedback from the system. 
Studies of new policy changes are needed to transform the fishery-focused TURFs co-
management system to a polycentric governance structure that is more oriented to whole socio-
ecological systems and relies on multi-level institutional arrangements “that are nested, quasi-
autonomous decision-making units operating at multiple scales” (Olsson et al. 2007: 2). 
Increasingly, polycentric governance is recognized as a key strategy in overcoming complex socio-
ecological dilemmas (Gelcich 2014; Ostrom 2010) because of its structure of multiple levels of 
decision-making centers within a governing structure which may be independent of one another 
but collaborative where institutions are nested, related, held accountable, and must cooperate 
(Ostrom, Tiebout, and Warren 1961, read in Ostrom 2010). Despite this recognition that 
polycentric governance can help overcome dilemmas, few empirical studies have addressed how 
co-management structures can transform to polycentricism. Thus, my dissertation addresses this 
gap by exploring the individual and institutional factors at the local scale which facilitate or 
constrain this transformation. 
1.2 Situating my research 
To situate my research, I first came to the Lakes Region in 2010 as a Thomas J. Watson 
Fellow. I had been a volunteer for the National Confederation of Artisanal Fishers when I met my 
best friend (now research assistant to this project) and her family. They are a fishing family—the 
father was a member of a fishing union and spent his life diving in open-access areas and TURFs 
with his wife as his tender. The mother of the family is a tender, a recolectora (shore harvester), 
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and a small-scale farmer who raises sheep and cows. When the father passed away in 2012, his 
son assumed his position in the fishing union. The three daughters went to trade school for high 
school to work in the maritime industry. Currently, one is a diver on an aquaculture farm, one was 
a diver but is now in school for gastronomy, and the other is a recolectora, a seaweed harvester 
who is raising her son at home with her mother. The family opened their home to me, and since 
spensding six months in Chile in 2010, I have maintained close relationships with the family for 
nine years.  My relationships with them are what inspire my interest in socio-ecological systems’ 
governance and adaptation as well as my future objectives to study social well-being as part of 
coastal resilience.   
I was 22 when I first went to southern Chile, and my experience with my Chilean family 
on their small farm in the Lakes Region was one of my first observations of how closely people 
interact with, and depend upon, the environment. Furthermore, it was one of my first experiences 
where I observed people living in and on the edge of poverty. At the time, the family struggled 
financially. The father was in a wheelchair because of illness and could no longer dive, and the 
mother had to take care of three high school age students and her husband while making money as 
a recolectora and small-scale farmer. The father’s healthcare costs were too high for the family to 
actively continue his care. My friend, who worked outside of the region at the time, sent money 
home to help her family. These observations sparked my interests in the complexities of poverty 
and fishers’ cultural identities and ways of life. It was these experiences which began my academic 
interests in envisioning marine resource management and governance as a way to ameliorate 
poverty. 
After traveling to several more countries as a Watson Fellow after my experience in Chile, 
I returned to the USA with a strong interest in marine fisheries management. To learn more about 
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fisheries management and coastal communities, I worked for Maine Center for Coastal Fisheries 
(Stonington, ME) and gained experience working with fishers and fishery managers, facilitating 
meetings, and conducting focus groups. Although this work was valuable, I wanted to gain 
experience working as a resource user first hand, so I left the desk and went to work as a stern-
man on a commercial fishing vessel (Stonington, ME) for three seasons where my livelihood 
depended solely on fishing. Through on-the-ground experience with fishers and fishery managers 
in diverse cultural contexts and working as a fisher in Maine, I saw how policy manifests itself in 
fishers’ everyday lives and how policy is both enacted and contested by those whose livelihoods 
it governs. I had always wanted to return to Chile to conduct research because fishers’ participation 
in the TURFs system and my family’s interconnectedness with the environment continued to 
fascinate me. I am grateful I had the opportunity to pursue my dissertation work in the Lakes 
Region where this journey began. 
My experiences with my Chilean family and in the Lakes Region have shown me how 
resource users’ abilities to enact agency or transform governance cannot be reduced to traditional 
measurements of perceptions, values, and attitudes. Human behavior is far too complex for us to 
think that we can gather exact understandings of the variables we seek to measure. Thus, in this 
dissertation, I tried to capture some of these complexities by integrating theories of agency and 
structure with ethnography and measurements of human values to illuminate why some resource 
users can act to transform their well-being, institutions, and governance, while others may be 
limited. It is the complexity of human behavior, political economy, and socio-ecological systems 
that demands an examination of process, not just outcomes. 
1.3 Methods 
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For this dissertation, I first went to the Lakes Region between July and September of 2016, 
several months after the harmful algal bloom closed wild fisheries to harvesting. Fishers were out 
of work, and many of them did not have an income for four months. I came to the region to identify 
research participants, select field sites, and gather a better understanding of the ethnographic 
context so I traveled across the region to several different communities, including Estaquilla, 
Calbuco, Carelmapu, Anahuac, and Ancud [Figure 1]. I lived as a participant observer and 
conducted nine in-depth semi-structured interviews, of which 13 hours are recorded and 
transcribed, where I asked fishers how they were coping with unemployment and adapting to the 
harmful algal bloom. My experiences revealed that fishers and their families were struggling—
many said they relied upon their neighbors or children who worked in other sectors to help pay 
their costs. Others were dependent upon subsistence agriculture. The effects of fishers’ 
unemployment was felt throughout each community. Many store owners had fewer customers and 
seafood processing plants had no product. I learned that few opportunities existed outside of 
fishing in these communities and that many fishers’ children were seeking work in other sectors, 
such as the aquaculture industry. It was evident to me that the communities not only needed other 
work opportunities, but that governance of the marine socio-ecological system had to transform to 
address both socioeconomic and ecological change. 
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Figure 1.1 The coastal Lakes Region which shows the communities of Estaquilla, Calbuco, 
the comuna of Maullín which includes Carelmapu, and Ancud on Chiloé Island. 
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I returned to Maine knowing that I needed to further explore theories related to governance 
transformations in socio-ecological systems. Many scholars have explored the relationship 
between existing political structure, agency, and outcomes in governance (Peterson 2014; Tsing 
2004). Particularly relevant understandings of structure, agency, and environmental governance to 
my research comes from Anna Tsing’s conceptualizations of friction (2011; 2012) and discussions 
of how community is represented in natural resource management when there are diverse actors 
involved in conservation and governance (Brosius, Tsing, and Zerner 1998). These ideas, as well 
as the knowledge that studies must not conceive of actors as rational, but as acting within structure 
with their own agency (Doane 2014; Peterson 2014), informed my resesarch plan to examine 
individuals’ varying levels of ability to enact their agency to collectively transform their own 
livelihoods and the institutions. I integrated these theories into an analytical framework which 
would contribute to understanding governance as a constantly evolving process—one which is 
influenced by the objectives, needs, and desires of diverse actors at the local scale.  
I returned to the Lakes Region in December of 2017 to conduct six months of field research, 
including semi-structured interviews and participant observation. I sought to observe how the 
environmental crisis and fishers’ responses had changed since 2016. I used several of the same 
questions in my semi-structured interviews that I had used in 2016 to see if the components of the 
problem had changed. The nature of the problem had changed, shifting from fishers coping with 
the environmental crisis to self-organization of fishers and conflict between stakeholders at the 
local scale. I decided to select Ancud and Carelmapu as my two field sites to develop the theoretical 
tools to study the opportunities and barriers to the formation of adaptive and polycentric 
governance. The two communities were similar in their dependence on nearshore fishing, the 
diversity of their stakeholders (fishers, Indigenous communities, aquaculture employees), and 
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conversations I had with fishers, which suggested their different responses to the harmful algal 
bloom. However, their responses to the 2016 harmful algal bloom differed—fishers in Ancud 
discussed the need for new governance while fishers in Carelmapu focused on the need to restore 
fishing in TURFs. 
During this phase of the study, I used snowball sampling, building from relationships 
formed in 2016, to interview 26 individuals across six fishing unions and five Indigenous 
communities. Of 26 individuals, I interviewed 15 individuals in Carelmapu across 3 fishing unions 
and five Indigenous communities, and 11 fishers in 3 fishing unions in Ancud. No individual I 
interviewed in Ancud belonged to an Indigenous Community, however 4 individuals self-
identified as Indigenous. Of 26 individuals, 14 were Indigenous: 10 individuals in Carelmapu and 
4 individuals in Ancud. Of those 14 individuals, 9 belonged to an Indigenous Community in 
Carelmapu, 1 self-identified as Indigenous in Carelmapu but did not belong to an Indigenous 
Community, and 4 self-identified as Indigenous but did not belong to an Indigenous Community 
in Ancud. When I designed my methodology, I chose to ensure Indigenous participation to 
recognize the heterogeneity of individuals at the local scale. This heterogeneity becomes important 
in understanding conflict in preferences for adaptive governance within communities (Chapter 4). 
In Chapters 3 of this dissertation, I will be making comparisons of semi-structured 
interview responses between two communities, Carelmapu and Ancud, to examine why legislative 
structure plays out differently at the local scale (Chapter 3). I will also examine the interview 
responses between two groups in Carelmapu: fishing unions and Indigenous Communities, to 
better understand how underlying values may be linked to certain policy actions and conflict at the 
local scale (Chapter 4). Because fishing unions are nested within regional federations and national 
confederations, I asked questions about individual fishers’ participation in these multi-level 
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institutions to gather data on multiple levels of governance. The semi-structured interviews also 
collected ethnographic data on several factors including demographics, attitudes toward 
management, perceptions of collective action, human agency, social capital, infrastructure, and 
preferences for management. The interviews were transcribed, analyzed, and coded for themes 
manually before compiling into a database. 
When I analyzed my ethnographic data, the theme of conflict between fishing unions and 
the Indigenous communities in Carelmapu was salient, arising five or more times in 14 of 15 
interviews. It was also the sole topic discussed in three of 15 interviews. The conflict related to 
fishing unions’ and the Indigenous communities’ preferences for adaptive governance—they had 
different objectives and desires for governance which seemed to foster the conflict. I wanted to 
understand the drivers for the conflict in more depth, so I turned to the literature to see what cultural 
and social factors may contribute to preferences and objectives for adaptation and governance. 
Human values were discussed as significant contributors to individuals’ preferences for adaptation 
and factors which underlie individual and institutional frames related to policy action (Somorin et 
al. 2012). Thus, I created a structured survey to measure human values based on Schwartz et al. 
(2012)’s framework for universal human values. I decided to measure both individuals’ and 
institutions’ values to account for the complexity of stakeholders, because fishing unions and the 
Indigenous Communities were not mutually exclusive as some fishing union members also 
belonged to the Indigenous Communities.. I measured other factors as well that have been 
hypothesized to underlie adaptation and transformations in governance including: (1) 
demographics including sex, age, income, belonging and participation in institutions, (2) 
perceptions of collective action and its efficacy, (4) social capital, and (5) social learning. My 
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objective was to see if there were any cultural or social variables that could explain the two 
communities’ varying abilities to transform governance and the conflict in Carelmapu. 
I designed and conducted structured surveys (n=68) in both Ancud (n=24) and Carelmapu 
(n=44). Each survey was administered orally where I read the survey to each participant to account 
for issues in literacy. Also, each survey lasted around 25 minutes. To recruit participants, I spent 
time at the main fishing docks and approached fishers at the end of their fishing day to ask them if 
they would be willing to take a survey. I conducted the survey at the dock. All surveys were carried 
out with the individual fisher and away from large groups of people. I found this form of sampling 
to be successful. Although I randomly approached individuals, only 3 out of 71 individuals 
declined to take the survey. I think many individuals felt comfortable with taking the survey with 
me because they had seen me around in both Carelmapu and Ancud for four months prior to 
conducting the survey. I found reading the survey to the participant was an effective way to 
conduct the survey. Individuals appeared to take the survey seriously and think about each question 
I asked them, which increased my trust in the validity of my results. I was also able to ask clarifying 
questions and to take field notes during the survey, which aided in the interpretation of my 
quantitative results. 
During analysis and write-up of my results in the following chapters, I verified my 
interpretation of interviews with my Chilean research assistant as well as three research 
participants: a fishing union leader from Carelmapu, a fishing leader from Ancud, and an 
Indigenous Community leader from Carelmapu. I spoke to each of these individuals at least once 
per month since leaving Chile in June 2018 until February 2019. Verifying my interpretation with 
these individuals increased my trust in the validity of my analysis and my results. Furthermore, it 
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built trust between myself and these individuals and provided them the opportunity to participate 
in the research process and inform me of their ideas for future research. 
 In the aggregation of this study’s three phases between 2016-2018 [Figure 2], my research 
draws upon eight months of participant observation, 35 in-depth semi-structured interviews of 
which 32 hours are recorded and transcribed, and 68 structured surveys. In addition, I have over 
700 hours of informal conversations with fishers at docks, union meetings, and in their homes 
where I took extensive field notes. Lastly, I have had and continue to have monthly conversations 
since October 2016 with three research participants. My research employed an ad hoc, adaptive 
research approach which drew on socio-ecological feedbacks in response to the harmful algal 
bloom (henceforth referred to as the environmental crisis) in the Lakes Region in 2016. 
Furthermore, it integrated consistent and frequent communication with research participants over 
three years. The environmental crisis in 2016 provided an ideal opportunity to study the process 
of governance transformation because it acted as a catalyst to conversations about marine and 
coastal governance. 
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Figure 1.2. Research phases, starting out with the exploratory examination of the Lakes
 Region, narrowing to a comparative study between Ancud and Carelmapu, and then
 conducting structured surveys in both communities, but with a focus on examining the
 factors which contribute to conflict in Carelmapu. I learned during the exploratory phase
 that although Ancud and Carelmapu were similar in fishery-dependence and
 demographics, they responded differently to the harmful algal bloom in 2016. 
1.4 Dissertation 0utline 
To remind the reader, this dissertation is concerned with examining governance 
transformation as a process which is influenced by legislative structure, power dynamics, 
conflict, and resource access. I ask: what factors contribute to or inhibit the transformation of 
current governance structures to adaptive governance in socio-ecological systems? Specifically, 
Phase 1 (2016): Exploratory ethnographic study of the Lakes 
Region: Semi-structured interviews (n=9) and participant 
observation
Phase 2 (2018): Comparative ethnographic study 
between the communities of Carelmapu and Ancud:
Semi-structured interviews (n=26), participant 
observation, attendance at meetings (n=7), 
participatory mapping
Phase 3 (2018): Orally-adinistered
Structured surveys 
in Ancud 
and 
Carelmapu 
(n=68),
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the dissertation addresses the following questions: (1) what community-level factors affect 
individuals’ abilities to contribute to transformations in governance that enable adaptation to 
socioeconomic and environmental change? (2) why do legislative structures governing marine 
resources play out differently in communities’ abilities to transform governance in the Lakes 
Region? and (3) how do underlying human values shape individuals’ and institutional frames 
related to policy interpretations and actions? 
Chapter 2- Livelihood Diversification as a Form of Resilience? An Ethnographic Account of 
Artisanal Fishers in Chile’s Lakes Region 
 This chapter presents an ethnographic and empirical analysis of artisanal fishers’ livelihoods, 
their perceptions of social and ecological change, and the importance, but limitations of, 
diversified livelihood strategies within the context of resilience and the transformation of 
governance. For many artisanal fishers, the act of fishing goes beyond the need for income and is 
essential to their ways of life, their ability to manage risk, and their likelihood of reducing poverty. 
To manage risk, reduce their poverty, and maintain their social and cultural ties to fishing, many 
fishers diversify their livelihood strategies. Following the environmental crisis in 2016, artisanal 
fishers in the Lakes Region were left without their livelihood and income from fishing for up to 
six months. Across the region, I found that fishers relied on livelihood diversification to cope 
without their main source of income. Other fishers stated that had to rely on their children or 
neighbors who worked in other sectors.  
 Reacting to stresses or relying on seasonal work, as did the fishers in the Lakes Region, may 
only ameliorate an individual’s situation for a brief time, and can leave the individual vulnerable 
to future stresses or long-term change. Fishers often lack the resources that are needed to foster 
moves toward adaptive governance or sustain long-term resilience, such as formal education, 
financial capital, healthcare, and transportation, which are vital in maintaining the resilience of 
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social, economic, and ecological systems (Fabricius et al. 2007; Goulden et al. 2013). Such 
findings are vital to understandings of environmental governance because the findings suggest that 
fishers lack the support that they need to create resilient and viable futures. Studies of 
environmental governance which disregard the individual-level and structural factors which affect 
individuals’ behaviors and abilities to act ignore essential information that can explain why some 
individuals cannot transform their situations. Furthermore, the studies overlook that individuals 
may need stronger political structures outside of the realm of environmental governance as well, 
such as better access to education or healthcare structures. Lastly, a theoretical focus on livelihood 
diversification as a form of resilience can essentialize communities as resource-dependent. This 
may ignore power relations between groups (Mclean 2015) and overlook individuals’ desires for 
transformative adaptation. This study offers a more holistic explanation of what conditions may 
foster the leadership and well-being resource users need to be active participants and managers in 
environmental governance. 
Chapter 3- Moving beyond co-management: Opportunities and limitations for enabling 
transformations to polycentric governance in Chile’s Territorial User Rights in Fisheries policy 
This paper offers a comparative ethnographic study of two coastal communities, 
Carelmapu and Ancud, to examine why legislative structure has differential effects in two 
communities’ abilities to transform governance. Both communities are home to multiple fishing 
unions which are governed by Chile’s co-management policy, Territorial User Rights in Fisheries 
(TURFs), and home to diverse stakeholders including Indigenous individuals and aquaculture farm 
employees. The individuals in the communities are bound by the same political structures which 
govern marine resource governance. Through analysis of ethnographic interviews, it was evident 
that each community had experienced a different outcome in their abilities to transform to 
polycentric governance at the local scale in the Lakes Region of southern Chile. Polycentric 
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governance requires multi-level institutions at different scales to facilitate face-to-face discussions 
between stakeholders (Ostrom 2010). One way to begin the development of polycentric 
governance is through the emergence of institutions which bring together stakeholders at the local 
scale (Ostrom 2010). My central research question asks, how do existing political structures affect 
the transformation from co-management of fisheries to polycentric governance of marine spaces 
at the local scale? Polycentric governance would move away from the binary structure of joint 
governance between fishing unions and the government to a structure which brings together more 
stakeholders, including Indigenous Communities, aquaculture companies, and processors, in 
multiple nested and cross-scale institutions to communicate and collaborate. Further, polycentric 
governance would require the emergence of new institutions which brings stakeholders together 
to collaborate and overcome dilemmas, Specifically, my objective is to examine why legislative 
structures, which govern marine resources, play out differently in two communities’ abilities to 
transform governance. 
I suggest that the legislative structures which govern new ocean uses have brought new 
stakeholders to the table of environmental governance and have shifted power dynamics, creating 
both opportunities and limitations for the transformation of polycentric governance. In both 
communities, fishers felt threatened by the proliferation of aquaculture. The state has created 
policy to support aquaculture development, but in doing so has created a structure which does not 
include fishers in decision-making and thus facilitated the situation of accumulation by 
dispossession. The proliferation of aquaculture and the red tide in 2016 elucidated different 
responses from the communities. In Ancud, new stakeholders have spurred conversations about 
preferences for management and individuals have initiated a collective action which united five 
fishing unions and government officials from Subpesca to form a management committee. 
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However, in Carelmapu, the Indigenous communities have proposed the development of an 
ECMPO, an Indigenous protected area, to protect themselves from the expanding industry. 
However, non-Indigenous fishers have not organized themselves to initiate the makings of 
polycentric governance because they refuse to work with the Indigenous communities. The fishers 
feel threatened by the creation of an ECMPO by the Indigenous communities and have resisted 
change, resulting in an area of friction. I call this accumulation by resistance—where a salient 
conflict between the two groups prevented the community from moving forward with 
environmental governance, thus allowing the Indigenous community to accumulate ocean space 
for conservation. 
These findings have both theoretical and methodological significance for understanding 
transformations in governance. Through analyzing how individuals are affected by legislative 
structure, I illuminate how it is not just legislative structure which may affect outcomes in 
individuals and institutions’ abilities to transform governance, but instead it is how individuals 
respond to, and interact with, legislative structures—thus how individuals enact their agency—
which affect their abilities.  In Ancud, individuals transformed governance by using their agency 
to draw upon their social networks with government agencies and universities to form a local 
polycentric institution, a management committee. However, in Carelmapu, non-Indigenous fishers 
resisted transformation, and would not cooperate with the Indigenous Communities to create new 
institutions to transform governance. Lastly, I employed ethnography to gather data on social 
change and conflict. Ethnography is a method lacking in studies of socio-ecological governance, 
but this study shows that it is essential in illuminating the complexities for transforming 
governance at the local scale. 
26 
 
Chapter 4- Values underlying preferences for adaptive governance in a small-scale fishing 
community in Chile 
The environmental crisis in 2016 illuminated pre-existing tensions between stakeholder groups 
in the region, causing conflict between groups. Conflict between stakeholder groups can inhibit 
the transformation to polycentric governance because polycentric governance requires 
collaboration and communication across multiple governing authorities. To understand 
transformations toward polycentric governance, scholarship must understand the social and 
cultural factors from which conflict arises. Individuals’ perceptions of desirable ways of life vary, 
and these perceptions influence the decisions they make with regards to their preferences for 
adaptive governance and short-term and long-term adaptation. 
In resource-dependent regions, conflict between individuals or groups may be influenced by 
how individuals’ subjectively and differentially value their experiences, their work, and their 
connections to their communities and environment. This chapter examines individual and 
institutional values which may underpin individual and institutional frames related to policy 
interpretation and action in the coastal community of Carelmapu in southern Chile. We examined 
both individuals and institutions because of the diversity of individuals surveyed. For example, 
some individuals interviewed identified as Indigenous, and belonged to a fishing union but not to 
the formal institution of the Indigenous Community. Also, some individuals interviewed were 
members of both fishing unions and the Indigenous Community. Therefore, to account for the 
multiple affiliations of stakeholders, we investigated the values underlying preferences for 
adaptation projects. 
Drawing upon participant observation, semi-structured interviews, and quantitative surveys, 
we use a multi-level approach and Schwartz et al. (2012)’s universal human values theory to 
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evaluate institutional and individual values underpinning different policy frames related to 
adaptive governance. At both the individual and institutional level, the Lafkenche Indigenous 
Community and Indigenous individuals diverged on their policy actions with non-Indigenous 
fishers and fishing unions in Carelmapu which caused a rift between the two groups.  Our findings 
suggest that the institutions in Carelmapu have different values which elucidate different frames: 
a non-Indigenous resource-focused frame and an Indigenous conservation frame. These differing 
frames are rooted in distinct ontologies, sociopolitical histories, and relationships with the 
environment, which are at the heart of this conflict in adaptation. Within the context of polycentric 
governance, conflict such as this must be overcome before trust can be developed to create new, 
collaborative institutions. 
Chapter 5- Structure, Agency, and Wicked Problems: Theoretical, Methodological, and Policy 
Contributions to Studies of Socio-Ecological Governance 
This dissertation offers a novel theoretical and methodological approach to studies of 
environmental governance in marine socio-ecological systems by integrating anthropological 
theories of structure, agency, and friction with ethnographic methods into studies of wicked 
problems in a multi-level analysis of individuals and institutions at the local scale. In doing so, I 
examine how existing governance structures may facilitate or constrain individuals’ and 
communities’ abilities to transform governance from co-management of fisheries to polycentric 
governance, which integrates the diversity of stakeholders in marine governance into decision-
making. 
The case study of the Lakes Region illuminates how global processes, such as climate 
change and socioeconomic change, and state political structure play out at the local scale to create 
areas of friction, but also areas for transformation. This study demonstrates that ontologies, 
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individuals’ relationships with the environment, sociopolitical history, and legislative structure 
create these spaces of friction or transformation. These insights from anthropology help to situate 
the “wicked” problem of governance, as one with no technical solution that requires governance 
that brings together the collective judgment of stakeholders (Jentoft and Chuenpagdee 2009). This 
study moves away from a focus on the outcomes of governance to problematize governance as a 
process, influenced by the socio-ecological system’s shifting components and the diversity of 
stakeholders. The Lakes Region of Chile is experiencing a “wicked problem” where new 
legislative structures which govern other aspects of marine resources challenge fisheries policy by 
shifting power away from unions to aquaculture companies and Indigenous communities. 
These findings suggest that studies of environmental governance should move away from 
solely examining outcomes of successful governance to seeing governance as a process and 
incorporating understandings of structure and agency to elucidate the social, cultural, and political 
reasons why governance transformations occur. Further, I suggest that ethnography should be an 
essential method in studies of environmental governance because of the method’s ability to 
illuminate processes of social and political change at the community level which can explain 
outcomes in governance transformations. 
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CHAPTER 2 
LIVELIHOOD DIVERSIFICATION AS A FORM OF RESILIENCE? AN 
ETHNOGRAPHIC ACCOUNT OF ARTISANAL FSHERS IN CHILE’S LAKES 
REGION1 
2.1 Abstract 
This chapter presents an ethnographic and empirical analysis of artisanal fishers’ 
livelihoods, their perceptions of social and ecological change, and the importance, but limitations 
of, diversified livelihood strategies within the context of resilience and the transformation of 
governance. For many artisanal fishers, the act of fishing goes beyond the need for income and is 
essential to their ways of life, their ability to manage risk, and their likelihood of reducing poverty. 
To manage risk, reduce their poverty, and maintain their social and cultural ties to fishing, many 
fishers diversify their livelihood strategies. Following the crisis in 2016, artisanal fishers in the 
Lakes Region were left without their livelihood and income from fishing for up to six months. 
Across the region, fishers relied on livelihood diversification to cope without their main source of 
income. Other fishers stated that had to rely on their children or neighbors who worked in other 
sectors. Reacting to stresses or relying on seasonal work, as did the fishers in the Lakes Region, 
may only ameliorate an individual’s situation for a brief time, and can leave the individual 
vulnerable to future stresses or long-term change. Fishers often lack the resources that are needed 
to foster moves toward adaptive governance or sustain long-term resilience, such as formal 
                                                          
1 This chapter was published in Daughters, A., & Pitchon, A. (Eds.). (2018). Chiloé: The Ethnobiology of an Island 
Culture. Springer. The chapter was written in the summer of 2017. The addendum was added to the chapter in April 
2019 drawing upon new insights from fieldwork in 2018. 
 
30 
 
education, financial capital, healthcare, and transportation, which are vital in maintaining the 
resilience of social, economic, and ecological systems. 
2.2 Introduction 
 For many artisanal fishers worldwide, fishing is necessary to their economic income as 
well as vital to social and cultural well-being, contributing to their abilities to manage risk and 
overcome poverty (Marschke and Berkes 2006; Peterson 2014; Urquhart and Acott 2013). 
Artisanal fishers—individuals who use small boats with little technology2 to fish areas near 
shore—face many challenges and threats to their way of life, including declining fish populations, 
poor resource governance, and climatic and ecological change (Beddington et al. 2007). To 
manage this risk while still maintaining their social and cultural ties to fishing, many fishers 
diversify their livelihood strategies (Allison and Ellis 2001; Ellis 2000). Livelihood diversification 
is “the process by which households construct an increasingly diverse portfolio of activities and 
assets in order to survive and to improve their standard of living” (Ellis 2000:14). The 
diversification of livelihood strategies offers fishers ways to spread the risk of fishing and other 
opportunities for sustenance over multiple sources. This can sometimes increase their resilience, 
an individual’s or socio-ecological system’s ability to cope with, and adjust to, disturbances in the 
marine economic, political, or ecological systems (Allison and Ellis 2000; Goulden et al. 2013; 
Gunderson and Holling 2002; Walker et al. 2004). Under uncertain futures facing rapid, and often 
abrupt, climate change and new socioeconomic development, understandings of individuals’ 
livelihood diversification as a form of resilience can illuminate barriers and opportunities for 
individuals to transform governance. 
                                                          
2 Artisanal fishing boats range in size from 15 to 30 feet. 
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 This chapter presents an ethnographic and empirical analysis of the livelihoods of 
artisanal fishers in Chiloé and the broader Lakes Region after the crisis of 2016 (see Chapter 1). 
The crisis dealt a significant blow to artisanal fishers’ economic and social well-being, bringing to 
the surface pre-existing tensions between fishers, aquaculture companies, and the government 
(Barrett and Caniggia 2002; Barton and Fløysand 2010). I emphasize fishers’ perceptions of social 
and ecological change, and the importance, but limitations of, a strategy of diversified livelihoods.  
The research is based on thirteen hours of recorded interview data, three months of field work in 
the Lakes Region as a participant observer in 2016, and five months of experience as a volunteer 
for Chile’s National Confederation of Artisanal Fishers in 2010. Through the fishers’ own words, 
I show the importance of fishing to their identities and their social, cultural, and economic well-
being. I then demonstrate how individuals were only able to cope during the environmental crisis, 
instead of adapting to transform their livelihoods. In doing so, I stress the risks of relying on 
livelihood diversification as a form of social and economic resilience in a dynamic, globalized 
world, particularly in marine socio-ecological systems. 
2.2.1 Chiloé’s and the broader Lake Region’s artisanal fisheries 
Chile is home to over 90,000 artisanal fishers who live in diverse social and ecological 
systems from the Atacama Desert in Chile’s north to the fjords and windswept fields of Patagonia 
in the south. Many are economically dependent upon marine resources and have strong social and 
cultural ties to fishing. Every year since 2008, artisanal fishers have harvested more fisheries 
product than Chile’s industrial fishing fleet, making a substantial contribution to Chile’s economy 
(Moreno and Revenga 2014).  
On the Archipelago of Chiloé and the broader Lakes Region, approximately 24,000 fishers 
are members of community-based fishing unions, formed under Chile’s fisheries and aquaculture 
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law, La Ley de Pesca y Acuicultura (INE 2008). Passed in 1991, the law established geographical 
areas where a union’s members are legally allowed to fish. The majority of fishers within these 
designated areas use diving as a harvesting method to extract the economically and culturally 
important loco (abalone Concholepas conchoelpas), sea urchin, crab, and octopus, among other 
species. Along the shoreline, others gather seaweed. A diver uses a mask and a chinguillo, which 
is a bag that attaches to his or her waist where the diver places the harvest. While under water, the 
diver breathes through a tube called a hooka. The hooka runs up through the water to the boat, 
where it is attached to an air compressor. The fishers dive off small open-boats, usually made of 
wood and powered by a small out-board motor, or human-powered by rowing. One or two 
individuals accompany the diver, and stay in the boat to maintain boat control, regulate the air 
compressor for the diver, and sort the harvested product. These individuals are known as tenders. 
The boat and its occupants bring back their harvests to their fishing unions, and sell their product 
to local, regional, and national markets. 
The Lakes Region is the most fisheries-dependent region in Chile (Moreno and Revenga 
2014), and a majority of the communities in the region are rural and poor (Latta and Aguyayo 
2012). Many of these rural households have adopted diversified livelihood strategies rooted in 
longstanding relationships with the natural environment. Individuals work as artisanal fishers 
during the loco, sea urchin, crab, and clam seasons and simultaneously engage in subsistence 
agriculture to feed their families and their neighbors (Latta and Aguyayo 2012). 
Artisanal fishers launch their fishing vessels from ports in coves, called caletas. The caletas 
discussed in this chapter are located in the mainland communities of Estaquilla, Carelmapu and 
Maullín, Calbuco, and the community of Ancud, on the big island of Chiloé (see Figure 1). These 
communities are situated one to two-and-a-half hours from Puerto Montt, the region’s capital and 
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the province’s only major city. Rolling green hills, ideal for sheep and cow pasture, run down to 
dramatic, steep bluffs lined by sandy beaches. Intense winds and heavy rainfall, especially in the 
winter during the loco season, make launching and navigating fishing vessels a challenging task. 
Increasingly, fishers are caught in interactions between local and global forces, primarily because 
of the expansion of aquaculture farming and global aquaculture exports. 
Many fishers today struggle to make a profit due to increases in vessel costs, low prices for 
product, and vulnerability from stresses in the environment. Increasingly, aquaculture farms are 
encroaching upon fishing areas. As a consequence, fishing families often find that they have to 
transition from artisanal fishing to work as divers or processors for aquaculture companies (Pitchon 
2015). They recognize the irony of being forced out of fishing to work for the companies that they 
perceive are killing their livelihood, and many of them are hesitant to leave their professions 
because fishing allows them to maintain their social connections and feed their families (Pitchon 
2015). 
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Figure 2.1. Map of the coastal Lakes region and the communities of Estaquilla, Carelmapu and 
Maullín, Calbuco, and Ancud. 
 
2.2.2 Fishing: A way of life 
In the Lakes Region, fishers are not only economically dependent upon fishing. They also 
identify with the occupation, and their social and cultural lives are inextricably tied to the craft. 
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When I asked fishers why they chose fishing as an occupation, many said fishing gave them a 
sense of freedom and a connection to their communities. They also fished out of necessity, and for 
some, the craft became their passion.  
In 2016 I visited Don Simon Dias, a fisher in Calbuco, a community close to the city of 
Puerto Montt on the mainland. There are around thirty thousand inhabitants in the town and its 
surrounding areas. Hills gently descend to inlets and coves, and off Calbuco’s shore are several 
islands which add geographical complexity to the area, making it ideal for salmon aquaculture. 
Aquaculture firms have set up many salmon pens in the area, with large enclosed nets for salmon. 
These pens encroach on fishers’ harvesting areas, causing tension and creating a contested space. 
Despite the impinging farms and availability of work outside of commercial fishing, ties to fishing 
remain strong, particularly for older fishers. 
When I asked Don Simon why he fished, he said, 
That’s a good question, very good question. Why do I fish? Fishing, it’s part of our 
psychology, our social lives, our sustenance. We are free, fishers are free. You leave for 
the sea, and if you want to return, you return; if you want to work, you work. You have 
liberty in your decisions…there is a social aspect of working as a shellfish diver. We work 
in distinct places, and in the evening, the whole caleta gets together to share food, converse, 
and joke with each other. The life of a fisher is very beautiful. 
Doña Rosa Toro, a fisher from Estaquilla, a town to the northwest of Calbuco, shared a similar 
sentiment. 
 
Our whole family is dedicated to the sea, in different forms, but it is what we do: to go 
fishing with nets, diving, working along the sea. In a way, everything we do is there. I fish 
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because I like to fish, it is also out of necessity—diving is the source of my livelihood, and 
I fish for my family.  
Estaquilla is a rural community with a population of around five hundred people, located 
two hours from Puerto Montt. The last few kilometers of the road into the town were paved in 
2014, but the pavement still does not reach the caleta. The road winds down hills of lush, green 
trees towards the ocean. As the road approaches the caleta, there is a small cemetery on a hill, and 
a couple of small stores, called negocios. A few churches and small houses dot the hillsides, with 
cattle grazing among them. There is no industry in Estaquilla outside of artisanal fishing, and it is 
common to see pick-up trucks parked outside the town hall or a church, indicating a fishing union 
meeting.  
During the fishing season, small wooden open-boats line the beach. Some individuals move 
from their houses above the caleta to small shacks on the beach in the summer for easy access to 
their boats during the sea urchin, crab, barnacle, and seaweed harvesting season, depending on 
environmental conditions. The shacks have one room, a small woodstove, and a camp stove for 
cooking. One fisher said he loves living along the caleta during the fishing season; it makes him 
feel close to his work and he can rely on the sea for his family’s sustenance. At the end of the 
summer fishing season, they move back to their homes in town and fish for loco from May to 
August, and work in subsistence vegetable farming and raise livestock. Fishing, they maintain, is 
the most important of all to their well-being. He said they depend on their marine harvest, not only 
for their income, but their diets, family ties, and social lives. 
Seasons for loco were instituted as part of the fisheries and aquaculture law, La Ley de 
Pesca y Acuicultura for small-scale fishing. The policy was formed after overexploitation of the 
species during a time of open markets and increased globalization in the 1970s and 1980s (see 
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Chapter 1). After extensive studies on the loco’s natural life history and human-loco interactions 
in central Chile (Castilla et al. 1998; Castilla and Gelcich 2008), the policy gave fishers exclusive, 
non-transferable access rights to specific territories, which were to be managed by local fishing 
unions. The law tied fishers to specific areas for diving, while the studies of marine animals’ 
natural life histories determined the season in which they now fish.  Outside of the loco season, 
fishers harvest other benthic resources such as sea urchin, clams, crab, and barnacles, in open-
access areas outside of their defined territories. Clearly defined fishing seasons helped stabilize 
the market for the selling and export of fishery products, which increased profit for many fishers 
(Rosas et al. 2014). Furthermore, it allowed fishers to maintain diverse seasonal livelihood 
strategies while simultaneously developing their specialized and intimate knowledge of the inshore 
marine environment close to their caletas. 
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Figure 2.2. Fishing vessels in the caleta of Estaquilla. 
Just south of Estaquilla, across the Maullín River, are the communities of Maullín and 
Carelmapu. The town of Maullín and its surrounding areas are home to around fifteen thousand 
people. There is one small supermarket, a small bus station, a hospital, and tight clusters of houses. 
Maullín has a small tourist economy, in part because of its proximity to Puerto Montt by a main 
road, its transportation infrastructure, and its location on the Maullín River, a tourist destination 
for trout fishing. Despite Maullín’s slightly more diverse economy, it remains a port town and 
reliant on fishing. Don Roberto Molina, a fisher from Maullín explained, 
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It [fishing] is a job for the people, it is an economic well-being for people, and it is very 
strong here. It is very profitable for people, but of course the risk is very great. The risk is 
very big, but you get used to it, you learn to know nature. Fishing, therefore, is done as a 
kind of family bond. It is the way of the sea, that you know when it is bad on the sea, you 
recognize when it is not good to go to work, or when you can work by the tide. Then you 
gain confidence, and as you continue, then, it's like any job. Then you realize it's normal 
work, like anything, like when you're working in the office…you become accustomed to 
it. They taught me this [fishing] since I learned to walk, and continued to teach me until I 
was 23 years old. At first, I was afraid of the sea, to go out so many kilometers in the ocean. 
Then, I got used to it, except for the dizziness, I have not yet overcome that. But all of that 
is the work of a fisher, who works all day on the sea and does so out of necessity, for his 
labor, for his chosen lifestyle. 
The community of Carelmapu is a short drive from Maullín. Home to only three thousand 
people, it is accessed by a narrow road that ends at the tip of a peninsula. The roads are unpaved, 
and there are a few small negocios and a small shellfish processing plant. There are few 
opportunities for work in Carelmapu outside of fishing, and many people who do not want to or 
cannot work on the sea move away. Don Cristian Auenante, a fisher from Carelmapu 
acknowledged that he started fishing because he had no other option, but that what began as a 
necessity morphed into a passion. 
 
When I began diving, I had no other option. After I started, I was captivated by the sea. It’s 
like, I have two grand passions in my life outside of being a father: to live and preach a 
Christian life, and to dive for shellfish. 
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However, Don Jamie Gonzales, a fisher from Ancud, a larger community on the rural island of 
Chiloé, stated that he believed most fishers fish out of necessity, 
Most of the fishers, and in my case- we are fishers out of necessity, not out of conviction, 
not because we want to be fishers, but because we were born near the sea, we grew up 
there, and we have no other option than to fish. We do not have the means to continue 
studying, others did not have the means from their parents for a good education, then there 
was nothing else to do than to go to sea. 
 
 Ancud is home to more than thirty thousand people, and its economy was once based in 
artisanal fishing. Now, the economy is more diversified because of aquaculture farms and the large 
number of tourists who visit during the summer months. A ferry and several bus companies service 
the big island of Chiloé, picking up individuals in the bus station in Puerto Montt and dropping 
them off at the bus station in Ancud. Similar to Calbuco, large aquaculture farms take up significant 
sections of the ocean area surrounding Chiloé. Declines in marine harvests and competition for 
ocean space from the farms have forced many fishers in the Ancud area to leave the craft of 
artisanal fishing and pursue work with the aquaculture companies as divers or processors (Pitchon 
2011). Nevertheless, artisanal fishers persist, still contributing significantly to the island’s 
economy and workforce. 
 The craft of artisanal fishing in the Lakes Region holds economic, cultural, and social 
value for fishers, their families, and their communities. However, impending and possibly 
irrevocable changes in the ocean’s ecosystem and climate, as well as the proliferation of 
aquaculture, loom over fishers’ livelihood security. 
 
41 
 
2.2.3 A way of life threatened 
There are many challenges to making a living as a fisher. Globalized markets, declining 
fish populations, poor governance of marine resources, and habitat and climatic changes threaten 
fishers’ ways of life and the source of their livelihoods (Beddington et al. 2007; Béné 2003; Béné 
and Friend 2011). For fishers in Chiloé and the Lakes Region, these threats are becoming 
increasingly severe, altering fishers’ relationships with the marine environment. Despite fishers’ 
love for the craft and fishing’s role in their economic and social well-being, there was a palpable 
sadness in how they spoke about the present and the future of fishing. Fishers said that the biggest 
threat to their livelihoods is the salmon-farm industry, explaining that they must fight for ocean 
space. They also shared their perceptions of ecological change, which fishers believed were 
compounded by poor practices in salmon farming and the complicity of the government. They 
were suspicious of the government’s and biologists’ declaration of red tide, and said they did not 
trust the government or the aquaculture companies. They suggested that the crisis of 2016 (see 
Chapter 1) was just the beginning of things to come, and they were urging their children and 
grandchildren to pursue other types of work. 
Don Simon Dias from Calbuco said, 
 
I think the salmon industry in this moment is the problem. They knew it [red tide] was 
going to happen, but not so quickly. Imagine the mortality of the salmon. They should not 
get to produce so much fish if they do not have an emergency mechanism in place in case 
the salmon die. Then, imagine the reaction of the sea. The state and the salmon industry 
are complicit. They say it is a red tide, but it never was a red tide. They wanted people not 
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to eat contaminated seafood, they shut down our fisheries. But then, some people tried 
eating the seafood, and nothing happened. They were fine. 
 
In this statement, he explained that a red tide would contaminate seafood so it would be 
poisonous to human consumption. However, a few individuals in Calbuco ate shellfish and showed 
no immediate or obvious health consequences. It made the fisher skeptical of the government’s 
and biologists’ declarations of a red tide, and he said he lost trust in the government. I heard of 
similar experiences from fishers in Estaquilla, Carelmapu, and Ancud. This, among other 
anecdotal evidence from fishers, including stories of individuals who saw the aquaculture 
companies dump infected fish near the shore of Chiloé, led fishers to believe that the alleged red 
tide was a farce. Instead, they said it was an infection from the salmon farms that caused the marine 
die-offs. This remains unproven, but fishers’ perceptions that the government is untrustworthy 
may have repercussions for any future relationships between the government and the fishers. 
This ecological devastation, and its subsequent social impact, brought into question future 
opportunities for artisanal fishers in the Lakes Region. Many fishers I spoke with said they came 
from several generations of fishing families, and when I asked them if their children fished, most 
fishers said no. Don Simon said sadly, 
 
We grew up with the sea, but there is no future in fishing. My children still study topics 
related to the ocean in university, but they do not fish. 
 
Don Gonzales from Ancud explained his hopes for his children, 
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My son, he just finished school last year. Then I tell him, study, try to study something, I'm 
economically a little better, I can give him the opportunity to study right now, and I tell 
him that he could continue studying, but I can’t tell him what to do. He does not understand 
yet - 17 years old - I said, I hope he studies something, for example: something about the 
sea, marine biology, try to protect our product, to keep looking after this beautiful island, 
but it will depend what he wants to do. 
 
He added, 
 
We did not want the salmon farms to enter our area. We had a great fight with the salmon 
farms and told them that we do not want them to come and pollute our waters. Now the 
“red tide” has arrived, that was what hurt me the most. I thought that someday, at least, 
what I said would be recognized because I have been a strong advocate of taking care of 
our waters. The people come here, tourists or someone who wants to come to eat the 
product of Ancud and the products of Chiloé, the products are now contaminated. If you 
go to Castro, Chonchi, Queilen, there, forget it, all products are contaminated, because the 
salmon farms throw away excess antibiotics and all that is below the pens are contaminated, 
dead…I believe that in fifteen years, artisanal fishing will not exist to such an extent. We 
are already old, I have about 50 years, and in ten years more I will have 60. In ten years 
more, I will no longer work on the sea. And if there are no more people who really care for 
the sea…” his voice drifted, “today people don’t care- our water touches the big companies, 
and now- I do not know how we are going to live. People are going to be all workers of the 
companies. 
44 
 
 
Don Molina from Maullín reiterated others’ concerns, and suggested that the government was not 
interested in caring for the marine environment, 
 
I would really like people from outside to do research, to visit this country and save these 
unique environments that remain in this world - look at it - they are killing it, aquaculture 
is killing it - look here, this was a sanctuary, a place of nature. It was a whale sanctuary. 
Nowadays, krill is being threatened by all these salmon companies, that food, they are 
taking possession of all this inner water that exists in the Southern Cone, they are killing 
all these mammals that exist in the bottom of the sea. It is something incredible daughter, 
but it is the pure holy truth. Chile is killing its sanctuary. And that is the reality. There is 
no other explanation more about this subject. 
 
The reality of environmental change and the influx and proliferation of aquaculture farms 
is a poignant one for fishers in the Lakes Region. Fishers’ abilities to cope with, or adapt to, 
uncertainty and the ramifications of abrupt changes are of upmost importance in maintaining their 
ways of life. 
2.2.4 Livelihood diversification as resilience to abrupt environmental change 
 
 It is well known that artisanal fishers around the world engage in a range of livelihood 
strategies to cope with uncertainty or abrupt economic, ecological, or political change (Allison and 
Ellis 2001; Goulden et al. 2013). Fishers in the Lakes Region diversify their fishing livelihoods by 
working in other businesses, including subsistence vegetable and livestock agriculture, and the 
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peddling of shellfish, firewood, and excess vegetable produce. Such diversification has allowed 
some individuals to stay in their communities despite the hardships of fishing. Others, including 
many young people, are unable to find or create work, and have either become divers for 
aquaculture companies or have left their rural communities to seek wage labor elsewhere. 
 Don Molina from Maullín diversified his livelihood by working with his father-in-law to 
operate a boat company. The boat brings tourists and individuals who need to commute between 
Maullín and the community of La Pasada across the Maullín River. He said that this type of work 
earns his family extra money, and makes him and his family more resilient to uncertainty in 
fishing: 
The other alternative that I have is that I work for a ship company. I have that privilege, 
you see, I take people from one bank to the other. It helps us to generate new income for 
us in bad weather because the sea is not always good. Others are not so fortunate as we. 
Across the strait from Maullín on the island of Chiloé, Don Gonzales spoke with me about 
the environmental devastation of 2016 and his worries about being the sole income earner for his 
family of four. With a teenage son and a new born baby, he said his need to support his family 
weighed upon him. He expressed gratitude that he had the opportunity to study, but that although 
he studied at a trade school in Santiago, he returned home to go fishing. In our conversation, his 
gratitude for the opportunity to study conveyed a sincere relief that if fishing were no longer an 
option, he would have another way to provide for his family, even if it was not a lot of money. 
I studied - thank God, I studied. I had the option to study but I did not like it - that is, I did 
not have the opportunity to work in it either, because the salaries are so low. I am a 
mechanical technician, I studied in Santiago, and later I could not study engineering 
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because I did not have the money to pay for school. From there [engineering] I would have 
had a higher salary, but the mechanical technician is very poorly paid, so I returned to 
fishing. 
He then looked at his newborn son and said, “He will never know fishing.” 
South of Puerto Montt, the community of Calbuco is dependent upon fishing and 
subsistence agriculture. Don Simon and his wife showed me their extensive vegetable gardens and 
their greenhouse, built to produce more food during the winter months. Although the region near 
the coast does not typically have frosts in the winter, the heavy rains and wind can harm growing 
plants. Initially, the gardens and the greenhouse were a way for them to grow food for their family. 
More and more, they sell produce for supplemental income. However, the household’s ties to 
agriculture were not as strong as their ties to fishing. When I asked them about their greenhouse 
and farming, they said it contributed to security for their family and neighbors, and could help 
make a small amount of income if they needed. Fishing, they said, provided nearly all of their 
income. Moreover, their social life in Calbuco was inextricably linked to fishing. He said he and 
his wife would gather with other fishers and their families to share food and company many nights 
during the week. Outside of fishing, they were involved in the church. 
Don Simon and his wife raised five children in their small home, and their children now 
work as engineers, teachers, or are studying in university. While their children were growing up, 
their family depended on fishing, but he said times have changed. He said it is “no longer profitable 
for his children to dedicate their lives to the profession of the fisher,” and that it is getting harder 
and harder to make ends meet while they are reliant on subsistence agriculture while the fisheries 
are closed. 
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Figure 2.3. Sheep grazing near a fisher’s home in Estaquilla. 
In Estaquilla, Doña Rosa Toro lives in a small, bright red and blue house, two hours from 
Puerto Montt. Green pastures surround her house and sheep graze among the grasses. She and her 
husband, both fishers, raised four children, all of whom now make their living on the ocean. Her 
husband passed away in 2012, and her son took his place in his fishing union and dives for loco 
48 
 
during the open season. He also works as a merchant marine for a large industrial marine logistics 
and shipping company. The three other children, all young women, work as merchant marines and 
as commercial divers for aquaculture companies. They are independent and hardworking, and are 
not new to hardship or to coping with changes in the ecosystem, economy, or politics. When 
fisheries were closed in the late 1980s because of overharvesting, she and her family experienced 
extreme poverty. Rooted in their relationships with the environment, they coped by cutting and 
selling firewood and raising livestock. Two of the daughters hope to attend university in Puerto 
Montt, but the expense of higher education proves to be a significant barrier to furthering their 
education. 
To supplement their income during the red tide crisis, Doña Rosa would drive the two 
hours to the city of Puerto Montt with cut and bagged firewood many times a week. I went on 
several of these deliveries with her and one of her daughters. When we returned home from one 
trip, the mother hopped out of the truck and disappeared over a hillside. Within moments, she was 
driving her four cattle back to the small barn for the night. She planned to sell the cattle and lambs 
at Christmas time. Her knowledge of small-scale farming and livestock-raising was impressive; 
she was the only fisher I spoke with who raised livestock other than chickens, and who had such 
an intimate relationship with farming. She said she enjoyed farming, but that it was hard work. 
Moreover, cutting wood and raising lambs to sell during the Christmas season helped her 
financially, but was not enough to live on: 
 
With the firewood, you cannot maintain your life. But if you go fishing, you can sell the 
fish and buy things you need for your house, or your vehicle. The wood is not enough to 
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pay the expenses. Nothing but fishing brings in enough for that. Selling the lambs also 
brings in too little, but they help. Apart from being fishers, we have to be small farmers. 
 
Although Doña Rosa was a farmer out of necessity, she said her ties to the sea remained 
strongest. Her day-to-day finances depended on their harvests from the sea, and her preferences 
for her and her family’s diets were also rooted in the sea. On most nights, one found mariscos 
(shellfish) or finfish with potatoes or bread on the dinner table in their household.  
During the crisis of 2016, the family could not dive for subsistence. My conversations with 
them at dinner during the winter of 2016 often revolved around the lack of mariscos in their meals, 
and they relied on neighbors who harvested finfish. Compounding the problem of no subsistence 
fishing was the difficultly they encountered in paying for food and other household costs. One of 
the daughters moved home for the winter to help her mother with the farming, while the other 
children contributed financially from their jobs away from Estaquilla. 
Fishers in the Lakes Region used their diversified livelihood strategies to cope with the 
fishery closures during the abrupt environmental crisis of 2016. However, coping—conceptualized 
as reactive adaptations used for short-term survival (Fabricius et al. 2007; Smit and Wandel 
2006)—may not be enough to foster individuals’ resilience to ecological, economic, or political 
stresses in the long term (Fabricius et al. 2007; Marschke and Berkes 2006), leaving fishers in the 
Lakes Region vulnerable. 
2.2.5 Limitations of livelihood diversification 
 
“I am one of those who claimed, many years ago, that the salmon companies sooner or 
later would kill our resources. What's more, this [environmental event] is a warning, a 
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beginning of a mortality that has come in time, because this is not going to stop, daughter, 
it will not go away. It will not stop, unless the government awakens and knows how to 
understand that sooner or later, these companies are going to kill our ecosystem, they are 
going to kill us.”- Don Roberto Molina from Maullín, 2016 
 
Strategies to supplement income are practiced by many fishers around the world. These 
strategies are sometimes considered coping mechanisms, when the individual reacts to some form 
of stress that has impacted the social, economic, or ecological system (Fabricius et al. 2007). In 
Chiloé and the Lakes Region, fishers relied on their seasonal livelihood strategies to cope during 
the abrupt crisis of 2016. Yet, livelihood diversification was not enough for fishers to maintain 
their ways of life. Fishing provides the majority of people’s income in this part of the region. With 
the closure of wild fisheries during the crisis, many fishers struggled to feed their families despite 
engaging closely with small-scale agriculture. Moreover, they felt that they lost their social and 
cultural connections to their neighbors and to their history. Without fishing, individuals organized 
fewer social gatherings outside of church activities. Fishers’ children also had to move away to 
find work, ending a generations-long tradition of fishing for many families in the region. These 
repercussions from the 2016 crisis illuminate the limitations of livelihood diversification as a form 
of resilience for individuals whose well-being is embedded in the natural environment. 
Reacting to stresses or relying on seasonal work, as did the fishers in the Lakes Region, 
may only ameliorate an individual’s situation for a brief time, and can leave the individual 
vulnerable to future stresses or long-term change (Fabricius et al. 2007). Artisanal fishers who live 
in rural and impoverished areas, like the fishers in the Lakes Region, often lack the resources that 
are needed to foster adaptation or sustain long-term resilience. These resources, which include 
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formal education, financial capital, healthcare, and transportation, are vital in maintaining the 
resilience of social, economic, and ecological systems (Fabricius et al. 2007; Goulden et al. 2013). 
It is only with resources such as these that individuals can adapt effectively to maintain their 
livelihoods over the long term (Fabricius et al. 2007). 
Future analyses of individual’s resilience must move beyond questions of livelihood 
diversification to address larger questions of ocean governance, accountability, and adaptive 
management of natural resources. In 2016, fishers called upon the government for accountability 
and for change to policy, and they have yet to receive a clear answer. Don Molina from Maullín 
said sadly, 
This is unfortunate for us as artisanal fishermen, I see Chile as one of the - you could say, 
as a power in the subject of what is fishing, because there is still natural fishing, artisanal 
fishing. We want to try to save it in time, but we need the support of the government, the 
government that will help us save these wild fisheries, so that it can survive for many more 
years if we want, if the government or this country would like to keep this fishery for many 
years. The problem is that there is no interest in doing so. 
 
2.2.6 Addendum: Moving from coping to adapting in the Lakes Region 
 In 2016, fishers in the Lakes Region coped with the environmental crisis by using their 
diversified livelihood strategies, such as subsistence agriculture, cutting and selling of firewood, 
and raising livestock to sell. However, the red tide and the subsequent paralyzed economy tested 
the strength of their livelihood diversification strategies, and many individuals realized that 
without fishing, they could not maintain many of their social connections or cultural ties to their 
environment. This shift in their social well-being affected their ability to maintain their social 
52 
 
resilience, raising questions about what people perceive as desirable ways of life and what forms 
of adaptation need to be developed and negotiated (Coulthard 2012).  Many fishers perceived that 
there was no future in fishing and that their children needed to seek work outside of the local 
fishing industry. However, they wanted to develop opportunities which would allow their children 
to stay in the area, maintain their connections with the sea, and revitalize their communities. This 
realization spurred individuals in the Lakes Region to discuss adaptive strategies that go beyond 
livelihood diversification.  
I suggest that the difference between livelihood diversification and adaptive strategies in 
this context is that in a post-crisis scenario, livelihood diversification connotes the strategies 
associated with coping and waiting to return to their former livelihood sources, while adaptive 
strategies implies overcoming coping with transformative, long-term adaptation of livelihoods and 
governance. As McLean (2015) states, a focus on livelihood diversification ignores the salience of 
power relations between actors and overlooks the need for governance structures which promote 
transformative adaptation. To further her argument, I suggest that discussions of livelihood 
diversification which refer to coping mechanisms as beneficial or as a desired form of resilience 
may essentialize individuals and communities as resource-dependent, and therefore reproduce 
their vulnerability to environmental change. Individuals and communities need the opportunity to 
transform their livelihoods through new adaptive strategies and transformations in governance 
structures. As I suggested in the chapter above, which was written in 2017, some individuals’ 
abilities to transform their livelihoods are not realized because of their lack of access to certain 
resources, such as formal education, transportation, and healthcare. While this may be true and is 
a continued problem, some individuals and groups in the Lakes Region have been able to reimagine 
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their livelihood trajectories and begin the process of implementing new adaptive strategies which 
are rooted in their visions for the future, which I learned by returning to the region in 2018. 
2.2.7 Transformative adaptive strategies in the Lakes Region 
 When I returned to the Lakes Region in January of 2018, my research in two of the 
communities mentioned above, Ancud and Carelmapu, illustrated that both individuals and 
institutions were developing long term strategies to adapt to uncertain future environmental 
change. These strategies included the formation of a new institution which was creating a larger 
management area to include TURFs as well as develop protected areas for conservation and zones 
for small-scale aquaculture. Other strategies discussed between stakeholders was the formation of 
Indigenous protected areas, known as Marine Coastal Spaces for the Original Peoples (ECMPOs), 
the development of infrastructure for tourism, and the potential for divers to use spearfishing for 
finfish. Although these adaptive strategies can be referred to as a form of diversifying their 
livelihoods, as I may later refer to in this dissertation, the strategies are different from the coping 
mechanisms discussed above. The adaptive strategies discussed here are long term strategies that 
have the potential to transform livelihoods and governance of marine resources. 
In the community of Ancud on Chiloé, members of fishing unions were acting collectively 
to form a new institution to bring together multiple stakeholder groups to create an adaptive 
management plan for Ancud Bay. This management plan incorporated new stakeholders into 
governance and planning development, moving away from the binary co-management structure of 
local fishing unions and the government to a new institution which integrates fishing union 
members, seafood processors, government officials, and independent fishers—those who fish in 
open-access areas and are not members of fishing unions. The group sought to create long term 
strategies to diversify their livelihoods through changes in legislative governance and resource 
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management. This included maintaining TURFs and creating both new spaces within the 
management area for conservation and other zones to seed mussels and seaweed for aquaculture 
harvests (see Chapter 3). The formation of this new institution, called a management committee, 
was made possible through an amendment to Chile’s Fisheries and Aquaculture Law in 2013 
which created legislation to created new institutions which bring together multiple stakeholder 
groups for nearshore marine resource management. It is this legislation that developed the platform 
for cooperation and collaboration across fishing unions, independent fishers, processors, and 
government officials. 
Across the channel in the mainland community of Carelmapu, individuals had divergent 
visions for adaptation (see Chapter 4) but were looking to form adaptive strategies through creating 
protected areas for conservation and tourism or through changing harvesting mechanisms to allow 
for the harvest of finfish species using spearfishing. The Indigenous Community in Carelmapu 
envisioned the creation of an ECMPO to protect the coastal zone and its waters from the 
development of aquaculture and mining industries. They were able to pursue this option because 
of legislation, implemented in 2008, which gave Indigenous Communities ancestral rights to 
marine spaces. They saw the development of an Indigenous protected area as an opportunity 
maintain their cultural ties to the sea, and also as a strategy to attract tourism to the area. Further, 
the Indigenous Community had applied to state grants to fund the development of projects to build 
infrastructure, such as a new dock, a boat and tour company to view wildlife, and workshops to 
train community members to be guides. 
Non-Indigenous fishers in Carelmapu did not want the protected area, perceiving that it 
would shift power away from fishing unions and their historical fishing rights in open-access areas. 
When the Indigenous Community invited non-Indigenous fishers to work with them on the 
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creation of the ECMPO, fishers refused because the ECMPO would require fishers to request 
access to marine spaces from the Indigenous Community (see Chapter 4). Because fishers did not 
want to see this shift in power, they resisted collaboration and instead envisioned changes to 
harvesting controls on marine resources. In 2016 when the red tide closed benthic resources to 
harvesting because of the resources’ toxicity, non-Indigenous fishers thought the opportunity to 
harvest finfish with spears while diving would help them become more adaptive to red tides and 
transform their livelihoods in the long term. However, changing this type of harvesting control 
would require changes to Chile’s national Fisheries and Aquaculture Law, which currently limits 
artisanal divers to hand-harvesting of benthic resources. 
Examining the process of a during-crisis to post-crisis scenario in Chile’s Lakes Region 
after the red tide in 2016 illuminates how discussing livelihood diversification as a form of 
resilience may essentialize communities, reinforce power structures, and reproduce social 
vulnerability. If the definition of resilience is the ability for the system to maintain its function, 
structure, and relationships, perhaps we should move beyond using that term for examining 
individuals’ livelihoods and their capacities to adapt, because returning to the same function, 
structure, and relationship to the ecological environment may reproduce resource users’ 
vulnerability. I suggest that forms of livelihood diversification where individuals must wait to 
return to work and which disrupts their social networks and cultural ties to their environment does 
not make a resilient system. Individuals at the local scale are affected by changes in national and 
international economic markets. They also live under and interact with legislative structures which 
may constrain or facilitate certain adaptive strategies and influence their visions for, and ability to 
achieve, their desirable ways of life. 
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The ways in which individuals and institutions are responding to environmental change in 
the Lakes Region suggest that there are opportunities for transformative adaptation through new 
strategies which address issues of power and legislative flexibility while allowing for collaboration 
and cooperation across groups, as seen in Ancud. However, there are also challenges in realizing 
these new adaptive strategies because of legislation which does not allow for adaptive changes or 
because of legislative structure which supports specific groups, and shifts power which causes 
areas of friction and conflict between stakeholder groups, as seen in Carelmapu. As Cutter (2016) 
suggests, attention to geographic dimensions of scale, effects of globalization and climate change, 
and equity, fairness, and access to resources is necessary to make sure that some groups not 
privileged over others and that power differentials are not reinforced through legislation or 
institutions. We must examine for what and for whom resilience is being created and understand 
that coping mechanisms upon which individuals rely during crises do not necessarily make a 
resilient system. We must determine the root causes of vulnerability before understanding and 
enhancing resilience or the transformative adaptation of a system. 
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CHAPTER 3 
MOVING BEYOND CO-MANAGEMENT: OPPORTUNITIES AND LIMITATIONS 
FOR ENABLING TRANSFORMATIONS TO POLYCENTRIC GOVERNANCE IN 
CHILE’S TERRITORIAL USER RIGHTS IN FISHERIES POLICY3 
3.1 Abstract 
This chapter contributes anthropological insights to discussions of adaptive governance in 
marine socio-ecological systems by elucidating the conditions which limit or enable the 
transformation from co-management to polycentric governance at the local scale. I offer a 
comparative study of two coastal communities, Carelmapu and Ancud, which are both bound by 
the same political structures governing marine resources and are home to multiple fishing unions 
governed by Chile’s co-management policy, Territorial User Rights in Fisheries (TURFs). 
However, each community has experienced different outcomes in their abilities to transform to 
polycentric governance at the local scale in the Lakes Region of southern Chile. I suggest that the 
legislative structures which govern new ocean uses have brought new stakeholders to the table of 
environmental governance and have shifted power dynamics, creating both opportunities and 
limitations for the transformation of polycentric governance. In Carelmapu, fishing unions have 
been unable to organize to transform environmental governance because they refuse to work with 
the Indigenous Communities, who are seeking to form a marine protected area, a Marine Coastal 
Space for the Original Peoples (ECMPOs). In Ancud on the island of Chiloé, fishing unions have 
initiated the beginnings of polycentric governance by uniting and collaborating with government 
officials to form a new institution to govern resources. I first examine the conditions under which 
fishing unions in Ancud facilitated the beginnings of polycentric governance through new 
                                                          
3 This chapter was authored by Sarah A. Ebel and written as an independent manuscript for submission to a journal. 
It will be submitted to a journal in May 2019. 
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management plans. I then explore how the legislative structures which govern new ocean uses 
have caused conflict in Carelmapu between fishers and the Indigenous Community, with attention 
to how conflict and exclusion constrain the formation of polycentric governance. 
3.2 Introduction 
For society to adapt to increasing uncertainty in complex marine socio-ecological systems, 
scholarship calls for a paradigm shift from top-down to decentralized governance (Armitage et al. 
2009; Berkes 2007). Decentralized governance allows for the incorporation of multi-level 
institutions with decision-making processes which match the ecological scale and empower 
communities through participatory approaches (Armitage et al. 2009; Berkes 2007; Folke et al. 
2002; Jentoft 2005; Lebel et al. 2006; Ostrom 2010).  Co-management, defined as joint governance 
of a resource between resource users and the state (Jentoft et al. 1998), has been widely proposed 
as a decentralized, multi-level governance structure that can address uncertainty and complexity 
to foster resilient socio-ecological systems and create more efficient and more equitable 
management outcomes (Jentoft et al. 1998; Pinkerton 2011; Pomeroy et al. 2001; Pomeroy, 
Cinner, and Nielsen 2011). It is suggested that co-management systems are designed to address 
changing environments (Pomeroy, Cinner, and Nielsen 2011; Weeks 2013), and in many cases, 
co-management has improved adaptive capacity in socio-ecological systems because resource 
users can identify local threats and respond quickly. However, some studies of co-management 
suggest that institutions may be limited in their ability to adapt to socioeconomic and socio-
ecological change (Brewer 2010; Davis and Ruddle 2012). For example, Davis and Ruddle (2012) 
suggest that co-management systems often shift the burden of responsibility onto resource users’ 
local institutions to overcome dilemmas, such as environmental change. This shift in responsibility 
often neglects a nuanced understanding of the realities of many resource-dependent communities, 
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including the disparity in users’ access to resources and the social inequality and poverty they face 
which affect their ability to adapt (Béné and Friend 2011; Davis and Ruddle 2012). 
To address these limitations, other researchers have suggested a move away from co-
management towards a polycentric approach (Gelcich 2014; Ros-Tonen, Derkyi, and Insaidoo 
2014; Ostrom, 2010). The specific difference between the two governance structures is that co-
management is a binary sharing of power between resource user institutions and the government, 
while polycentric governance incorporates more stakeholders into multi-level institutions with 
many centers of decision-making to facilitate face-to-face discussion between the stakeholders and 
monitoring of the ecological system at different scales (Ostrom 1961; Ostrom 2010). Polycentric 
governance requires both horizontal and vertical linkages at multiple scales which facilitate 
cooperation and collaboration between groups while allowing each group the independence to 
develop their own rules and social norms based on their specific social, cultural, and economic 
needs (Ostrom et al. 1961; Ostrom, 2010). Research has shown that polycentric governance may 
be more adaptable to external change than co-management because it allows for cooperative 
monitoring of socio-ecological systems, social learning, and innovation (Galaz et al. 2012; Ostrom, 
2010; Toonen, 2010). Furthermore, polycentric governance has been found to foster more 
effective, equitable, and sustainable socio-ecological outcomes (Ostrom 2010). In many ways, 
polycentric governance seeks to integrate the heterogeneity of stakeholders at the local scale to 
potentially the global scale to create multiple governing authorities which are not just nested, but 
also horizontally linked. 
To navigate transformations from co-management to polycentric governance, reform must 
build upon the existing strengths of co-management systems, their social structures, and the 
knowledge which actors have gained over time (Gelcich et al. 2010). Furthermore, the 
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transformation requires collaboration across stakeholder groups, necessitating understandings of 
how other political structures which govern ocean uses interact with the co-management system. 
Thus, transformation from co-management to polycentric governance requires the identification 
of dysfunctional states (Gelcich et al. 2010) and an empirical understanding of how political 
structures facilitate or constrain the formation of polycentric governance. 
This paper contributes novel insights to discussions of adaptive governance in marine 
socio-ecological systems by elucidating the conditions which may limit or enable transformations 
from co-management to polycentric governance at the local scale. I examine the local scale 
because it provides a lens into how individuals interact with governance structures on the ground 
and how individuals at the local scale can act collectively to initiate the transformation of 
governance by moving away from local fishing unions to the creation of new institutions which 
incorporate stakeholders from multiple governing authorities, bridging the local to the national 
level. Specifically, I focus on how, under new legislation in Chile, local fishing unions can 
cooperate to establish a new management committee with government officials, seafood 
processors, and independent resource users to regulate numerous species at multiple scales, such 
as within a bay, an administrative region, a larger geographic region, or multiple administrative or 
geographic regions (Gelcich 2014).  I offer a comparative study of two coastal communities, 
Carelmapu and Ancud [Figure 3.1], which are both bound by the same political structures that 
govern marine resource governance and are home to multiple fishing unions governed by Chile’s 
co-management policy, Territorial User Rights in Fisheries (TURFs). Although the two 
communities are governed by the same legislative structure, the communities have interacted with 
the structures differently, resulting in varying outcomes in communities’ opportunities to 
transform from co-management to polycentric governance in the Lakes Region of southern Chile. 
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Both communities have similar ethnic and socioeconomic diversity as well as similar resource 
dependence. However. one community has initiated the process of polycentric governance by 
drawing upon fishing unions’ collective management preferences to act collectively to collaborate 
with government officials to form a new management institution. The other community is riddled 
with conflict and resistance, which has posed a significant barrier to successful collective action. 
This comparative design of these two communities allows us to identify specific conditions that 
facilitate the transformation toward polycentric governance in one case, but not the other. 
62 
 
 
Figure 3.1. A map of the Lakes Region with field sites Ancud and Carelmapu circled in red. 
 
3.2.1 Chile’s co-management system: Territorial Use Rights in Fisheries 
Inshore benthic marine resources have been co-managed under Chile’s Fisheries and 
Aquaculture Law (FAL) since 1991, regulated by a policy called “Management and Exploitation 
Areas for Benthic Resources” (MEABR), better known internationally as Territorial User Rights 
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in Fisheries (TURFs) (Castilla and Gelcich 2008). Co-management allows for joint management 
and governance of a resource between resource users and state agencies (Carlsson and Berkes 
2005) and can also be conceptualized as a problem-solving process to help overcome social 
dilemmas through communication, collective action, and cooperation (Berkes 2003; Carlsson and 
Berkes 2005; Ostrom et al. 1999). This form of decentralized governance has been shown to be 
successful across a variety of contexts when certain conditions occur at multiple levels: social, 
political, geographical, and institutional (Jentoft 2013; Pomeroy et al. 2001; Wilson et al. 2006). 
At the political and institutional levels, the state government must enable legislation that fosters 
shared power and decision-making, creates supportive institutions that empower communities and 
individuals (Addun and Muzones 1997; Pomeroy et al. 2001), and understand resource users’ 
objectives (Pomeroy et al. 2001). At the community scale, success often depends on a defined 
number of members in institutions, a defined physical space that is managed, group homogeneity, 
and individuals’ capacity for collective action (Ostrom 1990; Pomeroy et al. 2001). 
Chile’s TURFs co-management system was developed after 17 years of dictatorship under 
Pinochet in the 1970s and 1980s. Under Pinochet’s regime, fisheries were quickly overexploited 
due to open access conditions combined with high export demands, which contributed to fisheries 
collapses and conditions of poverty throughout the coast (Jarvis and Wilen 2016). Species most 
affected included the loco, a gastropod (Concholepas concholepas), which is both economically 
and culturally valuable in Chile (Castilla and Gelcich 2008). These declines precipitated Chile’s 
first governance transformation from open-access to the co-management system (Gelcich et al. 
2010). Before Chile implemented the TURFs policy, research scientists worked with fishers to 
develop two experimental no-take zones in the 1980s in central and southern Chile (Gelcich et al. 
2010). These experiments showed that humans have a significant effect on determining the 
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ecological structure and composition of the nearshore environment (Castilla 1999). The 
experiments were not only beneficial to understandings of intertidal ecological dynamics but set 
the groundwork for collaboration between fishers, researchers, and government officials for the 
formation of nested co-management institutions (Gelcich et al. 2010). These stakeholders engaged 
in the co-production of knowledge, suggested by many scholars to be a tenant of resilient and 
adaptive socio-ecological systems (Armitage et al. 2009; Folke et al. 2005; Linkov et al. 2006). 
Most resource users are part of the co-management system and are members of local fishing 
unions, regional fishing federations, and national confederation of fishers, which work actively to 
hold discussions with the state. However, not all resource users are part of this system, and those 
independent fishers harvest in open-access areas, which are often overexploited (Gelcich et al. 
2005a). 
The initial objective of the TURFs policy was to restore fisheries by incentivizing resource 
users to form local unions to have access rights to specific exploitation areas (Jarvis and Wilen 
2016). Once a local union formed, the unions’ members were required to design and submit a 
management plan to the state (Castilla and Gelcich 2008). If the state approved the plan, union 
members were leased rights to harvest more than 60 different benthic species from specific areas 
with the prerequisite that stock assessments in the areas would be conducted every year and that 
continued use of the area would be determined by an overall sustainability assessment of each area 
every four years (Gelcich et al. 2010; Jarvis and Wilen 2016). Allocating rights to resource users 
for harvesting species in specific areas had both ecological and social benefits for Chile’s coast 
(Castilla 2010; Moreno and Revenga 2014). As the objectives of co-management systems suggest 
(Berkes 2009; Ostrom 2005; Pomeroy et al. 2011), the TURFs system brought together fishers in 
sharing power and responsibility of resource governance, fostering trust, promoting collaboration 
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and cooperation, and resolving some conflicts (Moreno and Revenga 2014). However, the initial 
implementation of the TURFs policy in 1991 overlooked the diversity of stakeholders at the local 
scale, including Indigenous peoples and aquaculture employees. This is likely because aquaculture 
was in large part still experimental in the early 1990s. Moreover, Indigenous peoples in Chile had 
been heavily persecuted through decades of dictatorship (Holton 2004) and were only allowed by 
law to organize and form their own institutions, referred to as Indigenous Communities, after 1995. 
Therefore, the national government may not have considered these two groups to be active 
stakeholders in marine governance during the inception of the TURFs policy. 
Despite the initial achievement of these goals and ecological restoration of inshore fisheries, 
the co-management system has had differential outcomes across Chile’s ecologically and 
culturally diverse coastline (Fernández et al. 2011). Criticisms of the TURFs policy suggest that 
the policy has imposed constraints on fishers’ decision-making and has failed to integrate fishers’ 
sociocultural norms and patterns of behavior into institutions and policy (Fernández et al. 2011; 
Gelcich et al. 2013). This is a common critique of decentralized governance—even where avenues 
for power sharing and equitable allocation of decision-making responsibility exist (Nursey-Bray 
and Rist 2009), individuals’ actions and their behaviors often remain constrained by the political 
structures under which they live (Béné and Friend 2011; Cleaver 2007).  
Finally, the co-management system was viewed as an end goal in fisheries management 
(Gelcich et al. 2010) without considerations for the development of salmon aquaculture or new 
Indigenous protected areas which have contributed to this rapidly changing oceanscape. Given the 
growing recognition that TURFs co-management was not enough to achieve sustainable marine 
socio-ecological systems (Gelcich 2014), the government amended the FAL in 2013—the first 
time since its inception in 1991. In the legislation, policymakers developed the framework to allow 
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management plans the ability to integrate more stakeholders into governance, including national 
and local fisheries agencies along with the fishing industry, to create locally specific and locally-
agreed upon management plans which may be operational at various geographical scales for a 
multitude of species (Gelcich et 2014; Subpesca 2014). It is this critique of Chile’s co-management 
system which I address in this paper while I examine how legislative structures may facilitate or 
constrain a transformation to polycentric governance. 
3.2.2 Opportunities for polycentric governance in Chile 
New legislation, an amendment to Chile’s Fisheries and Aquaculture Law (FAL) in 2013, 
moves away from solely having individual fishing unions as management institutions, paving the 
platform for the development of polycentric institutions. Instead of the binary co-management 
governance between the state and fishing unions, the new legislation promotes cooperation across 
fishing unions to establish management committees with government officials and other 
stakeholders to regulate a multitude of species at multiple scales such as within a bay, an 
administrative region, part of a larger region, or multiple regions (Gelcich 2014). To achieve this, 
any individuals or groups who have an interest or stake in the marine environment must contact 
the Undersecretariat of Fisheries (Subpesca). Subpesca must then arrange a meeting where all 
registered fishers and other interested parties attend. Within this group, participation criteria, such 
as target species, fisher categories, gear type, and landings history, are defined. With consensus 
reached among interested stakeholders, the management committee designs a management 
proposal which would later be open for comments by the public. The process aims to exclude no 
one, so the management committee must include two to seven artisanal fisher representatives, one 
processing plant representative, a representative of the national directorate of maritime territories, 
and a representative from the national fisheries service (Gelcich 2014: 577). The public comments 
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are considered, revisions are made, and the fishers who are under this management plan must 
comply with the new regulations (Gelcich 2014). Every three years, participating fishers are 
reviewed, and every five years, the management plan must be assessed (Gelcich 2014). These key 
aspects of the legal structure may allow for a shift towards polycentric governance. 
The legislation attempts to foster the inclusion of all stakeholders, the integration of knowledge 
systems, and increased monitoring of socio-ecological systems’ feedback to offer a more 
appropriate platform to enable the formation and adaptation of institutions (Gelcich 2014). Such 
arrangements could increase opportunities for knowledge co-production in institutions and the 
creation of the social networks necessary to enabling polycentric governance (Andersson and 
Ostrom 2008; Gelcich 2014). To achieve polycentric governance in the Chilean marine socio-
ecological system, Gelcich (2014) states that the main challenge will be to ensure that all local 
actors are represented, that they have the independence and capabilities to develop and enforce 
rules, and that the national agencies aid with enforcement and funding for implementation. I 
suggest that the legislative framework still may not recognize the diversity of stakeholders in local 
communities which may affect the communities’ abilities to transform from co-management 
toward polycentric governance. 
Outcomes in transformations to polycentric governance are often contextually dependent, and 
the structure of policy as well as the history of a specific area and its institutions may facilitate or 
hinder the formation of polycentrism (Gelcich 2014). The transition to polycentric governance 
requires reform which builds upon existing institutions (Gelcich et al. 2010) and thus requires an 
understanding of how existing legislative structure creates limitations or opportunities which may 
facilitate this transition. Further, power dynamics between actors must be understood to avoid 
competitive interactions and foster collaborative ones. 
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3.2.3 Navigating change in the Lakes Region 
The Lakes Region has undergone significant socioeconomic change since the inception of 
the TURFs co-management system in 1991, which has re-embedded the local scale of resource 
management in the globalized production and markets of large-scale aquaculture. Finfish 
aquaculture has expanded dramatically in the region since the 1980s as the industry moved from 
experimental production in the late 1980s to 1990s to a major global industry that is now second 
to Norway in its farmed salmon production (Barton and Fløysand 2010; FAO 2018). In 1995, Chile 
produced 157 thousand tons of aquaculture product (FAO 2018). Just 21 years later in 2016, Chile 
was producing 1,035 thousand tons in aquaculture product, almost seven times the amount 
produced in 1995 (FAO 2018). In 2005, the export value of finfish aquaculture in Chile amounted 
to US$2,207 million (Olson et al. 2008), compared to TURFs benthic resources’ economic value 
of US$250 million between 2005-2008 (Gelcich et al. 2010). Plans for aquaculture production in 
Chile are not slowing, as aquaculture production projections show a 26.4% increase from 2016 to 
2030 (FAO 2018). These shifts in aquaculture production are primarily seen in southern Chile in 
the Lakes, Aysén, and Magallanes Regions and are made possible by regulatory processes couched 
under the Aquaculture sector of the FAL. Aquaculture is regulated separately from the TURFs co-
management policy in a legislative structure under the FAL which was incorporated in 2003 
(Subpesca 2019). Under this legislative structure, only the applicant for the aquaculture farm and 
Subpesca are involved in decision-making (Subpesca 2019). As I will later describe, the 
proliferation of aquaculture has encroached upon fishers’ TURFs and the new legislative structure 
has shifted control of environmental governance and now exclude fishing unions from the 
decision-making process. 
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As aquaculture proliferates, Indigenous communities are responding by creating 
Indigenous protected areas, called Marine Coastal Spaces for the Original Peoples (ECMPOs). 
The state granted ancestral rights to marine spaces to Indigenous peoples in Chile in 2008 through 
the Lafkenche Law which provides the opportunity for Indigenous Communities to create 
ECMPOs to protect coastal and near shore zones to maintain their culture traditions and ties to the 
sea. Indigenous communities can include other stakeholders, such as fishers, in the development 
and planning of ECMPOS, but it is at their discretion. This legislative structure has resulted in a 
redistribution of power in marine and coastal governance but potentially creates the space for the 
creation of a local multi-stakeholder institution if cooperation and collaboration results between 
Indigenous Communities and fishers. 
The redistribution of power across these three legislative structures: TURFs policy, 
Aquaculture Law, and Lafkenche Law, which govern marine resources, has played out differently 
in the communities of Ancud and Carelmapu regarding their ability to transform to polycentric 
governance. Fishing unions in Ancud have acted collectively to form a management committee 
which brought together fishing union members, independent fishers, government officials, and 
seafood processors, to create a management plan for Ancud Bay. However, across the Chacao 
Channel, fishing unions in Carelmapu feel that the legislative structures have created an uneven 
playing field where fishing unions feel threatened by the creation of an ECMPO by the Indigenous 
Communities in Carelmapu. Given that trust, collaboration, and feelings of equity in decision-
making are cornerstones of polycentric governance, a meaningful shift toward polycentric 
governance in Carelmapu seems unlikely. 
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3.3 Methods 
Description of the study area: 
Rolling green hills used for agriculture, a coastline with rocky bluffs peppered with sandy 
and pebble beaches, and rural communities with small harbors, called caletas, characterize the 
coastal region. The inhabitants of the Lakes Region are economically, culturally, and socially 
dependent on the sea (Ebel 2018; Daughters 2018; Pitchon 2015), subsisting for generations on 
the harvests of shellfish and seaweed and engaging in economies of barter and reciprocity 
(Daughters 2018). Furthermore, the stakeholders of the Lakes Region are diverse, and include non-
Indigenous fishers, Indigenous fishers, Indigenous peoples, and aquaculture farm employees.  28% 
of the population in the Lakes Region identify as Original Peoples, or Indigenous. In the two 
communities examined here, 29% of Ancud’s population and 22% of Carelmapu’s population 
identify as Indigenous. Increasingly, these stakeholders in the coastal zone must navigate change 
as new ocean uses have brought new stakeholders to the table of environmental governance. 
People in the Lakes Region of southern Chile are increasingly dependent on large-scale 
salmon aquaculture, which has become the region’s largest employer. The aquaculture industry 
employs over 50,000 individuals in the Lakes Region (United Nations 2006), while nearly 24,000 
artisanal fishers are registered under TURF unions in the Lakes Region (INE 2008). Many 
communities in the Lakes Region are rural and poor (Latta and Aguyayo 2012) with 33.9% of the 
population in the Lakes Region living below the poverty line compared to 24.6% of the population 
nationwide (see OECD.stat). Cultural identities are shifting in the region as some artisanal fishers 
and many fishers’ children pursue work as wage laborers on aquaculture farms for more stable 
work and better pay (Daughters 2016; Pitchon 2011; 2015).  
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To examine how and why legislative structures governing marine resources play out 
differently at the local scale, ethnographic research was conducted in two communities in the 
Lakes Region. Ancud is an urban center on the north end of Chiloé Island, home to a population 
of around 40,000 people. It is located around two hours from Puerto Montt and is only accessible 
by ferry between the town of Pargua on the mainland and Chacao on Chiloé. There are seven active 
unions in and around Ancud’s main dock, El Muelle de Ancud and there are between 25-50 men 
in each union, totaling between 175-250 union members. Carelmapu is located on the mainland to 
the north of Ancud across the bay at the western end of the Chacao Canal. It is a small community 
of around 2,800 people. Both communities are dependent upon fishing, although they are both 
invested in diversifying their livelihoods through increasing infrastructure for tourism. 
Demographics in both communities are changing as young people leave to seek work in other 
sectors, mainly the aquaculture industry. 
Data collection methods and analysis: 
I gathered ethnographic data in Ancud and Carelmapu, including six months of participant 
observation from January through June 2018 and 26 semi-structured interviews (n=15 in 
Carelmapu and n=11 in Ancud), of which 22 hours are recorded and transcribed. Interview 
participants were recruited using snowball sampling where I built off my pre-existing relationships 
formed during fieldwork in 2016 to ask individuals for their participation. I also attended five 
fishing union meetings and two Indigenous community meetings between February and May 2018 
and spent time with fishers and members of the Indigenous communities in their homes and at the 
fishing docks, during which I documented individuals’ perceptions of socioeconomic change, their 
perceptions of marine resource governance, and their visions for the future of their communities. 
I also took comprehensive field notes from over 400 hours of observations and informal 
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conversations with fishers, documenting topics discussed at meetings and fishers’ interactions with 
Subpesca during meetings which Subpesca officials were present. Semi-structured interviews and 
field notes were manually coded for themes [Table 1]. Themes were verified by two union leaders 
from each of the two communities and one Indigenous community leader from Carelmapu. 
3.4 RESULTS  
3.4.1 The effect of legislative structure on communities’ abilities to transform governance 
Three salient themes emerged from my semi-structured interviews and informal 
conversations with fishers and members of the Indigenous Communities during January through 
June 2018 related to why legislative structure may have different outcomes in fishing unions’ 
abilities to transform environmental governance (Table 1). The themes are: the encroachment of 
other ocean uses on fishing unions’ TURF management areas, conflict between stakeholders, and 
preferences for management. In Ancud, I found that the most prevalent theme was fishers’ 
preferences in management, arising five or more times in 10 out of 11 interviews. I found a 
different salient theme in Carelmapu where conflict between stakeholders was the most prevalent, 
arising in all 15 interviews with fishers and members of the Indigenous communities. 
Encroachment of new ocean uses on fishing unions TURFs was pervasive through interviews with 
fishers and Indigenous Communities in both Ancud and Carelmapu which initiated the 
ethnographic study of stakeholders’ interactions with legislative structures. The themes suggest 
that new stakeholders entered the picture of environmental governance after the inception of the 
Fisheries and Aquaculture Law (FAL) in 1991 and have created ocean uses through new legislative 
structures which have shifted power dynamics in environmental governance. 
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Theme Theme Description Ancud (n=11 
interviews) 
Carelmapu 
(n=15 
interviews) 
Examples of Quotes Coded 
with Theme 
New ocean uses 
encroachment 
on TURFs 
Fishers stated aquaculture 
farms and ECMPOs 
encroached upon their 
TURF management areas 
and constrained their ability 
to dive in open-access areas 
and form new TURFs. 
 
 
 
9 
 
 
 
15 
Fisher from Ancud: “The fact 
is that when an [aquaculture or 
ECMPO] concession of that 
type is given, nobody can do 
anything more. If I wanted to 
ask for a management area, 
they [government] would 
forbid me because there is 
already something else there. 
Where there are already 
aquaculture concessions or 
Indigenous territories, we 
cannot do anything.” 
 
Conflict Conflict includes mentions 
of conflict with other 
stakeholder groups 
 
2 
 
15 
Fisher from Carelmapu: “The 
Lafkenche Law would have 
been good if it said that the 
artisanal fishers from unions 
who carried out harvesting in 
these zones within the proposed 
protected area did not lose their 
rights to harvest. But the fact is 
this law makes us lose our 
rights, there will be no more 
free entry. I have had the 
opportunity to be in several 
conversations with respect to 
the Lafkenche Law and losing 
our rights is the main conflict 
we have with the indigenous 
communities.” 
 
Preferences for 
management 
I asked fishers if they had 
preferences for future 
marine resource 
management. I found that 
fishers in Ancud had similar 
preferences to create more 
inclusive, larger 
management areas. In 
Carelmapu, fishers varied in 
their preferences—some 
thought the TURFs system 
should stay the same, while 
others thought that a shift to 
a new system was needed. 
 
11 
 
12 
Fisher from Ancud: “We need 
larger, more inclusive areas. 
We are contained to the 
management areas and there 
are others who cannot enter 
these areas because they are not 
union members. We need to all 
be involved together in another 
area. We must try to do things 
together because there is no 
work anywhere else. We need 
to think of something else to 
take care of ourselves and the 
ecosystem.” 
 
Table 3.1. Summary of themes from semi-structured interviews (n=26). Note: themes are not mutually exclusive. 
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3.5 DISCUSSION 
In this discussion, I focus on the three themes related to why legislative structure may have 
affected Ancud’s and Carelmapu’s abilities to initiate polycentric governance: (1) encroachment 
of new ocean uses on TURFs, (2) collective preferences for management in Ancud and, (3) conflict 
between stakeholders in Carelmapu. The first theme was discussed by all research participants, 
with a frequency of being discussed five or more separate instances in each interview. This theme 
underpinned the subsequent two themes because it was fishers’ feelings that new ocean uses were 
impinging upon their management areas and open-access fishing areas which brought forth 
discussions about preferences for future management and conflict between groups. In Ancud, the 
second theme of collective preferences for management dominated discussions in 10 of 11 
interviews. In some instances, this theme was discussed throughout the interview or arose five or 
more times. In this study, when individuals were asked their preferences for future management, 
they had similar responses. The sharing of those individual, similar responses makes up their 
collective preference. In Ancud, fishers stated that they wanted larger, more inclusive management 
areas and to diversify their livelihoods through small-scale aquaculture and tourism, discussed 
further in sections below. The third theme of conflict was salient in all 15 interviews in Carelmapu, 
arising five or more times in all fifteen interviews, specifically discussing the conflict between 
non-Indigenous fishers and the Indigenous Communities. 
First, I briefly discuss the legislative structures which facilitated the new configuration of 
stakeholders in environmental governance and the subsequent shift in power dynamics, which has 
resulted in conflict in the community of Carelmapu between fishers and the Indigenous community 
and inhibited the transformation of governance at the local scale. I then examine how fishing 
unions in Ancud drew upon their collective management preferences to organize and facilitate the 
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beginnings of polycentric governance through new management plans. Through examining both 
communities, I then identify the conditions which may limit or foster successful transformation to 
polycentric governance. 
3.5.1 A changing oceanscape: Legislative structures which facilitate a new configuration of 
stakeholders, shift power in environmental governance, and create conflict 
Socioeconomic change has swept through the Lakes Region’s oceanscape since the 
implementation of the FAL in 1991, which has added new legislative structures to the FAL and 
has brought a new configuration of stakeholder groups to environmental governance. New 
legislative structures which govern finfish aquaculture and the creation of ECMPOs have shifted 
power away from fishing unions under the TURFs co-management policy. The TURF’s co-
management policy was created during a period of ecological restoration in 1991; where fishers 
needed to be empowered to collaborate with the government to manage marine resources, where 
aquaculture was in many ways still experimental, and where the opportunity for Indigenous 
communities to create ECMPOs did not exist. Now fishers must contend with or collaborate with 
stakeholders under the new legislative structures to facilitate a transformation from co-
management to polycentric governance at the local scale. 
3.5.2 Accumulation by dispossession in the Lakes Region: Finfish aquaculture and the 
encroachment on fishing areas 
The proliferation of aquaculture in Chile’s Lakes Region has in large part been facilitated 
by legislative structures which were implemented in 2003. Aquaculture, regulated under the FAL, 
has two avenues for aquaculture development: aquaculture concessions and authorized aquaculture 
areas. Although Chile is reviewing the FAL to integrate aquaculture into ecosystem-based 
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approaches to fisheries and aquaculture management (FAO 2018), the current process of 
aquaculture farm development only includes the applicant and government officials. Furthermore, 
the aquaculture development process does not include a social impact assessment of the proposed 
farm’s effects on other ocean users. During 24 of 26 of my interviews in both Ancud and 
Carelmapu, fishers said they felt powerless to stop the proliferation of aquaculture in the region. 
They believe that the constraints that aquaculture places on their mobility in open-access harvest 
areas, which they rely on for much of the year, stem from the government’s lack of responsibility 
in regulating the aquaculture development. The fishers’ perceptions of the state’s lack of regulation 
makes fishers feel there are no protections for them. The current political structure of aquaculture 
formation and regulation as well as the rapid increase in aquaculture production since 1995 
suggests that their feelings may be justified—fishers and fishing unions are not integrated into the 
process and thus have no power in the decision-making regarding the formation of aquaculture 
farms, even though the farms take up their open-access fishing areas and encroach upon their 
TURF management areas. 
This situation is reflective of political ecology’s understandings of accumulation by 
dispossession (Harvey 2003), where state policies redistribute power over governance, and the 
redistribution creates situations where one group, such as aquaculture companies, accumulates 
ocean space by dispossessing others, such as fishers, of that same space. What further complicates 
and exacerbates this dispossession is the decentralization of resource governance in the TURFs 
policy. The binary co-management system of TURFs relies too heavily on fishers to overcome 
socio-ecological dilemmas, such as environmental change or new ocean uses. Studies of 
decentralized policy reveal that situation is not uncommon—government’s devolution of 
responsibility to the local level often remakes the relationship between the state and citizens 
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(Cleaver 2007; Ong 2006; Shore and Wright 2011) by shifting the burden of governance and 
ecological outcomes onto the local stakeholders (Davis and Ruddle 2012). Thus, devolving 
responsibility to citizens can leave stakeholders unable to determine who is accountable for 
problems that arise. 
How geographic ecological space is utilized, negotiated, and contested by diverse 
stakeholders through decentralized governance can misconstrue and redefine individuals’ roles 
and the ecological outcomes of sustainability (Comito et al. 2013). This is evident across socio-
ecological systems, such as in Anne Rademacher’s studies of river restoration in Kathmandu, 
Nepal, where decentralized regimes with diverse actors can diffuse and dilute power, and redirect 
accountability to create inaction, resulting in the perpetuation of environmental crises 
(Rademacher 2011). This is even more likely to occur when the state becomes a ‘cunning state,’ 
where it can’t be blamed because it can use multiple negotiation tactics “where the state appears 
only to disappear, and where it constructs and dismantles itself in ways that renders it 
unanswerable” (Randeria and Grunder 2011; 189). When there are legislative shifts which change 
power in environmental governance and current decentralized governance structures place the 
burden onto the local level to overcome dilemmas, those who are dispossessed of their space must 
overcome the dilemma on their own. In the case of fishing unions in the Lakes Region, fishers 
must find ways to deal with the rapid development of aquaculture—problems which they may 
have no power or resources to overcome. 
The accumulation by dispossession has implications for the transformation from the co-
management system to polycentric governance. Polycentric governance requires a political 
structure which fosters collaboration between groups to create multiple, overlapping governing 
authorities (Ostrom 1999; Brewer 2010). Moreover, it requires that stakeholders have equal power 
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in decision-making (Ostrom 1999). Within the current political structure, fishers do not have the 
same power in decision-making as aquaculture companies and are left to overcome ecological 
dilemmas, such as environmental change, on their own. The legislative structures and the threats 
from the proliferation of aquaculture pose new challenges for resource users in the Lakes Region, 
and Ancud and Carelmapu are responding to these threats and interacting with the marine resource 
governance structures in different ways. 
3.5.3 Accumulation by resistance in Carelmapu: Conflict between fishers and the 
development of Marine Coastal Spaces for the Original Peoples (ECMPOs) 
In 2008, Chile recognized Indigenous ancestral rights to coastal and marine resources 
through the Lafkenche Law. This new legislation created the avenue for Indigenous Communities 
to develop ECMPOs. The rights to create this form of marine protected area are granted to 
Indigenous Communities for subsistence harvesting and cultural practices by Subpesca, the same 
agency which governs the TURFs policy and aquaculture concessions. Intersectoral communities, 
such as an ‘association of communities’ formed by an Indigenous Community and non-Indigenous 
resource users, can also request ECMPOs. The areas delineated by the request are limited to 
protection only but do allow the potential for new economic opportunities through tourism. No 
commercial harvesting by Indigenous peoples is allowed in these areas, but other commercial 
resource users may seek permission from the Indigenous communities to create harvesting areas. 
If the request is approved by Subpesca, the Indigenous Communities or the ‘association of 
communities’ have jurisdiction over the defined area. The development of ECMPOs differs from 
the creation of aquaculture in that it allows the Indigenous communities the potential for 
integrating fishing unions in ECMPO development and planning. 
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While ECMPOs address some of the tensions rising from the loss of ocean space to 
aquaculture, fishing unions that have long been beneficiaries of the old co-management system of 
TURFs felt increasingly threatened by the ECMPOs. They felt that the ECMPOs limit their 
abilities to create new management areas and take away access to their open-access fishing areas. 
Here I focus on an event that illustrates the conflict between two communities. The Indigenous 
Communities in Carelmapu began planning the formation of an ECMPO, the “Borde Costero,” in 
late 2016. Discussions about creating an ECMPO had occurred before 2016, but Indigenous 
Community members said in interviews that the harmful algal bloom that caused an environmental 
crisis in March of 2016 sped up the planning process. Indigenous Communities felt they needed 
jurisdiction over ocean space to legally protect their zone from contamination and the development 
of open-water aquaculture. The Indigenous Communities invited leaders from all five fishing 
unions in Carelmapu to join them in the creation of an ‘association of communities’ which would 
include representatives from the fishing unions. Three leaders from three different fishing unions 
attended the first meeting in November of 2017. However, after the first meeting, all non-
Indigenous leaders from fishing unions refused to cooperate with the Indigenous Communities any 
further in planning the development of the ECMPO. When I asked why they did not want to 
cooperate with the Indigenous Communities, fishers responded that they felt their historical fishing 
rights were threatened by the ECMPO because it would prohibit their harvesting in open-access 
areas, as those areas would be subsumed by the ECMPO. Furthermore, the development of an 
ECMPO would require the fishers to ask permission from the Indigenous Communities to create 
new TURF harvesting areas within the ECMPO. Fishers said losing power over governance and 
the rights to the resource was a major tension they felt with the Indigenous Communities, 
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underlying their decision to not cooperate as a stakeholder in the ECMPO and resist transformation 
in environmental governance. 
Conversely, Indigenous Communities in Carelmapu sought to form an ECMPO to protect 
their ancestral coastal waters from open-water aquaculture development and contamination from 
aquaculture and mining industries. They also hoped to diversify Carelmapu’s economy by 
developing infrastructure for tourism, with the objective of creating jobs to retain young people in 
the community. To attract tourists to the area, they said they must protect their coastlines and 
nearshore zones. In personal communication with an Indigenous Community leader in February 
of 2019, I learned that the initial application for an ECMPO area was approved by Subpesca. The 
Indigenous Community leader said they would return to the fishing union leaders to invite them to 
create a management committee. However, the Indigenous leader was not hopeful that the two 
groups would reach a reconciliation. 
This shift in power, where fishers must seek permission from the Indigenous Community 
to harvest in areas which fishers feel they have historical rights, has created conflict at the local 
scale in Carelmapu. I suggest that this is a form of dispossession, but instead of dispossession by 
accumulation in the case of aquaculture, it is dispossession by resistance—where the fishers who 
are actively resisting collaboration with the Indigenous Community are dispossessing themselves 
of ocean space and access. What I mean by this is that despite an invitation for collaboration by 
the Indigenous Community, the fishers resisted any form of cooperation and opportunity to 
transform co-management to more collaborative, multi-stakeholder governance structures. What 
they may have failed to realize is that through resisting, they were dispossessing themselves of 
their ocean space and sacrificing their opportunity to work jointly with the Indigenous Community 
to manage marine resources. This has implications for Carelmapu’s ability to transform to 
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polycentric governance, because non-cooperation which arises from perceptions of unequal power 
dynamics due to shifts in political structures and conflict prevents the necessary collaboration and 
communication needed to form new institutions which include the diverse stakeholders. 
3.5.4 The makings of polycentric governance in Ancud 
In Ancud, fishers under the TURFs co-management structure were similarly affected by 
the aquaculture legislative structure which dispossessed fishers of their open-access harvesting 
areas, yet they remained unaffected by the Lafkenche Law. Fishers in Ancud did not feel 
threatened by the creation of ECMPOs even though the percentages of Indigenous peoples in the 
population are similar to Carelmapu. This is likely because there was not an active development 
of an ECMPO near their fishing grounds, thus the legislative structure of the Lafkenche Law was 
not perceived to be shifting power in governance. Despite the exclusion from the decision-making 
process in aquaculture development, the threats fishers faced from aquaculture catalyzed their 
active involvement in the transformation to polycentric governance at the local scale. I sought to 
understand why fishing unions were able to initiate the formation of management committee while 
Carelmapu was unable to do the same. I suggest that the initiation was in part facilitated through 
the unions’ collective preferences for management which provided them common ground to 
cooperate. Once fishing unions acted collectively, they drew upon their social networks with 
government officials and universities to facilitate a transformation to polycentric governance at 
the local scale. 
Fishers in 10 of 11 interviews in Ancud recognized a need for new policy which addressed 
issues regarding the development of aquaculture, stimulating discussion among fishers about their 
preferences for future management. In interviews, informal conversations, and attendance at union 
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meetings in Ancud, I asked fishers if they had visions or preferences for future management. 
Fishers in Ancud had similar preferences for management, stating that the threat of aquaculture 
development and contamination from industry may be overcome with new policy developments. 
Their suggestions for new policy developments go beyond the original TURFs co-management 
objectives to foster a move towards inclusivity in institutions and the creation of larger 
management areas which include union members, independent fishers, and officials from 
Subpesca. These larger management areas would create a platform for more variety in resource 
use, allowing stakeholders to diversify their livelihoods through harvesting from wild fisheries, 
seeding small seaweed and shellfish aquaculture concessions, and engaging in tourism. 
Fishing unions have drawn upon these collective management preferences to form a new 
Management Committee which aims to develop a more inclusive plan which addresses industrial 
contamination in the river, overexploitation of productive sea beds, and demands maritime 
concessions. This Management Committee is an example of the management committees outlined 
in the 2013 amendment to the Fisheries and Aquaculture Law (FAL) which offered a platform for 
governance transformation (Gelcich 2014). Integral to the development of the Management 
Committee were fishers’ abilities to draw upon their social networks with government officials 
and universities. Joining these multiple stakeholder groups and multiple levels of possible 
governing authorities resulted in a collaborative management committee which is creating a plan 
for Ancud Bay. The management plans bring together multiple stakeholder groups, including all 
Ancud’s fishing unions, independent fishers, and authorities from Subpesca. They have between 
16-20 meetings per year which are often extensive in length, sometimes several hours. Fishers 
stated that they were able to initiate the formation of this committee because of the connections 
some union members had with universities and the government. I attended five meetings for two 
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different fishing unions between February 2018 and May 2018, and of those five meetings, 
Subpesca or Sernapesca officials were present at three. It was evident that the officials were not 
only present in the capacity of an authority, but as a communicator who updated union members 
on changing laws and answered union members’ questions. The discussions between fishing union 
members and government officials were cooperative, and fishers said that they usually depended 
on the same official each meeting for communication and information. 
Through the formation of the Management Committee, fishers feel that they have more 
flexibility for adaptation to new ocean uses and more power in environmental governance. With 
the creation of a large management plan for Ancud Bay, 147 hectares of the bay were placed under 
a no-take protected zone for two years so that the Committee could work with the state and 
universities to conduct ecological studies. In areas open to diving, fishers can harvest from 25 
different species which all have a quota and minimum size limits. Different than TURF 
management areas, the larger management plan does not exclude independent fishers who are not 
in unions. Independent fishers can apply to the Management Committee to enter the bay and must 
abide by size limits and land their product at the designated dock in Ancud. The management plan 
for Ancud Bay also allows individuals who are part of the unions to apply for aquaculture 
concessions to plant seed for small-scale seaweed and mussel aquaculture. 
 Fishers also stated that they have more political strength with the formation of the 
Management Committee because they have a larger number of people united for the same cause 
and they have the support of government officials. Instead of individual fishing unions which act 
separately to govern marine resources under the TURFs co-management policy, the Management 
Committee brings the unions together, along with independent fishers and Subpesca, to set local 
closures and formulate more localized management plans. One such local management plan 
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example for Ancud is for luga roja, red algae [sp. Sarcothalia crispate], harvested and sold for its 
carrageenan. Previously, Chile’s Subpesca declared luga roja as overexploited and placed bans on 
its harvesting. With the work of the Management Committee, fishers and recolectores de la orilla, 
female shore harvesters, collaborated on policy which allows harvesters to collect the seaweed by 
cutting the seaweed at the base, similar to a chard plant, allowing the seaweed to regrow while 
simultaneously providing the best quality part of the plant which contains more carrageenan for 
the market. Fishers in Ancud are hopeful that with these types of collaboration and a larger, more 
inclusive management area they will be able to contend with large-scale aquaculture and increase 
their cooperation with other stakeholders on Chiloé. 
3.5.5 Conditions which limit or enable polycentric governance  
The comparative case study of these two communities elucidate several conditions which 
limit and enable the transformation from co-management to polycentric governance at the local 
scale. First, I discuss how the conflict in Carelmapu helped me identify the conditions which may 
limit the transformation to polycentric governance. Then, I identify the factors which may facilitate 
the transformation in governance using the example of Ancud. 
 The conflict between non-Indigenous fishers and the Indigenous Communities in 
Carelmapu, which has resulted in dispossession by resistance, has created a troublesome platform 
for a transition to polycentric governance. As noted in Gelcich (2014: 578), polycentricism 
requires cooperation and collaboration across all stakeholder groups to resolve conflicts and 
govern across independent decision-making centers (Ostrom et al. 1961). However, conflict in 
Carelmapu has prevented collaboration across groups and has inhibited the self-organization of 
fishing unions to form management committees to transform the TURFs co-management system 
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to polycentric governance. Early assessments of management committees in Chile corroborate my 
findings that conflict may constrain the transformation to polycentric governance. Gelcich, Reyes-
Mendy, and Rios (2019) state that the development of institutions which share power is hindered 
by distrust among stakeholder groups. However, these assessments are limited to the examination 
of fishers in unions. I contribute to these findings by examining the diversity of stakeholders at the 
local scale to show that it is the interaction between the new legislative structures and the 
stakeholders which underpinned the conflict in Carelmapu. It was the legislative structure of the 
Lafkenche Law under which the Indigenous Communities proposed development of the ECMPO 
which created fishers’ fears that they were losing power in governance and access rights to their 
open-access areas. In polycentric governance theory, the Indigenous Communities and fishing 
unions could work together to address the issues facing the community of Carelmapu. However, 
resistance by fishers to changes in the legislative structure and their perceptions that they are losing 
power in governance may hinder the creation of institutions, the integration of knowledge systems, 
and the collaboration needed to transform to polycentric governance. Furthermore, their resistance 
will result in the dispossession of their resource access and ocean space. 
Thus, by examining the conflict in Carelmapu, I suggest that the main condition which may 
limit the transformation to polycentric governance is twofold: (1) a structural shift in power 
through new legislative, and (2) fishers’ subsequent resistance to cooperating with stakeholders 
within their community for fear of losing power in governance. It is fishers’ interactions with the 
legislative structures and their non-cooperation with other stakeholders which has created the 
limitations. 
In Ancud, fishers have been able to organize to facilitate the transition from co-
management to polycentric governance by creating a management committee and a larger, more 
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inclusive management area. My findings suggest that there are two key conditions which 
facilitated their ability to initiate this transition: (1) collective preferences for management which 
have resulted in collective decision-making, and (2) networks with government officials and 
universities upon which fishers could draw to create the new institution. The important distinction 
is that fishers collaborated with government officials and universities to create the management 
committee and that they did not feel threatened by the development of ECMPOs, therefore they 
did not fear changes in resource access. The management committee has several representatives 
from each stakeholders group. This moves away from the idea of nested institutions where 
stakeholders are separate in their institutions but communicate across levels (Ostrom 1990) to a 
more inclusive, collaborative space where all stakeholders have equal power and representation in 
governance. 
3.5 Conclusion 
The legislative structures governing marine resources in the Lakes Region of Chile have 
shifted power in marine governance, and this study shows that the ability for communities to 
initiate the transition to polycentric governance was really defined by the interaction between the 
existing structures and how individuals perceived the legislative structures. Specifically, it was 
individuals’ perceptions that certain legislation failed to support them which spurred their 
responses and demonstrated their abilities to transform governance. For example, in Ancud, my 
ethnographic data illustrated that fishers, threatened by the proliferation of aquaculture and failed 
by a legislative structure which excluded them from decision-making, drew upon their collective 
preferences for management to create a management committee through the new legislative 
structure implemented in 2013. The Management Committee in Ancud is a step toward the 
formation of the institutions and collaboration needed to achieve polycentric governance of marine 
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socio-ecological systems at the local scale. However, across the Chacao Channel in the community 
of Carelmapu, fishing unions, bound by the same legislative structures and facing similar threats, 
were unable to initiate the development of polycentric institutions. I suggest this was largely 
because fishing unions were not only threatened by aquaculture but perceived that their historical 
rights to fishing were threatened by the legislative structure that allows the creation of an ECMPO 
by Indigenous Communities. The development of an ECMPO sparked conflict between fishing 
unions and Indigenous Communities where fishers’ resisted cooperating with the Indigenous 
communities, thereby inhibiting fishers’ self-organization to transform from co-management to 
polycentric governance. 
This study suggests that building upon co-management structures to transform to 
polycentric governance may be possible at the local scale in communities that have similar visions 
for the future and preferences for management, such as in Ancud, and in communities who do not 
feel that their fishing territories are threatened by new ocean uses and changes in governing power. 
In communities where stakeholders perceive that legislative structures have shifted power in 
governance, fishers’ resistance and non-cooperation with other stakeholders may inhibit a 
transition to polycentric governance at the local scale, such as in Carelmapu. In particular, this 
study highlights the need to understand perceptions of legislative structures, human agency within 
the context of legislative structure, and diversity of stakeholders at the local level to understand 
how individuals can enact their agency to foster cooperation and transformations in governance. I 
also observed that conflict at the local scale may be underpinned by a clash of identities and 
individuals’ perceptions of history of what constitutes rights to resources. I did not have the space 
to treat these observations here, but the fishers’ resistance to cooperate with the Indigenous 
Communities in Carelmapu pointed to a need to understand individual and group identity and its 
88 
 
relationship to worldviews, conflict, and transformations in governance. In addition, further 
research is needed to understand the cultural and social factors which contribute to resolving 
conflict, sharing power, and integrating meaningful participation in governance at the local scale 
to fully realize a shift to polycentric governance in marine socio-ecological systems. 
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CHAPTER 4 
VALUES UNDERLYING POLICY ACTIONS IN A SMALL-SCALE FISHING 
COMMUNITY IN CHILE4 
4.1 Abstract 
Resource-dependent communities must increasingly adapt to unprecedented biophysical and 
environmental changes which require individuals and institutions to have the agency and capacity 
to facilitate the creation of adaptive governance. However, achieving adaptive governance may be 
difficult because individuals’ perceptions of desirable ways of life vary, and these perceptions 
influence the decisions they make with regards their preferences and actions related to policy. 
Scholarship has demonstrated that these different preferences and actions may lead to conflict 
between individuals or groups as these factors are often influenced by how resource users’ 
subjectively and differentially value their experiences, their work, and their connections to their 
communities and environment. This paper examines values underlying how individuals and 
institutions frame their interpretations of, and actions related to, policy in adaptive governance in 
the coastal community of Carelmapu in southern Chile. In 2016, a harmful algal bloom resulted in 
fishing closures which exacerbated underlying tensions between institutions in the region who 
have incongruent visions for the oceanscape. It soon emerged that the Lafkenche Indigenous 
Community and small-scale fishing unions diverged on their interpretations of policy and their 
preferences for policy action. Drawing upon participant observation, semi-structured interviews, 
and quantitative surveys, we sought to understand the conflict by studying the values of individuals 
and institutions which underpinned their frames related to policy action to illustrate why 
individuals enacted or resisted transformation in governance. Examining this conflict at the 
                                                          
4 This chapter will be submitted as a single manuscript to a journal in May 2019. It was authored by Sarah A. Ebel, 
and co-authored by Michael P. Torre, and Christine M. Beitl. 
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individual and institutional levels demonstrated that two groups in the community had different 
value frames rooted in divergent ontologies as well as varying interpretations of, and interactions 
with, political structure. The knowledge that this conflict may in part be underpinned by conflicting 
ontologies and interpretations and interactions with political structure illuminates the challenges 
in facilitating the transformation of governance at the local scale. Although these different 
ontologies likely exacerbated the conflict between the two groups, we found that this conflict 
existed in large part because of interpretations and actions related to a new policy, implemented in 
2008, which shifted power in environmental governance away from fishing unions to the 
Indigenous Community. It is their interpretations and actions related to this policy, compounded 
by the abrupt environmental change, which is at the heart of this conflict in adaptation. This local 
conflict illuminates how discussions of adaptation undertheorize the importance of diverse 
ontologies and tensions between individuals and institutions as contributors to successful 
adaptation or conflict at the local scale. 
4.2 Introduction 
Theories of adaptive governance of socio-ecological systems suggest that in order for 
resource-dependent communities to adapt to unprecedented biophysical and environmental 
change, communities must have both the agency and the capacity to transform resource 
governance and their cultural, social, and economic well-being, instead of just coping (Fabricius 
et al. 2007; Walker et al. 2004). However, achieving adaptive governance—where individuals 
form the structures and processes they need to make decisions and share power to provide a 
direction and vision for sustainable management (Boyle et al. 2001)—can be difficult for 
individuals and groups to navigate. Many resource users have few other options for economic 
income, and their cultures, identities, and social lives are inextricably tied to their work (Marschke 
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and Berkes 2006; Urquhart and Acott 2013). Furthermore, individuals’ perceptions of desirable 
ways of life vary (Coulthard 2008). These perceptions influence the decisions they make with 
regards to short-term and long-term adaptation (McGregor et al. 2009) as well as underpin their 
interpretations and actions related to policy (Schon and Rein 1994). Resource users often have 
different interpretations of policy as well as preferences for adaptation, which may lead to 
divergent policy actions and conflict between individuals or groups (Adger et al. 2013; Coulthard 
2011; O’Brien and Wolf 2010; Pakizeh et al. 2007; Somorin et al. 2012; Wise et al. 2014). These 
interpretations, preferences, and actions are often influenced by how resource users’ subjectively 
and differentially value their experiences, their understandings and actions related to policy, and 
their connections to their communities and environment (O’Brien and Wolf 2010). Such values 
can be conceptualized as frames, defined as: 
“the broadly shared beliefs, values, and perspectives familiar to the members of a societal 
culture and likely to endure in that culture over long periods of time, on which individuals 
and institutions draw upon in order to give meaning, sense, and normative direction to their 
thinking and action in policy matters” (Schon and Rein 1994: xiii). 
To better understand governance policies framed around adaptation in resource-dependent 
communities, this paper explores how underlying values contribute to institutional interpretations 
and actions which may underpin local conflict, in Carelmapu, a community in the Lakes Region 
of southern Chile. In 2016, an environmental crisis, a harmful algal bloom, left the community 
without its main source of livelihood: fishing. With marine harvesting closed for six months and 
few other job opportunities available, individuals and groups in the community were forced to 
think about how to transform environmental governance. 
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Analysis of ethnographic data conducted in Carelmapu in 2018 demonstrated that, despite 
a shared dependence on the sea, two local institutions, the Lafkenche Indigenous Community and 
the local fishing unions, had different preferences for pursing adaptive governance to address 
environmental change. The Lafkenche Indigenous Community wanted to form a protected area to 
conserve the marine resources on which residents of Carelmapu depend. They were able to propose 
a protected area through the Lafkenche Law, a state law implemented in 2008 which grants 
ancestral rights to the sea to Indigenous Communities. The Indigenous Community in Carelmapu 
saw the protected area as a means to maintain their cultural traditions and to revitalize and diversify 
economic opportunities through the creation of a tourist economy. In contrast, the fishing unions 
wanted to continue management of marine resources in its current state, and potentially work to 
change legislation to harvest new species. Fishing unions did not want the protected area because 
they were concerned that their access to resource harvesting in open-access areas would change if 
those areas were encompassed by the protected area. The difference in these preferences for policy 
action, in large part caused by interpretations and actions related to the Lafkenche Law, triggered 
conflict in Carelmapu which resulted in the fishing unions refusing to cooperate with the 
Indigenous Community to move forward with a plan. 
This paper employs a values-based approach to contribute insights to the understanding of 
adaptation and stakeholder policy frames at the local scale by quantitatively measuring individual 
and group values underlying policy actions and conflict in the community of Carelmapu. Human 
values, defined as ‘desirable trans-situational goals, varying in importance, that serve as guiding 
principles in the life of a person or other social entity’ (Schwartz 1994: 21), refer to an individual’s 
or group’s desires, preferences, objectives, and needs (O’Brien 2009; O’Brien and Wolf 2010; 
Rokeach 1979; 2008; Schwartz 1992; 1994). Some attention has been given to examining how 
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individuals’ or groups’ values influence their preferences for adaptation and actions related to 
policy (O’Brien and Wolf 2010; Somorin et al. 2012), specifically in large policy programs such 
as REDD+ (Somorin et al. 2012). However, there is an increasing need to substantiate and further 
understandings of how human values, which motivate human behavior and decision-making and 
give purpose and meaning to individuals’ lives (Gecas 2008; Schwartz 1992; 1994), influence 
individual and institutional actions in adaptive governance and policy matters (Somorin et al. 
2012). 
Informed by our ethnographic data, we hypothesized that the conflict between the two 
groups in Carelmapu was driven by divergent values which underpinned individual and 
institutional frames related to policy interpretations and actions. To test this hypothesis, we adapted 
Schwartz et al. (2012)’s framework of universal human values to construct a structured survey to 
conduct a multi-level analysis of individual and group values. A values-based approach can elicit 
diverse conceptualizations of what is desirable, whose values are prioritized, and why there may 
be conflict between groups (O’Brien and Wolf 2010). It can also contribute to understandings of 
individual and institutional frames which can elicit knowledge of how individuals organize their 
experiences and produce action in policy (Schon and Rein 1994). 
4.2.1 Preferences, interpretations and actions related to adaptive governance and their 
association to universal values 
Certain values have been shown to be shared by humans across culturally, socially, 
economically and geographically diverse groups (Schwartz 1992; Pakizeh et al. 2007; Schwartz et 
al. 2012). Yet, other values may differ in their relative importance to the individual or group 
(Pakizeh et al. 2007; Schwartz et al. 2012). The variation in importance of values to individuals 
and groups is what contributes to different motivations and behaviors (Schwartz 1992), and 
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preferences and needs for adaptation (Havercamp 2017; O’Brien and Wolf 2010). In a cross-
cultural study of human values in 44 countries, Schwartz (1992) identified ten universal human 
values that are in structural relationship to one another, some of which are compatible and others 
which stand in opposition to each other. For example, in the context of adaptation, individuals who 
exhibit values of “self-direction” or “universalism” may focus their efforts on social or 
environmental justice to foster equitable processes, while others who exhibit values of 
“achievement” or “power” may prioritize their own goals, which may lead to conflict (Havercamp 
2017; Schwartz et al. 1992). Schwartz furthered his theory on universal human values by adding 
nine more values in Schwartz et al. (2012) (Table 1) to create “a finer set of meaningful, 
conceptually distinct values which may have universal, stronger heuristic and predictive power 
(Schwartz et al. 2011: 664). Other studies have used this theory and qualitative measures. For 
example,  Havercamp (2017) investigated motivational factors in climate change adaptation 
decision-making in Hampton Roads, VA, USA while Wolf et al. (2013) examined the ways in 
which individuals’ values were connected to their views on adaptation to demonstrate how values 
shape individuals’ interpretations of climate change impacts in Labrador. With regards to policy 
action, how individuals and institutions organize their experiences and produce a bias for action 
may be related to their value system (Somorin et al. 2012). 
This paper uses eleven of Schwartz et al. (2012)’s nineteen universal values to examine 
groups’ and individuals’ values which may underlie their policy frames related to adaptive 
governance. Like Havercamp (2017) and Wolf et al. (2013), values used in this study were 
identified through ethnographic interviews and participant observation. The remaining nine values 
from Schwartz et al. (2012) were not used in this study because they did not emerge in our analysis 
of the ethnographic data. Following a multi-phased research design (Johnson 1998), this study 
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integrates the values we identified into a structured survey to quantitatively measure the presence 
of the values in the community of Carelmapu. Here, our intention is not to test Schwartz et al. 
(2012)’s theory, but to bridge a mixed methods values-based approach with literature on adaptation 
and environmental policy. We draw on the ethnographic research in our interpretation of how 
divergent values among the different groups underpin the refusal of one group to cooperate with 
the other in the implementation of a new MPA.  
4.3 Ethnographic setting: Environmental change, adaptation, and conflict in Carelmapu 
Carelmapu is situated on a peninsula boarded by the Pacific Ocean over an hour from the 
urban center of Puerto Montt in the Lakes Region of southern Chile (Figure 1). The Lakes Region 
is the country’s most fishery-dependent region (Moreno and Revenga 2014), and Carelmapu, home 
to around 2,500 residents, is one of the region’s most fishery-dependent communities. For a small 
community, residents of Carelmapu are ethnically diverse—many individuals are members of the 
geographically expansive Mapuche Indigenous group. Spanning south-central and southern Chile, 
the Mapuche consist of several ethnicities but share a common socio-economic structure and 
language. Persecuted through much of Chile’s colonial history and more recent dictatorship under 
Pinochet in the 1970s and 1980s, the Mapuche were allowed to legally form Indigenous 
institutions, called Indigenous Communities, in the 1990s. In addition to the Mapuche, non-
Indigenous individuals moved to Carelmapu to pursue work in the fishing industry.  
Carelmapu was once an active port during the 1960s through the 1990s, but demographics 
began to change again in Carelmapu in the 2000’s as the proliferation of aquaculture in the region 
provided a better economic opportunity, drawing young people away from Carelmapu (Ebel 2018). 
The aquaculture industry in the Lakes Region, which started in the 1980s, is vast and continues to 
grow, employing well over 50,000 individuals in the region (United Nations 2006). Yet, the 
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expansion in aquaculture is not without environmental consequences or social conflict (Daughters 
2018). Pollution from salmon farms’ feed, antibiotics, and salmon feces wreaks havoc on the local 
ecosystem, causing anoxic areas and contributing to the formation of harmful algal blooms, which 
in turn close commercial fisheries to harvesting due to the toxicity of harvestable species 
(Daughters 2018). Furthermore, the encroachment of aquaculture on commercial fishing areas—
combined with a legislative structure which excludes resource users from decision-making—
threatens marine resource users’ livelihoods. This combination does so by limiting the areas from 
which they can harvest, forcing them to turn to other livelihood strategies or leave their 
communities (Ebel 2018). Residents of Carelmapu are acutely affected by environmental and 
economic change associated with the ocean. They are increasingly caught between local and global 
forces, such as climate change, the proliferation of aquaculture, and changes in economic markets, 
which affect their access to marine resources and subsequently, their livelihoods. 
In 2016 an environmental crisis occurred at a magnitude the region had never seen. The 
perfect storm of climate anomalies and pollution from aquaculture farms triggered an extensive 
harmful algal bloom which caused widespread marine species mortalities and the closure of all 
wild-caught fisheries and aquaculture exports off the coast of the Lakes Region (Buschmann et al. 
2016). Some observers suggest this event paralyzed the region’s economy (Daughters 2018). The 
2016 crisis displaced resource users’ livelihoods in the region for half a year, and they were left to 
depend on subsistence agriculture and peddling of vegetables and firewood (Ebel 2018). As 
harmful algal blooms are predicted to occur with increased frequency (Buschmann et al. 2016), 
the 2016 crisis prompted community-based groups in Carelmapu to think about adaptive 
governance to address future environmental changes. For example, the harmful algal bloom 
accelerated the Indigenous Community’s process of proposing an ECMPO to the state. 
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Figure 4.1. Chile’s coastal Lakes Region. The community of Carelmapu is encircled in red. 
 
4.4 Methods 
This study was conducted in two phases: an exploratory phase and an explanatory phase 
(Johnson 1998). The exploratory phase was inductive where the first author gathered ethnographic 
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data through six months of participant observation from January through June 2018 and conducted 
semi-structured interviews (n=15) in Carelmapu, of which 11.5 hours are recorded and transcribed. 
The town of Carelmapu has five fishing unions with a total of 500 members and six Indigenous 
Communities with a total of 250 individuals including children. Another 500 individuals are 
independent divers or recolectores, women who harvest products along the shore. These 
populations are not mutually exclusive. Many members of the Indigenous Community are also 
members of fishing unions, and some independent divers and recolectores are also members of 
the Indigenous Community. Semi-structured interview data and participant observation 
demonstrated that a conflict in Carelmapu existed over the two groups’ preferences for policy 
action related to adaptive governance. It was this ethnographic data that helped us formulate our 
hypotheses and the construction of a structured survey. To review, we hypothesized that the 
conflict was driven by divergent values which underpinned individual and institutional frames 
related to policy interpretations and actions. Specifically, it was the Lafkenche Law, implemented 
in 2008, in combination with the harmful algal bloom, which brought to the surface individuals’ 
and groups’ desires for different policy actions. 
 During phase two, we developed and administered a structured survey (n=44) which 
measured individuals’ levels of agreement with statements associated with universal human 
values. Prior to the construction of the survey, we looked in the literature to see how values have 
been measured and found Schwartz et al. (2012)’s universal human values framework. We adapted 
their framework to fit our ethnographic context. We then constructed the survey using eleven of 
nineteen of Schwartz et al. (2012)’s universal human values which were found during the analysis 
of the ethnographic semi-structured interviews. We administered the survey during April and May 
2018. Participants were recruited randomly on fishing docks, before fishing union meetings, and 
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before and after Indigenous Community meetings. The first author approached each individual and 
asked their willingness to take a survey. 68 out of 70 individuals (97%) asked participated in the 
survey. Structured surveys were read to each participant to account for issues of literacy and took 
around twenty minutes to complete. Of 44 individuals surveyed, 41 were economically dependent 
on marine resource harvesting, 36 belonged to fishing unions, 9 were members of the Indigenous 
Community, and 12 self-identified as indigenous. Five individuals did not belong to either group, 
and 6 individuals belonged to both the Indigenous Community and a fishing union. 
The 11 values identified in semi-structured interviews were measured in the structured 
survey using a 5-point Likert Scale. In the survey, each value had corresponding statements (see 
Table 1) to which the individual had to answer, “strongly agree,” “agree,” “I don’t know,” 
“disagree,” or “strongly disagree.” Survey data was entered into Excel and coded on the 5-point 
scale: 1 for “strongly disagree” through 5 for “strongly agree.” Statistical analysis was conducted 
at the individual and group level. The individual level was analyzed between “self-identified 
indigenous individuals” and “non-indigenous individuals.” The group level was analyzed between 
groups labeled “fishing unions” and the “Indigenous Community.” 
A Kruskal–Wallis analysis was used to test for significant (α = 0.01) variation in Likert-
ranked responses to each individual statement associated with Schwartz et al. (2012) values 
between each level of analysis: individuals and groups (Mircioiu & Atkinson 2017). This method 
is a non-parametric alternative to a one-way ANOVA that is better suited to ordinal data, and was 
carried out using R software version 3.3.2 (R Core Team Development 2016). Critical level of 
significance was adjusted from α = 0.05 to α = 0.01 to account for multiple testing (Schwartz et al. 
2012). 
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Differences in the compositions of Likert-ranked responses associated with Schwartz et al. 
(2012)’s universal human values were analyzed at the individual and group levels with a 
multivariate approach using the multidimensional scaling (MDS) and adonis procedures. For these 
analyses, the vegan package within R software version 3.3.2 was used (Oksanen et al. 2008, R 
Core Team Development 2016). Similarity matrices of Likert-ranked response data were 
constructed for each surveyed individual using the Euclidian distance measure (Schwartz et al. 
2012). MDS based on similarity matrices was used to generate 2D pots depicting similarity in the 
structure of Likert ranked responses between groupings at the individual and group levels. Spider 
diagrams were overlaid upon 2D NMDS plots to show group centroids and spread.  
To further explore the divergent responses underlying the conflict between two groups in 
the community, survey responses from the five initial groups (non-Indigenous fishing union 
members, non-Indigenous independent divers, Indigenous Community members, and independent 
Indigenous divers) were then divided into three groups: non-Indigenous individuals in fishing 
unions, non-Indigenous individuals independent of fishing unions, and the Indigenous 
Community. Indigenous fishing union members are included in the grouping of the Indigenous 
Community because we interviewed no Indigenous individuals who were not members of the 
Indigenous Community. We removed one group, the independent Indigenous individuals in 
fishing unions, because of the small sample size (n=1). The groups we left in the analysis were 
visible within the ethnographic data. To show similarity between the three groups, 3D MDS was 
used. Ellipsoids encompassing 50% similarity of each grouping were added to capture the central 
tendency and variability in Likert-ranked responses to questions and better highlight group 
differences. Significant (α = 0.05) variation in Likert-ranked responses between non-indigenous 
individuals in fishing unions, non-indigenous individuals independent of fishing unions, and the 
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Indigenous Community was tested using the adonis function in the vegan package (Oksanen et al. 
2008). This function performs a permutational multiple analysis of variance (PERMANOVA) 
using similarity matrices based on the Euclidian distance measure to assign variation in Likert 
ranked responses among groupings. The number of permutations used in these analyses was 999. 
Pairwise comparisons were then used to test the where significant variation occurred between each 
of the three groupings. For all pairwise comparisons, critical level of significance was adjusted 
from α = 0.05 to α = 0.01 to account for multiple testing. 
4.5 Results 
This section reports on the results from the ethnographic data and quantitative analysis of 
values to compare the differences between the two institutions to support our hypothesis that 
divergent values exist. The ethnographic data demonstrated that there was a conflict which existed 
between the Indigenous Community and the fishing unions in Carelmapu. The two groups had 
tried to work together to formulate an adaptation plan in November of 2017, but they disagreed on 
the ways to transform the governance of marine resources from co-management to a more 
collaborative, adaptive governance structure. The Indigenous Community wanted to use their 
ancestral rights to sea, granted to them by the state’s Lafkenche Law, to form a protected area, but 
the members of fishing unions pushed back, saying that the protected area would exclude non-
Indigenous divers from their traditional harvesting in open-access areas and would require divers 
to request permission from the Indigenous Community. 
4.5.1 The Indigenous Community’s history and preferences for adaptive governance 
The Lafkenche Indigenous Community (referred to by members as the Indigenous 
Community) is an institution recognized by the state of Chile. The Indigenous Community in 
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Carelmapu was formed in 1996 and is currently made up of six smaller groups, each with their 
own leaders and legal aides. Smaller groups are formed under the larger institution because smaller 
groups allow the community to reach decisions more easily. Smaller groups also allow members 
to receive more state funding, including university scholarships for their children. 
In 2008, “La Ley Lafkenche” (The Lafkenche Law or the “People of the Sea” Law) allowed 
for Indigenous communities to submit requests to the state to create Marine Coastal Spaces of the 
Original Peoples (ECMPOs), which would give rights to Indigenous peoples to access designated 
marine areas based on their ancestral customary use. Aware of this law, the Indigenous Community 
in Carelmapu began meeting after the 2016 crisis to envision adaptation and begin the process of 
submitting a request to the state to create an ECMPO called the “Borde Costero” (Coastal Border), 
a protected area that would include part of the shoreline and extend out to 12km from the peninsula 
into the sea. The Indigenous Community was severely affected by the harmful algal bloom in 
2016—many members of their community were out of work and they were unable to continue 
their traditional subsistence practices. They believed that a protected area would prevent further 
industry from entering the coastal zone and contaminating the marine ecosystem. Furthermore, it 
would help the community diversify their economic opportunities through tourism. 
The Lafkenche Law which allows for the development of ECMPOS allows Indigenous 
Communities to invite other stakeholders to form local institutions to manage the ECMPOs. The 
Indigenous Community interpreted this to suggest that they could work with non-Indigenous 
fishers to develop management protocols for the protected area. During the initial planning process 
of the ECMPO, the Indigenous Community invited the fishing unions to work with them to 
development a management committee which would work together to govern the ECMPO. Despite 
the invitation, fishers refused to work with the Indigenous Community during the planning because 
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they interpreted the Lafkenche Law to state that fishers could no longer commercially harvest 
within the ECMPO. This interpretation was only partly correct—fishers would not be able to 
harvest in open-access areas, but they would be able to create new harvesting areas with permission 
from the Indigenous Community or the management committee. 
4.5.2 The fishing unions’ history and preferences for adaptive governance 
In the Lakes Region, approximately 24,000 resource users are members of community-
based fishing unions, formed under Chile’s fisheries and aquaculture law, La Ley de Pesca y 
Acuicultura (INE 2008). The specific policy under the law, known internationally as the Territorial 
Use Rights in Fisheries (TURFs) policy, passed in 1991 and amended in 2013, aimed at alleviating 
poverty and restoring fisheries by incentivizing resource users to form local unions to have access 
rights to specific exploitation areas (Jarvis and Wilen 2016). Union members harvest many species, 
including the economically and culturally important loco (abalone Concholepas conchoelpas), sea 
urchin, crab, barnacles, and octopus, by diving in management areas which are co-managed by the 
unions and the state (Castilla and Gelcich 2008). There are five fishing unions in Carelmapu, 
totaling just under 500 men. In total in Carelmapu, there are 1200 individuals who make their 
living from the sea, including divers in fishing unions, independent divers, and women who harvest 
resources along the shore. Divers also harvest in open-access areas, areas which are not designated 
to any union. Many divers depend on harvesting resources in these open-access areas throughout 
other parts of the year when they are not fishing for loco in TURFs from May through July. 
Resource users experienced hardship in 2016 because they depended upon benthic species, 
many of which become toxic for human consumption during harmful algal blooms. Many divers 
had no fishery landings for almost half a year. This hardship reverberated throughout the 
community of Carelmapu, affecting seafood processors and shop owners (Ebel 2018). The unions 
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recognized that the coastal zone was vulnerable to the impacts of environmental change and 
industry but had few preferences for adaptive governance that went beyond maintaining the status 
quo of current marine resource management, opening other species to harvesting, and asking for 
subsidies from the government in the case of another crisis. Fishers did not want the development 
of the ECMPO, stating that it threatened their historical fishing rights. 
4.5.3 Survey of individual and group values underlying preferences for adaptive governance 
As stated, we used the ethnographic data from phase 1 to construct a survey to measure 
individuals’ responses to statements associated with eleven of Schwartz et al. (2012)’s values to 
illuminate how values may influence preferences for adaptive governance. The survey indicated 
that nine out of eleven values were shared between the Indigenous Community, the fishing unions, 
self-identified indigenous individuals, and non-indigenous individuals (Figures 2 and 3). However, 
responses to the Likert-ranked statements, I think that change in the ecosystem is an opportunity 
to do something different and Humans have control of the environment,  associated with the two 
values “stimulation” and “tradition” respectively, were significantly different between indigenous 
and non-indigenous individuals (“stimulation”: p = 0.004; “tradition”: p=0.001; Figure 2) as well 
as between the Indigenous Community and fishing unions (“stimulation”: p = 0.001; “tradition”: 
p=0.002; Figure 3). 
MDS ordination of Likert-ranked responses shows dissimilarity in the overall composition 
of values per individual between self-identified indigenous and non-indigenous groupings as well 
as between the Indigenous Community and fishing unions (Figure 4). 3D MDS ordination of 
Likert-ranked responses also shows dissimilarity in the overall composition of values per 
individual in three groupings: The Indigenous Community, non-indigenous individuals 
independent of fishing unions, and non-indigenous individuals in fishing unions (Figure 5). 
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PERMANOVA shows that individual level (indigenous individuals vs. non-indigenous 
individuals) significantly explained 9.74% (F = 4.53; R2 = .097; p = 0.01) of variation in Likert-
ranked responses of individuals belonging to each group type (Indigenous Community vs. fishing 
unions) significantly explained 10.61% (F = 4.98; R2 = 0.11; p < 0.001) of the variation in Likert-
ranked responses of individuals belonging to each group.  Additionally, when Likert-ranked 
responses between three groups: The Indigenous Community, non-indigenous individuals 
independent of fishing unions, and non-indigenous individuals in fishing unions, were compared 
together, PERMANOVA shows that grouping factor significantly explained 14.07% (F = 2.86; R2 
= 0.14; p < 0.01) of total variation. Pairwise comparisons show a significant difference in the 
composition of Likert-ranked responses between the Indigenous Community and non-indigenous 
individuals in fishing unions (F = 4.47, R2 = 0.12, p = 0.001) and between the Indigenous 
Community and non-indigenous individuals independent of fishing unions (F = 4.67, R2 = 0.34, p 
= 0.001). A statistically similar composition of Likert-ranked responses was found between non-
indigenous individuals who are members of Fishing Unions and non-indigenous individuals who 
are not members of the study groups (F = 0.85, R2 = 0.03, p = 0.548). 
  
106 
 
 
 
Figure 4.2. Likert ranked responses of self-identified Indigenous individuals and non-
Indigenous individuals to statements associated with Schwartz et al. (2012) 
values. Significant differences in Likert ranked responses between indigenous 
individuals and non-indigenous individuals, identified by Kruskal–Wallis 
analysis, are denoted as follows: *p < 0.01, **p < 0.005, ***p < 0.001 
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Figure 4.3. Likert ranked responses of the Indigenous Community and the fishing unions to 
statements associated with Schwartz et al. (2012) values. Significant differences 
in Likert ranked responses between the Indigenous Community and the fishing 
unions, identified by Kruskal–Wallis analysis, are denoted as follows: *p < 0.01, 
**p < 0.005, ***p < 0.001 
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Figure 4.4. Multidimensional scaling (MDS) ordination of Euclidian distance similarities 
from Likert ranked responses of all statements associated with Schwartz et al. 
(2012) values. The top plot shows similarity in the compositions of Likert ranked 
responses of indigenous individuals and non-indigenous individuals and the 
bottom plot shows individuals who are members the Indigenous Community and 
fishing unions.  Spider plots are overlaid to highlight group centroids and 
variability. For these analyses the vegan package within R software version 3.3.2 
was used. 
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Figure 4.5. 3D Multidimensional scaling (MDS) ordination of Euclidian distance similarities 
from Likert ranked responses of all statements associated with Schwartz et al. 
(2012) values.  Ellipsoid clusters are delineated at the 50 % level of similarity for 
non-indigenous individuals in fishing unions, non-Indigenous individuals 
independent of fishing unions, and all Indigenous individuals belonging both to 
the Indigenous Community and fishing unions. For these analyses the vegan and 
rgl packages within R software version 3.3.2 was used. 
 
 4.6 Discussion 
Based on our ethnographic research conducted in Carelmapu, we hypothesized that the conflict 
between the Indigenous Community and fishing unions was rooted in different values which 
underpinned divergent frames relating to policy interpretations and actions in adaptive governance. 
We found this to be accurate in part—the two institutions had both divergent and shared values 
which contributed to their interpretations and actions related to policy. High sharing occurred in 
values of tradition, personal and societal security, and achievement. On the other hand, two of the 
values measured were not shared: stimulation and power over resources. We suggest that the 
shared value of “tradition” and the divergent value “power over resources” are the two critical 
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values underlying individual and institutional frames which underpinned their desirable policy 
actions and the current disagreement among the two groups about how to move forward with 
models of adaptive governance within the socio-ecological system. 
The divergent values of “power over resources” suggests two different frames related to policy 
interpretation and action. In other words, the fishing unions and independent divers were more 
focused on marine resource extraction which resulted in their preferences for either maintaining 
or changing harvest controls on marine species, while the Indigenous Community and self-
identified Indigenous individuals were more focused on conservation.  In the following sections, 
we lay out our interpretation of our results: first we outline the limitations in our data, then we 
discuss the shared value of “tradition,” and lastly, we follow with a discussion of how the critical 
value of “power over resources” fostered the divergence in policy interpretation and action, 
underpinning conflict. We propose that the conservation-focused frame, combined with policy 
which supports these values, influenced the Indigenous Community’s preference for a protected 
area as a form of governance, while the fishing union’s resource-focused frame fostered their 
preferences for changes to fisheries management and reliance on current marine resource 
governance. Our ethnographic observations suggest that these different values and subsequent 
frames are rooted in distinct sociopolitical histories and relationships with the environment. 
4.6.1 Limitations in data 
While 9 out 11 values were shared between members of all groups, PERMANOVA offers 
a unique perspective through observing similarity in the overall assemblage of Likert ranked 
responses among groups. In each comparison of the assemblage of questions between groups, 
group type explained only ~10% of the variation in Likert-ranked responses. However, the MDS 
plots reveal distinct assemblages of Likert-ranked responses between each group, driven largely 
111 
 
by differences in responses to two values, “power over resources” and “stimulation.” The MDS 
plots also show a large variation within groups which we attribute to differences in individuals’ 
sex, age, place of birth, etc. which effectively masks the variation attributable to each group. 
However, our relatively small sample size precluded our ability to test these factors individually. 
  Despite our small sample size, we feel that the individuals surveyed accurately represent 
the make-up of the groups. In addition, our ethnographic data also suggests that our sample size 
of individuals (n=44) accurately represents the groups (n=2). We attribute some of the shared 
values to similarities in geographical, social, and economic contexts in which individuals and 
groups are embedded. However, although values may be shared by the two distinct groupings, our 
ethnographic data suggests that the shared values may arise from distinct sociopolitical histories 
and relationships with the environment, which we describe below. Furthermore, we put forward 
that it is the shared value of “tradition”, regarding the importance marine resources to family and 
religious traditions, along with the divergent value of “power over resources,” which fostered the 
difference in policy frames, leading to the conflict in preferences for adaptive governance. 
4.6.2 Shared values: The salience of “tradition” 
Individuals and groups shared 9 of the 11 values measured in the survey, with strong 
sharing occurring between statements that measured values related to family and religious 
“tradition.” It is important to note that shared and differing values indicate the value’s relative 
importance to the group (Schwartz 1992). For example, in the case of Carelmapu, the strongly 
shared value of “tradition” suggests that each group feels that access to marine resources is 
necessary to their cultural, family, and religion traditions. The shared value does not indicate that 
they have the same traditions. This is significant because the differences in their traditions 
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combined with how the groups highly value “tradition” is what underpins interpretations and 
actions related to policy in adaptive governance. 
Individuals in Carelmapu have social and cultural ties to resource harvesting and the sea, 
portrayed by our ethnographic data as well as by the strong sharing of the values of “tradition” 
between the groupings. Social and cultural ties to the sea are common in many resource-dependent 
communities where individuals rely on the ocean for many of their family and religious traditions 
(Pitchon 2015). 100% of self-identified Indigenous individuals and 82% non-Indigenous 
individuals agreed or strongly agreed that access to marine resources was necessary to maintaining 
their cultural, family, and/or religious traditions (Figure 2). 
4.6.3 Traditional fishing practices and ancestral roots to the sea: The Indigenous 
Community and Indigenous peoples in Carelmapu 
The Indigenous Community and Indigenous individuals in Carelmapu are part of the 
Lafkenche people, or “People of the Sea,” a group which belongs to the larger population of the 
Mapuche Indigenous people. In our semi-structured interviews, Indigenous individuals said that 
subsistence on marine resources was essential to maintaining their cultural traditions and social 
connections. Interviews with Indigenous individuals highlighted that the Lafkenche people have 
subsisted on marine resources and practiced traditional fishing practices in the region for hundreds 
of years. This was corroborated by Daughters (2018) who wrote that the Lafkenche people have 
harvested fish from the sea using rock and mud-and-stick weirs, cultivated and harvested seaweed 
along the shore, and gathered shellfish through wading along the shore and diving since the 
fifteenth century. They also had an economy based on reciprocity and bartering of marine 
resources until the 1960s when commercialization and the market economy came to the region 
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(Daughters 2018). Indigenous people still use many of these techniques including harvesting 
seaweed from the shore and intertidal zone. 
In the 1973, a coup overthrew Salvador Allende’s government and forcibly placed Chile 
under the regime of Augusto Pinochet (Holton 2004). Under Pinochet’s dictatorship, the Mapuche 
people were heavily persecuted. They were no longer allowed to speak their language or speak 
openly about being indigenous. In March of 1979, the Junta Decree Law No. 2568 was passed 
which stated that Mapuche inhabitants in Chile “ceased to be Indigenous, as did their lands” 
(Holton 2004: 103). Mapuche history was erased from official history textbooks “under the 
doctrine of national security” and the state expanded their jurisdiction over Mapuche lands (Holton 
2004: 103). Consequently, Indigenous people were not taught about Indigenous culture in schools 
or at home. In an interview, one woman elder in the Indigenous Community in Carelmapu said, 
“We never saw benefits from being Indigenous, not like ones you would most expect. We 
would expect to learn from our elders’ roots, but we practically didn’t know anything, we 
didn’t know what an Indigenous community was, what the people did before, because our 
grandparents never taught us because the Indigenous were so discriminated against, we 
were very discriminated against.” 
Despite the persecution of the Mapuche, the Indigenous people maintained a strong 
connection to the land and sea (Daughters 2018; Kowalczyk 2013). The woman elder we 
interviewed spoke of harvesting seaweed and mussels along the shoreline, netting fish, and 
gathering chamomile, mint, and wheat from their gardens. She said that in the 1990s, the Mapuche 
people started “raising their voice, saying that we [the indigenous people] were citizens like any 
other, with rights and duties.” Environmental protection and indigenous movements to reclaim 
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land and natural resources were pervasive throughout Latin America in the 1990s (Kowalczyk 
2013; Tomaselli 2012; Van Cott 2005). In the case of the Mapuche, they demanded autonomy, 
distancing themselves from the Chilean government (Kowalczyk 2013). The Lafkenche 
Indigenous Community in Carelmapu did this through the creation of six smaller Indigenous 
Communities in 1996 and claimed ancestral rights to the sea through the Lafkenche Law in 2008. 
Exercising these rights allowed the Indigenous Communities to continue many of their traditional 
harvesting practices and to develop a plan for a protected area as a means to govern the socio-
ecological system in the face of future environmental change. 
In another interview, an Indigenous leader from Carelmapu said that the environmental 
crisis in 2016 alerted the Indigenous Community to the reality of the threats posed by industry on 
the ecosystem and on their traditional livelihoods, mobilizing community leaders to begin the 
process to create the protected area through the Lafkenche Law. In their opinion, protection of the 
marine ecosystem from industry was essential.  
Our findings suggest that the value of “tradition” is linked to three underlying reasons that 
foster the Indigenous Community’s policy actions in proposing the creation of a protected area. 
Firstly, if the protected area were harmed by contamination from mining or aquaculture industry, 
the Indigenous Community would reserve the right to sue the state. Secondly, a protected area 
would add economic opportunity for the community through the development of ecotourism. 
Indigenous Community leaders said that they wanted to develop ecotour trips which would take 
tourists by boat to explore marine life while also telling tourists the history and stories of the 
community of Carelmapu. The Indigenous Community plans to hold tourism workshops where 
residents of Carelmapu can be trained as tour guides or as business owners. Lastly, the Indigenous 
Community members who want to reclaim their ancestral rights are supported by the Lafkenche 
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Law which recognizes their rights and supports them in maintaining their cultural traditions. One 
Indigenous Community leader said he hopes that with the formation of a protected area, inhabitants 
of Carelmapu can “continue to maintain their rhythm of life, their social well-being—and to 
improve it, to protect our main source of wealth which we get from the sea.” He said that in the 
future, “every child of Carelmapu may have the option to decide to stay in town and not be forced 
to leave because there are no opportunities.” 
It is the Indigenous Community’s traditional fishing practices and cultural connection to 
the ocean which underlies their held value of “tradition” and in part drives their actions related to 
policy to form a protected area for adaptive governance. However, the belief that certain 
individuals and certain groups have historical rights to marine resources is also shared by the 
fishing unions in Carelmapu. Divergence in the conceptualization and meaning of tradition often 
varies across groups (Ingold and Kurtilla 2000), and it is this divergence between which group has 
traditional rights to the resource that in part underpins the conflict in policy actions related to 
adaptive governance. 
4.6.4 Historical fishing rights and fisheries policy: Fishing unions in Carelmapu 
Resource users in fishing unions in Carelmapu have designated access rights to marine 
resources which started in 1991 when governance of marine resources was decentralized under the 
TURFs policy. After two decades of environmental deregulation and overexploitation of fisheries 
during Pinochet’s dictatorship in the 1970s and 1980s, the TURFs policy in 1991 incentivized 
resource users to form local unions to co-manage resources and have access rights to specific 
exploitation areas (Jarvis and Wilen 2016). Resource users harvest from management areas as well 
as from open-access areas. Traditionally, divers access their management areas and the open-
access areas using small boats which have one or two tenders- individuals accompany the diver 
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and take care of boat and the catch while the divers are below the surface of the water. Divers sell 
their catch locally or to processers for national and international markets. In our interviews with 
members of fishing unions, fishers stated that they had historical rights to fishing grounds near 
Carelmapu, including rights to both management areas and open-access areas. In their opinion, 
they have done well managing the marine resources since the formation of the TURFs policy in 
1991.  
With the introduction of the Lafkenche Law, non-Indigenous fishers now feel that shifted 
power away from fishers to the Indigenous Community and that the proposed protected area 
threatened to take away their historical rights to access marine resources. They were unwilling to 
cooperate with the Indigenous Community to create an adaptive governance plan because they 
were concerned that the protected area will harm their ability to access open-access areas. The 
protected area plan would require divers and fishing unions to formulate new management plans 
for any areas outside of the management areas. One diver, who is also the president of his fishing 
union, said, 
“The Lafkenche Law would have been good if it said that the artisanal fishers from unions 
who carried out harvesting in these zones within the proposed protected area did not lose 
their rights to harvest. But the fact is this law makes us lose our rights, there will be no 
more free entry. I have had the opportunity to be in several conversations with respect to 
the Lafkenche Law and losing our rights is the main conflict we have with the Indigenous 
Community.” 
Another diver said, 
117 
 
“The president of the Indigenous Community is a teacher and he is not from here, he does
 not depend on the sea. All those free spaces he requested for protection—we work in those
 areas when the management areas are closed. I have worked in those spaces all of my life.” 
We observed that only three leaders of fishing unions discussed the proposed plan of the 
protected area with the Indigenous Community. These meetings were only open to leaders of the 
fishing unions and leaders of the Indigenous Community, in total around twelve people. When the 
fishing union members disagreed with the proposed plan, they offered no new plan or new 
preference for adaptive governance outside of changing harvesting controls. They also refused to 
have any future meetings with the Indigenous Community, and the conflict between the two groups 
grew. 
4.6.5 Power over resources 
Finally, our survey revealed that the two groups diverged in their feelings of power over 
resources. “Power over resources” was measured using two statements: “Humans have control 
over the environment” and “My community should have control of marine resources.” While 
individuals and the groups agree that they communities should have control of marine resources, 
there was a significant difference between the groups’ responses to the statement “humans have 
control over the environment.” Members of fishing unions were split evenly between those who 
agreed that humans can control the environment (43%) and members who disagreed with the 
statement (46%). Similarly, 48% of non-Indigenous individuals agreed with the statement and 39% 
disagreed. In contrast, the 89% of the Indigenous Community and 91% of Indigenous individuals 
disagreed that humans were in control of the environment. 
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Indigenous people in Carelmapu did not see themselves as controllers of the environment, 
but instead saw themselves as uniquely tied to marine resources and responsible for the sea’s 
protection from industry and overexploitation. We suggest that how Indigenous people responded 
to this statement exemplifies a unique Indigenous ontology, or way of being, that contributes to 
their conservation-focused frame. Members of the Indigenous Community and Indigenous divers 
described their relationship with the marine environment as reciprocal. They stated that if they 
conserved and protected the environment, the sea would replenish its resources and take care of 
them for generations. This belief influenced their preference for a protected area. One Indigenous 
Community member and diver in a fishing union said, 
“For me, this sea is my sea, it is the sea of my daughters, it is the sea of my grandchildren, 
and of the generations that come, so if I can have the opportunity to protect it, that is what 
I am going to do. That is within my hands to protect. The effects of the red tide were evil 
but came for a good reason because we woke up, we just realized we need to take more 
protective measures at sea.” 
Many Indigenous groups around the world have ontologies embedded in their relationship 
with the environment where they see the relationship as one which strives for unity between 
humans and nature (Nadasdy 2007; Royal 2002; Schmidt and Dowsley 2010). In studies of other 
Indigenous communities in Latin America, this belief in reciprocity has been shown to influence 
preferences and policy actions in the context of environmental change. For example, in the Cusco 
Region of Peru, Quecha communities have been shown to hold the value “ayni” which is a value 
rooted in reciprocity that “implies that all elements of natural give and receive to contribute to the 
harmony of the world” (Walshe and Argumedo 2016: 167). This value is equated to the concept 
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and political movement of buen vivir in Bolivia and Ecuador which emphasizes climate justice 
and adaptive governance created by Indigenous peoples (Gudynas 2011; Walsh 2010). 
 These ontologies based in conservation-oriented, reciprocal values foster the development 
of community-based adaptation strategies where communities take measures to protect the 
environment and sustain their knowledge systems and Indigenous practices to reduce their 
vulnerability to environmental change (Mugambiwa 2018). In Carelmapu, these values, in 
conjunction with the policy support from the Lafkenche Law, contributed to the Indigenous 
peoples’ frames related to policy action where individuals began the process to create the protected 
area to maintain their traditional ways of life and adapt to environmental change—even if this 
meant decreasing resource exploitation. 
In contrast, non-Indigenous individuals and members of fishing unions were divided over 
whether they agreed that humans have control over the environment. Few non-Indigenous resource 
users had preferences for governance outside of changes in controls in marine resource 
management. For example, union members discussed switching to the harvest of sea urchins or 
finfish when they are unable to harvest other shellfish because of algal blooms. A diver said, 
“Well there is no specific plan because one, that is, there is no way to prevent red tides in 
the future. We could diversify the activity of diving in the coastal edge with some 
harvesting of fish. However, currently the records and resources are practically closed. If 
I could dive and shoot fish, I could have an alternative, but according to the legislation 
they are closed.” 
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 This form of governance is not an uncommon preference—many humans respond to 
environmental change by looking to increase controls over resources (Holling et al. 1996; Folke 
et al. 2005). Our ethnographic interviews demonstrated that many non-Indigenous resource users’ 
attitudes remain focused on resource extraction. This may suggest that they have a different 
ontology than the Indigenous community, a way of being which is based in resource extraction 
instead of conservation. Individuals’ resource extraction focuses and their resistance to change 
their rights to resources has been shown in other studies of Chilean resource users, particularly 
fishing union members under the TURFs policy (Gelcich et al. 2009; Gelcich et al. 2015). 
Although resource users have become more empowered to become stewards in governance 
through the implementation of the TURFs policy, they believe their livelihoods are at risk (Gelcich 
et al. 2009) and are unwilling to relinquish their rights (Gelcich et al. 2017). Even prior to the 
Lafkenche Law in 2008, fishers perceived that their open-access areas were becoming scarce, in 
large part because of the proliferation of aquaculture (Ebel 2018) and the creation of state-run non-
Indigenous marine protected areas (Gelcich et al. 2009). With the implementation of the Lafkenche 
Law and the ability for Indigenous Communities to create protected areas, fishers interpreted the 
law as a threat and perceived their traditional rights being taken away. Their resource-focused 
frame influenced their policy action, where they resisted working with the Indigenous Community 
in Carelmapu, and instead sought changes in harvesting controls in fisheries management. 
According to Schwartz et al. (2012) , the variable “power over resources” reflects a 
motivational continuum. This could signify that the individual or group values are opposite in 
relation to one another and are thus incompatible and may cause conflict. For example, in her 
qualitative study of Hampton Roads, VA, Havercamp (2017) found that the dominant values of 
groups were “power” and “security” which were in structural opposition to the values which 
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fostered social and environmental justice. These values, she stated, were a key factor underpinning 
conflict in adaptation in Hampton Roads, VA.  In contrast, our quantitative measures showed 
divergence in only two statements associated with two values, while most individual and groups 
values were shared. The divergence in the value “power over resources” illustrates how although 
the value systems may not be divergent, they may suggest different frames related to policy 
interpretation and action, specifically with regards to conservation and environmental governance. 
4.7 Conclusion: Ontologies, frames, friction, and policy actions 
Recent calls in adaptation studies advocate for more attention to community-level factors 
which influence behavior and decision-making in the context of environmental change (Adger et 
al. 2013; Agrawal 2008). Attention to human values in the context of how individuals and 
institutions frame policy interpretations and action is essential because it is human values that 
demonstrate individual or group desires, preferences, and objectives (O’Brien and Wolf 2010; 
Schwartz 1992; 1994). However, these value systems must be examined within the context of 
historical systems of oppression and new state policies which shift power in environmental 
governance. Situating individual and institutional values within historical and sociopolitical 
context illustrates how and why individuals and institutions interpret policies, how they are 
affected by the existing political structures, and why they may pursue certain policy actions. It is 
this situated understanding which may reveal individual and group ontologies. Within the context 
of local to global engagement, these ontologies may meet to create areas of friction (Tsing 2004; 
2012) which can contribute to understandings of conflict and explanations of how individuals and 
local communities interact with structure at the national and international level (Tsing 2004).   
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This paper examined values underlying individual and institutional frames related to 
conflict in policy interpretations and actions in adaptive governance at the local scale. This values-
based approach illustrated that the Indigenous Community and fishing unions had divergent 
ontologies which are based in relationships with the environment, history, and sociopolitical 
context. These ontologies underpin the individual and institutional policy frames. These frames, 
combined with ethnographic explanations of the political structures and historical systems of 
oppression, explain individual and institutional preferences actions related to adaptive governance. 
Thus, we suggest that a values-based approach can address areas of friction and elucidate 
individual and institutional frames which can provide information on how individuals and groups 
understand policy and interact with political structures. Furthermore, such an approach can 
illuminate why conflict might exist between groups. Future studies should seek to understand how 
ontologies and interpretations of political structure are articulated through individuals’ discourse 
to illuminate how divergent identities and conflict emerge through local to global connections and 
create new areas of friction (Tsing 2004). 
Lastly, our mixed methods approach integrating qualitative ethnographic data with 
quantitative measures offers unique insights into how culturally embedded values at multiple 
levels underlie conflict or disagreement over appropriate responses to environmental change. 
Moreover, differentiation and/or consensus at the individual level has important implications for 
group-level collective action and the formation of adaptive, transformative governance. Adaptive 
governance requires individual levels of agency, shared values and cooperation between groups, 
and the creation of ordered rule and collective action, thus the understanding of the factors which 
may contribute to conflict in preferences for adaptive governance at the local level is imperative. 
The outcomes of this study suggest the integration of quantitative and ethnographic methods can 
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further understandings of how values contribute to various preferences and policy actions with 
implications for potentially mitigating conflict in resource-dependent communities undergoing 
often rapid and complex environmental change. 
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CHAPTER 5 
STRUCTURE, AGENCY, AND WICKED PROBLEMS: THEORETICAL, 
METHODOLOGICAL, AND POLICY CONTRIBUTIONS TO STUDIES OF SOCIO-
ECOLOGICAL GOVERNANCE 
5.1 Addressing wicked problems through insights from anthropology 
Through the case study of Chile’s Lakes Region, we see how global processes, such as 
climate change and socioeconomic change, play out at the local scale to create areas of friction, 
but also potential for transformation. This study demonstrates that it is the interactions between 
individual and group ontologies, their relationships with the environment, historical processes of 
engagement or oppression, and individual and institutional interactions with political structures 
which create these spaces for friction or transformation. These insights from anthropology help to 
situate the “wicked” problem of governance, one with no technical solution that requires 
governance that brings together the collective judgment of stakeholders (Jentoft and Chuenpagdee 
2009), in processes of social and cultural change. To address these wicked problems, most studies 
of environmental governance focus on the determinants of good governance (Adger 2000; Cote 
and Nightingale 2012; Tompkins and Adger 2004). However, a sole focus on outcomes in the 
system ignores the nature of the problem’s shifting components and the cultural and social factors 
which may inhibit governance transformations (Cote and Nightingale 2012; Jenoft and 
Chuenpagdee 2009). Studies of socio-ecological systems must not treat the systems as static nor 
only seek to evaluate determinants of successful governance (Cote and Nightingale 2012; Jentoft 
and Chuenpagdee 2009). Instead, studies must elucidate the details of the problem facing the 
system (Jenotft and Chuenpagdee 2009) as well as the process of how individuals are constrained 
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by or interact with governance structures (Cote and Nightingale 2012) to illuminate how 
transformations in governance can occur at multiple scales. 
In this multi-level analysis of individuals and institutions in the Lakes Region of Chile, I 
have addressed these gaps in knowledge by exploring the relationship between individuals, 
institutions, and governance structure to examine the social, cultural, and political factors which 
may facilitate or constrain the transformation in governance at the local scale, with attention to 
legislative structure, shifting power dynamics, conflict, and differential access to resources. By 
doing so, my dissertation makes several unique contributions theory, methodological approaches 
to studies of governance, and applications to policy. In this chapter, I will summarize the 
theoretical, methodological, and applied contributions this study offers, not only anthropological 
understandings of marine and coastal governance, but broader understandings of socio-ecological 
systems. 
5.2 Theoretical contributions to studies of governance in socio-ecological systems 
This dissertation contributes to studies of governance in socio-ecological systems by 
bridging anthropological theories of structure and agency with studies of socio-ecological 
governance as a “wicked problem.” I draw on anthropological perspectives on structure and 
agency (Bourdieu 1977; Giddens 1979; Radcliffe-Brown 1952) to illuminate how diverse 
stakeholders at the local scale experience differential abilities to transform environmental 
governance. A focus on the relationship between structure, agency, and governance can help 
studies move away analyzing the determinants of governance to instead see governance as a 
constantly evolving, dynamic process. Furthermore, the integration of Giddens (1979)’s theories 
of structure and agency into studies of governance can help better articulate patterns of social 
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processes and shifting power dynamics to address the gaps in understanding of how diverse 
stakeholders and existing governance structures complicate governance transformations. Chile’s 
TURFs co-management system did not recognize the diversity of stakeholders in its 
implementation in 1991. However, with new legislative policies under the Fisheries and 
Aquaculture Law, such as the Aquaculture Law (2003), Lafkenche Law (2008), and legislation to 
promote management committees (2013), political structures now recognize the diversity. These 
new structures have created new opportunities for collaboration while simultaneously creating 
areas of friction, shifting in power away from fishing unions to new ocean users. This shift in 
power dynamics away from fishing unions to aquaculture companies and Indigenous communities 
has created a contentious platform to bring together the collective judgment of stakeholders to 
transform governance. 
 Using this theoretical approach, my dissertation findings demonstrate that individuals and 
institutions at the community-level have different abilities to transform governance, and their 
abilities are affected by their interactions with overarching legistlative structures (Chapter 3). I 
demonstrate that there are different outcomes in communities’ abilities to transform governance 
because of how diverse stakeholders interact with or are impacted by legislative structures 
(Chapter 3). These findings are essential to understanding the formation of adaptive governance 
in socio-ecological systems because they show that even in similar cultural and biophysical 
contexts and under the same legislative structures, there are social, cultural, and political factors 
which may facilitate or inhibit the transformation of governance. For example, in Ancud, fishers 
enacted their agency by drawing upon their collective management preferences and social 
networks with government officials and universities to create a management committee with 
Subpesca. However, in the nearby community of Carelmapu, fishers did not organize, felt 
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dispossessed of their ocean space, and resisted any form of cooperation with the Indigenous 
communities because fishers felt threatened by the creation of an ECMPO. 
 I explored these differential outcomes further by examining the values underlying individual 
and institution frames related to policy actions in adaptive governance. By doing so, I illustrated 
the potential ontological and structural reasons why the Indigenous Community can enact their 
conservation-focused frames, and why fishing unions refused to cooperate with the Indigenous 
Community, instead focusing their effots on changing harvesting controls in fisheries management 
(Chapter 4). This study’s findings are significant to understandings of adaptive goverance in socio-
ecological systems because they begin to address the gap in understanding how culture and 
structure affects individuals’ and groups’ abilities to transform governance. It also points to the 
need to dig deeper into understanding how cultural worldviews and interpretations affect behaviors 
and actions related to the formation of governance and the ability to individuals to adapt under the 
context of global change. 
 Lastly, to illustrate the individual factors which may constrain or facilitate transformations in 
governance, I used these anthropological concepts to show how many fishers in the Lakes Region 
were only able to cope during environment crisis, instead of being able to draw upon their agency 
to act collectively to transform their livelihoods and the governance structure (Chapter 2). This 
ethnographic study illustrated that fishers’ inabilities to transform governance during an 
environmental crisis was in large part due to the lack of their resources, such as other job 
opportunities, formal education, transportation, and healthcare (Chapter 2). Further, the study 
highlights that a theoretical focus which suggests that livelihood diversification during crisis 
scenarios as a form of resilience may essentialize resource-dependent communities, ignore the 
power relations and structural impediments, and overlook individuals’ desires for transformative 
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adaptation and resilience. These findings are vital to studies of environmental governance because 
understandings of environmental governance are often focused on successful outcomes and ignore 
the individual-level and structural factors that affect individuals’ behaviors and abilities to act. 
This study illuminates the need to focus on structures which go beyond solely marine resource 
management to ask questions of broader ocean governance and questions external to marine 
governance, such as education and healthcare structures, which affect individuals’ well-being and 
their abilities to enact their own agency. 
5.3 Methodological contributions to studies of socio-ecological systems 
 In this dissertation, I use multi-level analysis of individuals and institutions to illustrate how 
diverse stakeholders, bound by the same state legislative structures and affected by similar 
environmental problems, have different abilities to facilitate the transformation from co-
management to adaptive governance. The multi-level study allows for the examination of how 
individuals and institutions are affected by, interact with, and contest policy between different sites 
over time (Wright and Reinhold 2011). Further, the study integrates ethnography into 
examinations of governance. Studies of socio-ecological governance often lack ethnography 
(Fabinyi, Foale, and Macintyre 2015; Poe, Norman, and Levin 2014), but ethnography can 
illuminate the processes of governance transformations and the social, cultural, and political 
factors which affect individuals’ and institutions’ abilities to transform governance. 
 By using ethnography in the study of environmental governance in the Lakes Region, I learned 
that even at the local scale, individual and institutional abilities to transform governance vary 
widely. In studies of socio-ecological systems and environmental governance, studies often 
assume that individuals and institutions have the same objectives, preferences, and needs related 
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governance (Coulthard 2012). Yet, my ethnographic data illustrate that individuals have varying 
objectives and preferences for governance which influence their actions related to policy (Chapter 
4). Further, the study demonstrates that individuals may be differentially affected by the lack of 
resources which inhibits their abilities to transform governance (Chapter 2). For example, even in 
the small community of Carelmapu, home to 2,800 people, individuals and institutions differ in 
their preferences and policy actions related to adaptive governance (Chapter 4). While individuals 
in the Indigenous Community want to create an ECMPO to promote conservation and tourism, 
non-Indigenous fisheries in fishing unions want to maintain the TURFs co-management structure 
and continue to harvest from open-access areas. To understand the friction, which had structural 
roots from the Lafkenche Law, I then incorporated measures of human values. However, the 
quantitative measures of human values explained little without further interpretation using 
ethnography which illustrated the ontological and political reasons why the two groups which 
underpinned conflict in their preferences and actions related to transformations to adaptive 
governance. 
 Furthermore, employing ethnography as a method to understand governance transformations 
offered insights into why legislative structures plays out differently in two locales in the same 
region. My comparative study of Ancud and Carelmapu (Chapter 3) examined policy and 
governance structures using ethnography to illustrate why the two communities experienced 
different outcomes in their abilities to transform to polycentric governance. This comparative case 
study illuminates the need for studies of governance to incorporate ethnography to explore the 
process of governance transformations. Further, the use of ethnography demonstrates how the 
interplay between political structure and individuals may have differential outcomes in 
communities’ abilities to individuals to transform environmental governance. 
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5.4 Policy implications and recommendations 
 This research demonstrates that policies which address only one sector, such as fisheries 
management, may become obsolete or ineffective in a globalized, rapidly changing socio-
ecological system. The TURFs policy, when implemented in 1991, was considered an ideal form 
of governance in fisheries—a structure which empowered fishers at the local level and restored 
the abundance and diversity of nearshore benthic resources (Moreno and Revenga). However, the 
TURFs policy in 1991 did not have to contend with the proliferation of aquaculture or state 
recognition of ancestral rights to Indigenous Communities. More recent studies suggest that the 
governance of TURFs has problems related to lack of enforcement and increased poaching in 
management areas (Gelcich et al. 2017) as well as distrust between fishers and the government 
which inhibit successful transformations from TURFs co-management to polycentric governance 
(Gelcich et al. 2019). My study corroborates and adds to these findings and suggests that we should 
revisit the idea of TURFs as an ideal form of governance. Discussion of TURFs as a form of 
governance must be complicated further by understandings of politics, diversity at the local and 
regional level, diverse ontologies at the local level, and willingness or unwillingness of 
stakeholders to cooperate between groups. It is through complicating this form of governance that 
we can see ways to transform co-management to polycentric governance to become more adaptive 
in light of global change. 
 Thus, this dissertation suggests that the adaptation of existing policies or formation of new 
governance structures must consider the diversity of stakeholders and their various objectives and 
needs, as well as how political structures create areas of friction and/or transformation. 
131 
 
Furthermore, policies need to go beyond delineating spaces in the ocean which exclude users by 
addressing the fluidity of stakeholders’ engagement with each other and resources to address the 
evolving nature of the socio-ecological system. 
5.5 Calls for future research 
This study makes evident the need for research which moves away from solely examining 
determinants of successful governance to seeing governance as a process. Furthermore, it suggests 
that studies of adaptive governance in socio-ecological systems can integrate understandings of 
structure and agency and friction to elucidate local to global connections and the social, cultural, 
and political reasons why governance transformations may or may not occur. Furthermore, I 
believe my dissertation began to elucidate understandings of social change, in large part because I 
employed ethnography. Thus, this dissertation calls for more ethnographic studies of 
environmental governance because of the method’s ability to illuminate processes of social and 
political change at the community level which can explain outcomes in governance 
transformations. 
5.6 Directions for Future Research 
My dissertation demonstrates that there is a need to conduct long-term studies of the 
transformation of governance in marine socio-ecological systems which integrate ethnography 
with anthropological understandings of structure and human agency. In the future, I aim to develop 
a longitudinal study of this region to illustrate the process of governance transformations and the 
cultural and social factors which facilitate or constrain the transformation. I am particularly 
interested in the factors which facilitate or hinder social well-being in the context of environmental 
governance and socioeconomic change. I would like to design research which addresses not only 
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questions of ocean governance, but also how other factors, such as healthcare and education, may 
affect social well-being and transformations in governance. My objective in this research is to 
illuminate how individuals’ visions for their own well-being influence their preferences and needs 
for governance. I aim to create participatory approaches to understand diverse individuals’ and 
groups’ objectives, needs, and desires for governance across varying scales and geographic 
locations, and to create qualitative and quantitative metrics of well-being. Indicators of well-being 
can be scalable across geographic space and transcend the context of fishing communities to be 
applicable in other natural resource-dependent regions. Furthermore, these metrics can be used for 
local and regional decision-making as a baseline to assess the social outcomes of environmental 
governance. Social well-being provides a framework to illuminate a more nuanced understanding 
of the aspects which foster successful governance transformations and is a framework which can 
address the needs of diverse stakeholders alongside the need for conservation. 
Lastly, I would like to develop and write an ethnography of the Lakes Region’s 
sociopolitical and environmental change by following resource users’ lived experiences, starting 
with Pinochet’s dictatorship up through their current struggle for power in the conflict for ocean 
space with large-scale aquaculture industry. I have been closely connected to individuals in the 
Lakes Region for nine years and would like to compile my experiences in the region to further my 
own understandings of how sociopolitical history and institutional factors affect individual 
behavior to build off insights in anthropology as to why actors have differential opportunities to 
exercise agency to have access to decision-making (Agrawal 2005; Cleaver 2007). I would like to 
engage with Anna Tsing’s literature on friction to illuminate the local to global connections, as I 
feel the case study of the Lakes Region can add significant insight into these relationships. By 
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doing so, I hope to illuminate why actors experience or do not experience equitable outcomes, 
situating their experiences in a globalized context.  
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APPENDICES 
Appendix 1. Informed Consent 
Consentimiento informado para el proyecto de Sarah Ebel 
Usted está invitado a participar en un proyecto de investigación como parte de la Universidad de 
Programa de Política Ambiental de la Antropología y de Maine diseñada por PI Sarah Ebel 
(Departamento de Antropología) y su profesora, Dr. Christine Beitl (Departmento de 
Antropologia). El propósito de la entrevista es aprender acerca como su adaptó a los cambios de 
la marea roja. Las entrevistas se llevarán a cabo por Sarah Ebel y Maribel Bustamante Toro. Debe 
tener al menos 18 años de edad para participar. 
¿Qué va a pedir que haga? 
Si está de acuerdo, se le pedirá a participar en una entrevista de 45-60 minutos dependiendo de 
su tiempo y disposición a elaborar en cada pregunta. Con sólo su permiso, me gustaría grabar la 
conversación con una grabadora de voz digital. Para continuar, vamos a hacerle una serie de 
preguntas acerca de su conocimiento del ecosistema, su sindicato, y las cosas ustedes hicieron a 
adaptarse a los cambios en el mar. 
 
¿Hay riesgos o beneficios? 
Los únicos riesgos asociados con este estudio son inconvenientes y su tiempo. 
Sus ventajas incluyen la oportunidad de compartir su conocimiento de la gestión de los recursos 
bentónicos en Chile. Esta forma de conocimiento y cómo los sindicatos y cooperar puede ser 
beneficioso tanto para los pescadores y los administradores de las pesquerías en Chile y en todo 
el mundo. Usted será capaz de compartir su voz con el gobierno y la comunidad científica que 
pueden ayudar a mejorar la gestión de la pesca. 
 
Nota de confidencialidad 
Su nombre no aparece en todos los documentos o informes y las conclusiones se informó en un 
resumen de mantener su confidencialidad. Vamos a utilizar un número de código en lugar de su 
nombre en el papel de grabación y audio de la entrevista. Una de las claves del papel que une el 
código con el nombre que se almacenará en el escritorio bloqueado de Ebel en la Universidad de 
Maine. Este proyecto puede durar hasta el 1 de mayo 2019 y el documento de la vinculación de 
su nombre y el número de código será destruido por el 1 de mayo 2019. Todos los archivos de 
audio y transcripciones serán guardados en un disco duro externo en el escritorio bloqueado de 
Ebel. Los archivos de audio y transcripciones sin información de identificación se mantendrán 
indefinidamente en el disco duro externo. 
 
Voluntario 
Su participación es voluntaria. Si decide participar en este estudio, puede parar en cualquier 
momento. Puede saltarse cualquier pregunta que no desee responder. 
 
¿Preguntas? 
Si usted tiene alguna pregunta acerca de la investigación, es posible que no dude en ponerse en 
contacto con el Co-PI Sarah Ebel en la siguiente dirección: 
 
146 
 
Sarah Ebel, Departamento de Antropología 
5770 S Stevens Hall, Orono, ME 04469 a 5770 
Teléfono: (860) 707-0613; E-mail: sarah.ebel@maine.edu 
 
O, Facultad Patrocinador: 
Dr. Christine Beitl, Departamento de Antropología 
Teléfono: (207) 581-1893; E-Mail: christine.beitl@maine.edu 
 
Si usted tiene alguna pregunta sobre sus derechos como participante en la investigación, por 
favor, póngase en contacto con Gayle Jones, asistente de la Universidad de Maine de Protección 
de Sujetos Humanos de la Junta de Revisión. 
 
Gayle Jones, Oficina del Vicepresidente de Investigación 
Teléfono: +1 (207) 581-1498; E - mail: gayle.jones@umit.maine.edu 
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Appendix 2. Semi-structured Interview (administered 2016 and 2018) 
Disertación: Visiones del mar y acción colectiva en las áreas de manejo de los recursos 
bentónicos después de la Marea Roja en 2016 
Semiestructurada Protocolo de Entrevista 
 
Fecha: _______   Número Entrevista: _______ 
 
• Gracias por aceptar participar (presentes y explicar el consentimiento informado). 
Este proyecto se lleva a cabo a través del Departamento de Antropología de la Universidad de 
Maine para la tesis doctoral de Sarah Ebel. El propósito de la entrevista es aprender sobre sus 
conocimientos del ecosistema, sus experiencias, y como respondieron a la marea roja después de 
2016. 
• La entrevista debe tomar 45-60 minutos dependiendo de su tiempo y disposición a elaborar en 
cada pregunta. 
• Con su permiso, nos gustaría grabar la conversación con una grabadora de voz digital. 
• Confidencial: información personal retirado, los resultados reportados en forma agregada para 
proteger su identidad. 
• Voluntario: Si usted no se siente cómodo respondiendo a una pregunta, podemos pasar o 
terminar la entrevista. 
• ¿Tiene alguna pregunta antes de empezar? 
 
I. Línea de base demográfica y la información acerca de la pesca (establecer el contexto de 
sus respuestas) 
 
1) ¿Cuántos años tiene usted?  
 
2) ¿A qué bucear? (si solo dice loco, dice: **¿Algo más? **) 
 
3) ¿Qué sindicato pertenece usted? 
 
 
4) ¿Es usted de una familia de pescadores o buzos? ____ ¿Cuántas generaciones? 1º 2º 3º + 
(círculo) 
 
5) ¿Siempre ha vivido en esta área y ha trabajado como buzo? 
 
 
6) ¿Participa en reuniones o cualesquiera otras asociaciones? 
 
 
7) ¿Tiene la pesca proporciona en la actualidad la mayoría de los ingresos de su familia? 
 
8) Si no es así, ¿lo que proporciona la mayoría de los ingresos de su familia? 
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9) ¿Qué nivel de educación formal usted tiene? 
 
 
10) Y sus hijos, ¿Qué nivel de la educación formal tienen? 
 
 
11) ¿Tiene seguro de salud? ¿Como usted obtiene este? ¿A través del estado, o un sindicato? 
 
 
12) ¿Han otros beneficios que usted recibe desde el sindicato? ¿Qué son? 
 
 
II. Percepciones del mar: hábitat, poblaciones y distribución de especies, el clima, la 
acuicultura… 
 
13) Por favor, marque en el mapa los hábitats, distribución de especies, y otras cosas que usted 
ve en el mar. 
 
(***Usa el mapa y marque las áreas donde los buzos dicen***) 
 
15) (Free List) En general, ¿Qué hace un ecosistema deseable en su opinión? (si necesitas, dice: 
por ejemplo, ¿hay una temperatura del mar que es mejor para algo?) 
 
   
   
   
   
 
16) ¿Por qué estés hábitats o especies son más deseable?  
 
17) (Depende en su respuesta) ¿En el ecosistema, que funciona tiene [este hábitat, o esta 
especie?] 
 
18) ¿Usted nota cambios en el mar? ¿Qué tipos de cambios? ¿Y algo más? (***Por cada cambio, 
le pregunta***): ¿Por cuánto tiempo usted nota este cambio? ¿Los cambios se quedan, o se 
fueron desde poco tiempo? 
 
    
    
    
    
    
    
 
19) ¿En este tiempo, cuales los problemas en el mar? 
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III. Las percepciones de la marea roja y la acción colectiva (***dimensiones de capacidad 
adaptiva***) 
 
1. Social Capital 
 
20) ¿Usted pertenece a asociaciones, organizaciones, o grupos en su comunidad? (¿Y sigue, 
“algo más?”) 
 
 
21) ¿Usted habla con socios de su sindicato en un base regular? ¿Cuántas veces cada semana? 
¿Con quién habla? 
 
 
22) ¿Usted habla con otra gente en su comunidad? ***Sigue…*** ¿Afuera de su comunidad? 
***Sigue***… ¿Como la conoce? 
 
 
23) ¿Había confianza con sus dirigentes? ¿O entre buzos en su sindicato? ¿Había la confianza 
entre sindicatos en esta región? 
 
 
24) ¿Tiene confianza en el gobierno? (si o no, sigue…) ¿Por qué? 
 
 
2. Agency  
 
25) ¿Como usted y su familia respondió cuando la marea roja pasó? 
 
 
26) ¿Sus ingresos recuperaron después de la marea roja? 
 
 
27) ¿Como el sindicato respondió a la marea roja? ¿Había reuniones en su sindicato cuando la 
marea roja pasó? 
 
 
28) ¿Había tipos de acción en su comunidad a discutir o a responder a la marea roja? 
 
 
 
29) ¿Había conversaciones sobre la marea roja entre los sindicatos en región X? 
 
 
30) ¿Si había, sobre que parte de la marea roja? ¿Ustedes hablan con la federación o hablan con 
la confederación nacional? 
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31) ¿Ve cambios a las políticas a adaptarse a los cambios en el mar? 
 
3. Infraestructura 
 
32) ¿Su comunidad tiene una municipalidad o centro de municipalidad? 
 
 
33) ¿Hay una escuela primera? ¿Hay un colegio? 
 
 
34) ¿Si por favor, describe la trasportación acá- hay buses? ¿Cuántas veces cada día sirven 
Puerto Montt u otros lugares? 
 
 
35) ¿Hay médicos en su comunidad? ¿Hay un hospital? Si o, donde tiene que ir si necesita un 
médico/hospital? 
 
 
36) ¿Cuándo la marea roja pasó, como afectó la infraestructura en su comunidad? Por ejemplo, 
¿había infraestructura a ayudar su comunidad a adaptar? 
 
 
37) ¿La marea roja influyó la construcción de infraestructura nueva? (si sí, sigue…) ¿Qué tipo, y 
por qué?  
 
4. Learning 
 
38) ¿Los cambios en el mar desde la marea roja duraron mucho tiempo? ¿Cuánto tiempo? 
¿Cuáles cambios duraron la mayoría del tiempo? 
 
39) ¿Usted cambió sus prácticas del buzo después de la marea roja? 
 
40) ¿Usted o su sindicato cambió sus mercados o donde venden sus productos después de la 
marea roja? 
 
41) ¿Los cambios en sus mercados duraron mucho tiempo? ¿Cuánto tiempo? ¿Como ajustaron? 
 
IV. Visiones del mar 
 
42) ¿Cuáles son sus visiones del mar para el futuro? 
 
 
43) ¿Que quiere usted por el futuro de su trabajo y familia? ¿Como llegar a un bienestar? 
 
 
44) ¿Usted tiene preferencias de manejo para la pesca artesanal? ¿Cuál son? 
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Appendix 3. Structured Survey (administered April-May 2018) 
Nombre de Comuna: ____________________________________ 
Nombre de Sindicato o/y Comunidad Indígena:______________________________________ 
I. Datos de base demografico 
 
1. ¿Cuántos años tiene usted?  ______________ 
 
2. Su sexo:    M  /  F 
 
3. Usted trabaja como (encierre cada una que aplica a usted): 
Buzo  Pescador Artesanal  Recolector  Otro: _____________ 
4. ¿A cuáles asociaciones pertenece usted? (por favor, marca cada una que usted 
pertenece) 
a. Sindicato   d. CONDEPP Chile  g. Comité de Manejo 
b. Federación  e. CONFEPACH  h. La Mesa de la Marea Roja 
c. CONAPACH  f. Comunidad Indígena  i. Otro: 
_________________ 
l. No pertenezco a una 
asociación. 
 
5. ¿Usted es dirigente de su sindicato/comunidad indígena? (circulo):  Si / No 
 
6. Usted es indígena (no significa que necesita estar en una comunidad indígena):   Si  /  
No 
 
7. ¿Cuál es su nivel de educación?: _______________ 
 
8. Su lugar de nacimiento: _____________________ 
 
9. ¿Ha salido alguna vez a trabajar fuera de su caleta o comuna? Si / No 
 
10. Si sĺ, ¿dónde fue usted a trabajar? ________________________________________ 
 
11. ¿Por qué usted salió a trabajar afuera de la comuna? (por favor escribe en el espacio 
abajo) 
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12. ¿Cuánto dinero ganan usted y su familia al mes? _____________________________ 
 
13. Sus hijos (por favor, marca cada una que aplica: 
a. Bucean en la pesca artesanal  d. Están en la universidad 
b. Trabajan en la pesca artesanal   e. Están en el colegio/el liceo 
c. Trabajan en las salmoneras   f. Otro: _________________ 
 
14. ¿Si usted es buzo, cuantas veces bucea al mes? _________________________ 
 
15. ¿En qué profundidad usted bucea normalmente? _________________________ 
 
16. ¿Tiene usted una enfermedad de buceo?  Si / No 
 
17. ¿Usted buseaba durante al marea rojo? Si / No  
 
18. ¿Durante de la marea roja en el 2016, usted recibió un bono?  Si / No 
 
19. ¿Usted tiene una cuenta con el Banco Estado para recibir el bono?     Si / No 
 
 
II. Participación en Asociaciones 
 
20.  ¿Cuántas veces al mes usted participa en reuniones de sus asociaciones en total? 
a. 1 vez  b. 2 veces  c. 3 veces  d. más que 3 veces 
Por favor, lee la frase y marca si usted está muy de acuerdo, en acuerdo, no sabe, está en 
desacuerdo, o está en muy desacuerdo. Marca la respuesta que más refleja lo que piensa 
usted. 
21. Yo creo que es importante que nuestro sindicato tome decisiones en conjunto.  
a. Estoy muy de acuerdo  b. Estoy en acuerdo  c.  No sé 
b. d. Estoy de desacuerdo e. Estoy muy desacuerdo 
 
22. Me gusta bucear porque me siento independiente. 
a. Estoy muy de acuerdo  b. Estoy en acuerdo  c.  No sé 
d. Estoy de desacuerdo e. Estoy muy desacuerdo 
 
23. Soy un líder en mi comunidad. 
 
a. Estoy muy de acuerdo  b. Estoy en acuerdo      c. No sé  
d. Estoy de desacuerdo  e. Estoy muy desacuerdo 
 
153 
 
24. Estoy optimista por el futuro de mi comunidad. 
 
a. Estoy muy de acuerdo  b. Estoy en acuerdo c. No sé  
d.   Estoy de desacuerdo  e. Estoy muy desacuerdo 
25. Siento que la acuicultura está cambiando el medioambiente  y no hay nada que 
puedo hacer. 
a. Estoy muy de acuerdo b. Estoy en acuerdo c. No sé  
d.    Estoy de desacuerdo e. Estoy muy desacuerdo 
26. Mi comunidad debería tener control del manejo de los recursos del mar. 
a. Estoy muy de acuerdo  b.  Estoy en acuerdo     c. No sé 
d. Estoy de desacuerdo  e. Estoy muy desacuerdo 
27. Siento que es mejor si compartimos el manejo del mar con el gobierno. 
a. Estoy muy de acuerdo  b. Estoy en acuerdo  c. No sé . 
d. Estoy de desacuerdo  e. Estoy muy desacuerdo 
 
28. Siento que la situación del manejo de los recursos del mar está bien y no tiene que 
cambiar. 
a. Estoy muy de acuerdo  b. Estoy en acuerdo  c. No sé . 
e. Estoy de desacuerdo  e. Estoy muy desacuerdo 
 
29. Yo tengo derechos a los recursos del mar. 
a. Estoy muy de acuerdo  b. Estoy en acuerdo  c. No sé . 
f. Estoy de desacuerdo  e. Estoy muy desacuerdo 
 
 
30. Me siento desanimado sobre mi futuro y el futuro de mi comunidad. 
a. Estoy muy de acuerdo b. Estoy en acuerdo c. No sé  
d. Estoy de desacuerdo e. Estoy muy desacuerdo 
 
31. Creo que el cambio en el ecosistema y la economía del mar es una oportunidad para 
que nuestra comunidad pueda hacer algo diferente. 
a. Estoy muy de acuerdo b. Estoy en acuerdo    c. No sé 
d. Estoy de desacuerdo e. Estoy muy desacuerdo 
32. Me siento satisfecho con mi trabajo. 
 
a. Estoy muy de acuerdo b. Estoy en acuerdo    c. No sé 
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d. Estoy de desacuerdo e. Estoy muy desacuerdo 
33. Los humanos tienen el control de la naturaleza. 
a. Estoy muy de acuerdo b. Estoy en acuerdo    c. No sé 
d. Estoy de desacuerdo e. Estoy muy desacuerdo 
34. Cada día, yo tengo los recursos y el apoyo que necesito para hacer mi trabajo y 
cuidar a mi familia. 
a. Estoy muy de acuerdo b. Estoy en acuerdo    c. No sé 
d. Estoy de desacuerdo e. Estoy muy desacuerdo 
35.  Siento que mi trabajo es valorado por otros. 
 
a. Estoy muy de acuerdo b. Estoy en acuerdo    c. No sé 
d. Estoy de desacuerdo e. Estoy muy desacuerdo 
36. El acceso a los recursos marinos es necesario para mantener mi cultura y mis 
tradiciones religiosas o familiares. 
a. Estoy muy de acuerdo b. Estoy en acuerdo    c. No sé 
d. Estoy de desacuerdo e. Estoy muy desacuerdo 
37. Creo que todas las personas merecen acceso a recursos naturales. 
a. Estoy muy de acuerdo b. Estoy en acuerdo    c. No sé 
d. Estoy de desacuerdo e. Estoy muy desacuerdo 
38. Es mi responsabilidad cuidar la naturaleza y los recursos naturales. 
a. Estoy muy de acuerdo b. Estoy en acuerdo    c. No sé 
d. Estoy de desacuerdo e. Estoy muy desacuerdo 
39. Los puntos de vistas que son diferentes de los míos son importantes a considerar 
cuando tomamos decisiones del manejo de recursos del mar. 
 
a. Estoy muy de acuerdo b. Estoy en acuerdo    c. No sé 
d. Estoy de desacuerdo e. Estoy muy desacuerdo 
40.  Siento que mi asociación puede tener influencia en la política del mar, como la ley de 
pesca y acuicultura. 
 
a. Estoy muy de acuerdo b. Estoy en acuerdo    c. No sé 
d. Estoy de desacuerdo e. Estoy muy desacuerdo 
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41. Siento que las confederaciones nacionales, como CONAPACH, CONFEPACH y 
CONDEPP, representan las cosas que mi sindicato necesita. 
 
a. Estoy muy de acuerdo b. Estoy en acuerdo    c. No sé 
d. Estoy de desacuerdo e. Estoy muy desacuerdo 
42. Yo tengo la información y los recursos que necesito para entender las políticas del 
mar. 
 
a. Estoy muy de acuerdo b. Estoy en acuerdo    c. No sé 
d. Estoy de desacuerdo e. Estoy muy desacuerdo 
43. A veces, yo hablo con los políticos, como senadores, alcaldes, diputados etc., del 
estado para comunicar las cosas que mi comunidad necesita. 
 
a. Estoy muy de acuerdo b. Estoy en acuerdo    c. No sé 
d. Estoy de desacuerdo e. Estoy muy desacuerdo 
44. Yo tengo conexiones con gente que trabaja para el gobierno del estado. 
 
a. Estoy muy de acuerdo b. Estoy en acuerdo    c. No sé 
d. Estoy de desacuerdo e. Estoy muy desacuerdo 
45. Yo hablo con una universidad que estudia la pesca artesanal. 
a. Estoy muy de acuerdo b. Estoy en acuerdo    c. No sé 
d. Estoy de desacuerdo e. Estoy muy desacuerdo 
46. Yo hablo con los dirigentes de las confederaciones nacionales. 
 
a. Estoy muy de acuerdo b. Estoy en acuerdo    c. No sé 
d. Estoy de desacuerdo e. Estoy muy desacuerdo 
47. Mi asociación tiene un plan para adaptarse si un evento como la marea roja ocurre 
en el futuro. 
a. Estoy muy de acuerdo b. Estoy en acuerdo    c. No sé 
d. Estoy de desacuerdo e. Estoy muy desacuerdo 
48. Me uní a una nueva organización que se formó después de la marea roja en 2016 con 
la esperanza de que pudiera influenciar en las decisiones del gobierno. 
 
a. Estoy muy de acuerdo b. Estoy en acuerdo    c. No sé 
d. Estoy de desacuerdo e. Estoy muy desacuerdo 
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49. Yo puedo cambiar mi trabajo y hacer otra cosa si es necesario. 
a. Estoy muy de acuerdo b. Estoy en acuerdo    c. No sé 
d. Estoy de desacuerdo e. Estoy muy desacuerdo 
50. Cambié mis prácticas de bucear o de recolectar después de la marea roja, como 
también en donde vendo mis productos. 
a. Estoy muy de acuerdo b. Estoy en acuerdo    c. No sé 
d. Estoy de desacuerdo e. Estoy muy desacuerdo 
51. ¿En su opinión, que tipo de recursos o información necesita usted para adaptarse a 
los cambios en el mar? Por favor, escriba abajo: 
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